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Abstract 
 
 
The last decades have been of significant importance for small state studies as 
new small states have been created and many of them have become members of 
an existing or a newly created regional organisation. This investigation introduces 
an innovative model for studying the role of small states in regional organisations. 
It conceptualises small states into region-engaging, region-constraining and 
region-adapting actors, according to their particular type of engagement in 
regional politics. This thesis defines Ecuador and Uruguay as region-engaging 
small states, and argues that elements of a shared collective identity were a major 
factor of influence on the region-engaging character of Ecuador and Uruguay in 
the recent process of constructing the South American Union of Nations 
(UNASUR). Theoretically, the study employs a constructivist approach to 
exploring the reasons why Ecuador and Uruguay have supported the creation and 
consolidation of UNASUR. It takes a cross case-oriented approach based on the 
analysis of documents, political speeches and semi-structured interviews of 
members of the political elite, whilst also considering various historical events 
during the period from 2000 to 2012. Each case study delves into various 
historical events to provide specific foci on elements of a shared collective 
identity, left-oriented ideology, the failure of economic integration projects, the 
overpowering influence of exterior agents, the need for national and regional 
peace, as well as the prospect of leading roles and a new type of political 
cooperation within UNASUR. A significant component of the research concerns 
the shared factors of a South American identity, whereby the use of illustrations 
facilitates the comparison and the understanding of the aspects of identity 
influencing the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay in the consolidation of 
UNASUR. 
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Introduction 
 
Many Eastern-European small states continue to adapt their economic and 
political systems in order to become full members of the European Union, despite 
the fact that Southern European small states such as Greece and Cyprus have 
questioned the appropriateness of European integration following Europe’s 
financial crisis. It is well known that such phenomena involve and affect small 
states to a disproportionate extent. 
 
The cyclical political or economic crisis in one region triggers the interest of 
academics in explaining and understanding such political and economic events, 
and politicians seek practical examples in other regions with the expectation of 
finding political alternatives either in historical explanations, or practical measures 
implemented by other governments in order to resolve similar issues. 
 
While such events have become a challenge to some small states within the 
European Union, which since its origins has had economic integration as its 
motor, the six South American small states, Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, 
Surinam and Uruguay have joined the six relatively larger states, Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela in an integration project that 
prioritises political union as a new type of integration. Hence, it has relied primarily 
on the political will of their governments, that in the name of the twelve South 
American peoples, have decided to, ‘…construct a South American identity and 
citizenship, and develop an integrated regional space in the infrastructural area 
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with regard to political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, energy and 
communicational issues, in order to contribute to the strengthening of the unity of 
Latin America and the Caribbean’ (UNASUR, 2008: Preamble)1. 
  
In the process of the construction and consolidation of this newly created South 
American international organisation, some states have played a more prominent 
role than others. Researches have mainly focused on the role of relatively bigger 
states, in order to explain the role and the possible ambitions of regional and 
rising powers in the international context of the twenty-first century (Bernabé, 
2012; Caballero, 2011; Gardini, 2011a; Poggio, 2011; Malamud, 2011; Sanahuja, 
2010; Seabra, 2010; Freitas, 2007; Burges, 2007). 
 
However, very few studies have analysed the role of small states and their 
reasons behind their engagement, despite the fact that the South American small 
states have also been involved in this South American regional integration project 
throughout the whole process. 
  
This investigation therefore analyses the region-engaging character of Ecuador 
and Uruguay in the context of the process of creating and consolidating the South 
American Union of Nations (UNASUR). It develops an innovative model to look at 
the role of small states in international organisations and provides the answers to 
the question, why have Ecuador and Uruguay supported the creation and 
consolidation of UNASUR? 
                                                          
1 The  provided translation of direct citations are only those steeming from primary sources. These 
translations have been made by the author of this investigation and the original cited texts are collated in 
Appendix 4. 
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The UNASUR is the main political pillar of the South American region, whose 
period of creation can be traced back to the first meeting of South American 
heads of state and government in Brasilia in September 2000 (Sanahuja, 2010). 
Hence, this study includes the analysis of historical events from the period of the 
appearance and expansion of the Initiative for the Regional Integration of South 
America (IIRSA) in 2000, and the foundation of the South American Community of 
Nations (CSN) in 2004, as predecessors of UNASUR. 
 
The period of formal consolidation of UNASUR spreads from 2008, the year of the 
signature of its treaty, to 2012, when sanctions were imposed for the first time by 
UNASUR on a member state, Paraguay. This measure taken by UNASUR acts as 
a minimum indicator of the degree of its consolidation as a further influential actor 
of regional politics. 
 
The study was initially inspired by the fact that these two South American small 
states, Ecuador and Uruguay made substantial contributions to the consolidation 
of this South American regional international organisation while the investigation 
was being planned. 
 
On the one hand, Ecuador, as President Pro Tempore of UNASUR 2009-2010, 
and as depositary of the instruments for the legal international recognition of 
UNASUR as a norm-binding organisation of states, campaigned for, and obtained, 
the ratification of six member states until the end of its period in November 2010. 
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On the other hand, the ratification of the UNASUR treaty by Uruguay made it 
possible for this organisation to begin to consolidate in December 2010. The 
Uruguayan decision to submit the ratification of the treaty fulfilled the required 
ninth instrument for legal international recognition of UNASUR, and legally bound 
all South American states in a political union during a regional crisis that provoked 
scepticism about UNASUR’s consolidation. This fundamental step showed that 
South America was consolidating as a socio-politically organised region. 
  
The second motivation for this study was the transformation of the behaviour of 
small states in the context of international cooperation, owing to the fact that most 
states supported economic international cooperation as a mechanism of 
integration, and all of them were involved in the negotiations for the creation of the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) which were driven by the USA from the 
beginning of the 1990s. However, this project failed after the withdrawal of support 
by most South American states, including Ecuador and Uruguay, during the 
negotiations for the creation of UNASUR. 
 
The first contacts with documents of the regular meetings of the South American 
presidents within the framework of the IIRSA, CSN and the UNASUR treaty 
enabled the identification of theoretical links to the social constructivist 
perspective for the study of international relations, which conceives international 
relations as a socially constructed reality, and became the general theoretical 
guide to understand these political events as further clarified in chapter two.  
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The insights gained through feedback of data and theory also enabled the 
formulation of the following specific question: has identity influenced the decision-
making process of these small states in the process of creating and strengthening 
UNASUR? 
 
The dominant approaches in the study of the behaviour of small states in the 
context of region construction suggest that there is a causal relationship between 
being a small state and lacking power, if power is considered as the material 
capability of small states. In that case, supporting processes of integration as 
region construction would endow small states with sources of power and elements 
of influence on international politics (Geurts, 1998; Hänggi, 1998; Wivel, 2005; 
Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010; Bizzozero, 2008, 2010). 
For that reason, these studies also consider small states as individualists, free 
riders, competitors and internationally material-oriented political actors. 
 
According to the approaches supporting these views Ecuador and Uruguay would 
have been likely to benefit from supporting the Free Trade Area of the Americas 
(FTAA) project, driven by the United States of America (USA), as this would have 
meant more possibilities for competition, and for example, that Ecuador and 
Uruguay would by this means have had assured access to the strongest market 
on the continent, and perhaps to security through a partnership with the leading 
world power, the USA. Similarly, they would have been able to freely trade with 
middle powers such as Mexico and Argentina, or with emerging powers such as 
Brazil. 
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Instead, the South American small states supported the creation of UNASUR, a 
regional political organisation that supports cooperation and coordination between 
national public policies and the consolidation of South American citizenship and 
identity, pushing commercial integration into the background. 
 
This suggested, at the beginning of this study, that theoretical perspectives that 
explain this process of integration on the basis of commercial cooperation and 
power relationships were not the most appropriate theoretical tools to use as a 
guide for understanding the role of small states in the process of the creation of 
the South American region. 
 
Therefore, this study has also borrowed constructivist theoretical ideas to explain 
emerging regions in the form of security communities, as developed by Adler and 
Barnett (1998), in order to understand the complexity of the rise of South America 
as a region through the creation of UNASUR and the engagement of small states 
in this process. 
 
In this context, the South American small states have played an international role 
that demanded clarification. Constructivist views of role theory developed by 
Nabers (2011) have been used as further elements to construct a conceptual 
framework as a guide for the understanding the role of Ecuador and Uruguay in 
the process of consolidating UNASUR. 
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The Importance of Studying South American Small States in 
the Construction of the South American Region  
 
International Relations (IR)2, as a discipline that subsumes small state studies, 
has not produced sufficient literature compared with the increasing number of 
small states and their important political value in international relations both 
regionally and globally. The reasons for the underproduction of investigations in 
this field vary, from the supremacy given to realist approaches and therefore to 
research on great powers (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006), and to the disagreement 
about a ‘common research agenda’ regarding small state studies (Steinmetz and 
Wivel, 2010: 8). 
 
With that in mind, this study aims to contribute to the enrichment and development 
of the literature in the area of small state studies by introducing new insights 
regarding the actions of small states of the South American region in its process 
of integration. 
 
Moreover, studies of small states within the discipline of International Relations 
have been conducted employing mainly (neo) realist- and (neo) liberal- theoretical 
frameworks, which due to their nature tend to underestimate the role of small 
states in international politics, converting the study and theorisation of small states 
within the discipline of International Relations to an under-valued field of research. 
Katzenstein (2003) points out that the leading authorities in the study of 
                                                          
2 This investigation refers to International Relations (IR)  as the discipline of study and international 
relations as the relations of a state with other states. Moreover, the terms small nation, small state, small 
country or small power are used to mean the nation-state as the primary unit of international relations.   
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international relations once tended to share the view that ‘since nobody cares 
about small states why waste so much time writing about them?’ (p.10). Probably, 
this has also contributed to undermine the importance of studying South American 
small states in the international context. 
 
In fact, small state studies as a sub-field of the discipline of International Relations 
is not well represented and adopted across regions. Small state studies is 
underrepresented within the European academic environment and limited within 
the South American region. Tickner’s (2009) study of the situation of the discipline 
of International Relations in Latin America demonstrates that from 1012 academic 
articles published in six prominent journals of International Relations of Latin 
America, the theme ‘small state’ does not appear at all as a subfield of 
International Relations or as a research theme in the South American region. 
 
In the light of that, this study also aims to strengthen the field of small state 
studies by presenting new insights into the role of small states from a non-
European region. This presentation of new insights into the role of small states in 
the formation of a regional international organisation in the South American 
region, and to the development of its political institutions, will contribute to the 
further development of the field and open its theoretical debates to a wider 
geographical area. 
 
South American small states have traditionally been involved in the construction 
and transformation of the region. At the sub-regional level Ecuador and Bolivia are 
founder member states of the Andean Community (CAN), and Uruguay and 
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Paraguay have been involved in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) 
since its creation. 
 
These states have also been members of the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI) throughout its history, as well as members of the 
Organisation of American States (OAS). In addition, their membership of global 
international organisations such as the United Nations (UN) offers them the 
possibility of influencing the shape of international policies by supporting each 
other in the debates about international matters and decision-making processes in 
order to put forward their projects and interests (Waltz, 2001; Wivel, 2005). 
 
Their recent commitment to the South American Community of Nations (CSN) and 
their support for its transformation into UNASUR, and UNASUR’s subsequent 
consolidation affirms these South American states as inspiring case studies that 
can help to understand the importance of small states in emerging regions.  
 
This is particularly important as most South American small states are older 
political unities than many European small states. The main global conflicts of the 
twentieth century such as the two world wars and the Cold War did not impact in 
the same way on the societies of the American continent, or on its political map, 
as they did on Europe. 
 
In South America, only two states, Guyana and Surinam, were created in the 
twentieth century, and the old small states, notably Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay 
and Uruguay, have maintained their sovereign status since their creation in the 
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1820s and 1830s. Hence, South American small states seem to have developed a 
local approach, both to their role in international organisations, and to regionalism, 
whose study with the old theoretical tools developed within the European 
academic environment could be inappropriate (Dabène, 2009). 
 
The rise of constructivist approaches has made a significant impact on most of the 
subfields of IR and can be a useful tool to analyse the international events driven 
by small states. For that reason, this study expects also to contribute to the 
theoretical debates of International Relations by probing the wider applicability of 
the explanatory character of theoretical approaches informed by social 
constructivism in the sub-field of small state studies. 
 
Finally, academic studies in English about small states from non-European 
regions, in particular about South American small states, are still 
underrepresented within the discipline of International Relations. There are only a 
few examples of studies concerning small states from non-European regions, 
compared with the large quantity of academic articles and books about larger 
states. 
 
By presenting new, important case studies about small states from the South 
American region, this study aims to facilitate the task of scholars and students 
with new data and information gathered and distilled here, contributing to the 
construction of a more accurate notion of the international political role of small 
states worldwide. 
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Structure of this Study 
 
The study is organised into five major chapters and a short conclusion chapter. 
The first chapter analyses the secondary literature on small states and seeks to 
identify the roles and patterns of behaviour of small states as international actors 
in international politics generally, and more specifically in the construction of 
regions. This chapter also reviews the literature about the development of small 
state studies as an area of study, and indicates the approaches to studying small 
states in regional integration processes in Europe and South America. 
  
The second chapter further clarifies the concepts that form the basis for the 
development of this investigation and presents an emerging conceptual 
framework that guides the two case studies, Ecuador and Uruguay, in the 
formation and consolidation of UNASUR. It employs an inductive approach to 
construct this framework on the basis of insights obtained from the data, relating 
them to social constructivist principles to study international relations, rising 
regions as security communities and role theory, as mentioned above. The final 
part of this chapter also describes the case study methodology as well as the 
methods employed for gathering and analysing the qualitative data that form the 
basis for this study. 
 
The third chapter presents the insights obtained through the empirical case study 
of Ecuador as an international political actor in the construction of UNASUR. It 
focuses on six factors identified as significant influences for the Ecuadorian 
support for the creation and consolidation of UNASUR. These include the 
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domestic political situation, the influence of the major external agents such as the 
USA, Colombia and Peru; the disenchantment of Ecuador with the Andean 
Community of Nations (CAN), the influence of ideology of the governing powers, 
the links of national with regional identity, and the enactment of international roles 
within UNASUR. 
 
The fourth chapter outlines the main insights into the region-engaging character of 
Uruguay obtained through the empirical case study of this small South American 
state. It uses similar approaches to the study of Ecuador, taking into account the 
Uruguayan particularities. It focuses on the domestic political situation, the 
influence of the major external agents such as the USA, Brazil and Argentina, the 
Uruguayan discontentment with MERCOSUR and ALADI, the influence of the 
ideology of the governing powers, the links between national with regional identity, 
and the enactment of international roles within the UNASUR. 
 
The fifth chapter contrasts and discusses the outcomes of the two empirical case 
studies, as suggested by the cross-case analysis method in Miles and Huberman 
(1994). It illustrates the main similarities and differences between the two case 
studies, focusing on four main themes: the national situation of these small states, 
the idea of a new type of cooperation, the factors of identity as the study’s 
explanatory guide, and the importance of the enactment of international roles for 
small states, focusing on the role of member and on the significance of playing the 
role of President Pro Tempore. 
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The conclusion chapter summarises the main insights obtained throughout this 
study, and evaluates the conceptual framework and the methodology in order to 
propose suggestions for further studies. 
 Chapter 1: Small States, Followers or Constructors of 
Regions? A Literature Review 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The role played by small states in the formation of regions is related to their 
motivations and the reasons for their given support to projects of region 
construction. Exploring the literature on small states and understanding the 
explanations given by scholars about such factors are of importance for this study, 
since this can help identify possible answers to the question as to why small 
states would support the formation of regions. 
 
This chapter’s first aim is to highlight the theoretical development of the study of 
small states as a sub-field of International Relations, on the basis of the question: 
are small states ‘followers’ or ‘constructors of regions’? It aims to identify the 
theoretical approaches that in general terms have driven the study of small states 
within IR. 
 
Secondly, it looks at various positions of the literature regarding the engagement 
of small states in the construction of regions. Here, the aim is to single out 
theoretical frameworks or concepts that can inform an analysis of the part played 
by Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction of UNASUR, despite the fact that the 
literature studied is predominantly European and North American IR publications.  
Thirdly, it studies some literature on small states in Latin and South America. This 
aims to understand the academic situation of small state studies as a sub-field of 
IR in South America, as well as the South American perspective about small 
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states as international actors in the construction of regions. Finally, I summarise 
the chapter’s conclusions and suggest further insights regarding the engagement 
of small states in the construction of regions. 
 
1.2 Small State Studies within International Relations 
  
In the first years of the development of ‘realist’ thinking in the study of international 
relations, the conventional analysis portrayed the small state as an insignificant 
element of the international system within an overall classification of states as 
world powers, middle powers and small powers. 
 
States were then considered ‘small’, if they lacked real military power. It was 
assumed that without military power a small state was in constant danger of 
disappearing and its destiny was outside its control, contingent upon the strategic 
interest of big powers (Wolfers, 1945; Morgenthau, 1948). 
 
However, a study conducted by Baker (1959) demonstrated that some small 
states develop alternative approaches in order to survive as a political unit and to 
manage pressure imposed on them by stronger, external forces. Baker (1959) 
was intrigued by the ways in which Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, Eire and 
Portugal managed to avoid being directly involved in the Second World War. 
Hence, she wanted to find out the methods used by small states to resist pressure 
imposed by bigger powers in the extreme case of war, and she found 
unexpectedly that small states’ diplomacy could sometimes outweigh the strength 
of bigger powers (ibid). 
16 
 
 
Baker’s (1959) work has consequently triggered important academic debates 
within IR such as the need to formulate a theory which designates the small state 
as a unit of analysis, and create a corresponding methodology to define the small 
state. Within the realist school the main concept under debate, when analytically 
classifying and defining small states, has been the concept of smallness with 
reference to the states’ material capabilities and its power (Vital, 1967; Handel, 
1990; Väyrynen, 1983, 1997; Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010). 
 
Scholars have further developed the idea of an area of studies within IR that 
concentrates mainly on the study of small states in the context of international 
relations by employing arguments particular to small states, suggesting that such 
states are confronted with different issues, may have different interests, and might 
be equipped with different resources than their fellow larger states (ibid). 
 
The growth of further approaches to the study of international relations in the 
1950s and 1960s, such as liberalism, economic structuralism and 
transactionalism that challenged classical realism, appear to have confused the 
original idea of developing a general theory that helps explain the actions and 
inactions of the small state internationally. 
 
Instead, most research in the area has focused on the study of small states on the 
basis of the main theoretical perspectives of IR. Consequently, small state studies 
have developed into a jumbled puzzle of theoretical ideas and empirical studies 
from various origins lacking a convincing argument that holds it all together. 
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For instance, Vital (1967, 1971a, 1971b) develops an explanation for the survival 
of the small state as an isolated independent state that cannot integrate or merge 
voluntarily with another in order to withstand war, and consequently withstand 
external stress and preserve national unity, because hostilities prevent this. 
 
He exemplified Israel, Cambodia and Finland, and argues that small states which 
are at war would fall into the prescribed category of a politically independent 
nation. In the last analysis, a greater power may use its superiority to force the 
weaker states to submit. He concludes that when studying small states, it is 
preferable to define a small state more loosely, and suggests criteria in his study. 
 
Väyrynen (1983) summarised the following definitions of the small state identified 
by authors within the security concept of ‘balance of power’ as either: 
 An ally of a big power or of a plurality of rival states 
  A protectorate of a big power 
 An unattractive/hiding/non-aligned state irrelevant to any big power’s 
strategic interest (p. 88). 
Realist theories, the dominant explanatory tool of the behaviour of small states in 
security studies, adopted this conceptual order. 
 
Furthermore, the fear of an imminent war positioned by the discourse of the Cold 
War very likely influenced the empirical study of small states until well beyond the 
Cold War’s end, and strengthened the proposition that small states lack hard 
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power, and that therefore their survival depends on a big world power or on a 
security community. 
 
For instance, empirical studies about the economic, political and military 
vulnerability and concerns of 31 small states of the Commonwealth reported by 
the Commonwealth Secretariat (1997) suggest that analysis conducted since 
1985 was based on the theoretical assumptions of the imminent presence of war 
due to the military offensive of Grenada by the USA in 1983.  
 
Scholars from different areas of the study within IR used a combination of different 
disciplines in order to incorporate other factors and dimensions of the small state 
in their theoretical explanations (Rothstein, 1968; Keohane, 1969; Singer, 1972). 
For instance, Singer (1972) based his work on a combination of political science, 
economy, psychology, sociology and communication theory to explain the role of 
small states in the international environment dominated by big powers. 
 
Here, Singer (1972) focuses in the first and fourth chapters of his study on the 
need to explain the importance of social elements such as the role of 
communication and language, the identity of groups, and the contribution of 
historical and ideological elements, among others, for his understanding of small 
states in their role in international politics. And he suggests that such factors 
should also be considered as elements of the power of states as they impact on 
the behaviour and relationships of others (ibid). 
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However, the fact that small states interact with various international actors such 
as governmental and non-governmental organisations, have human and natural 
resources, and have acquired new technology, including the possibility of 
developing nuclear weapons, has further diffused the ideas about the main factors 
that should be considered when classifying and studying small states. 
 
Moreover, the quantitative dimension of power, the categorisation and definition of 
small states based on their size in relation to their hard power and material 
capabilities which dominated in the aforementioned approaches has been 
criticised by authors such as De Russett (1954), Vandebosch (1964), Wilcox 
(1967), Goetschel (1998), Hey (2003), and Rostoks (2010) throughout the 
development of this area of study. 
 
They have questioned the reliability of such methodology, based as it is on the 
quantification of power. They point out that qualitative factors such as level of 
education, political culture, social cohesion, membership in international 
organisations, and the uncertainty of the international system could also be 
included as sources of power (ibid). 
 
A further perspective regarding the study of small states in international politics 
has been developed by economic structuralists, institutionalist and neo-liberal 
thinkers. For instance, researchers such as Santos (1983), Katzenstein (1985) 
and Hey (1993, 1995a) analysed the small state from the perspective of the 
economic structuralist or globalist, and neo-liberalist approach. They take into 
account mainly the economic factors, and the capacity of small states to act either 
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relation to a big power (Hey, 1993, 1995, 1995a), within a constraining economic 
structure (Santos, 1983), or within a liberalised international market of democratic 
systems (Kantzenstein, 1985).  
 
According to these scholars, small states are small in terms of their economic 
capability. Small states at the periphery are exposed to dominance and 
interference at all levels of the state by the core or economically stronger states. It 
follows that core states would support the imposition of economic liberal and 
neoliberal measures within small states, to weaken them and avoid the 
transformation of economic production worldwide (Santos, 1983). 
 
On the other hand, Katzenstein (1985) has suggested that the economic 
dominance of stronger powers has also affected industrialised European small 
states. His study concentrates on the possible outcomes for Switzerland, Sweden, 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark by the application by these small states of 
corporate democratic measures as a mechanism to counter the pressure of 
competition with external economic forces driven by developments of the global 
economy. 
 
His study suggests that democratic corporatism between those states has allowed 
them to resist the dominant contradictions of international market competition by 
accommodating each other’s needs and ‘including all significant actors in the 
decision-making process’ (ibid, p. 192). 
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From a different perspective, but still centred on the structural approach, 
Fernández (2012) based the study of his native small state Uruguay on the 
theoretical premises of the neo-realist Kenneth Waltz to analyse Uruguay’s 
foreign policy from 2010 to 2012 within the framework of MERCOSUR. His 
emphasis on the behaviour of Uruguay as a small state within MERCOSUR 
shows the restriction imposed on small states by the system, since two bigger 
powers, Brazil and Argentina, dominate the system to maintain stability. 
 
This perspective allows him to agree with neo-realist explanations regarding the 
domination by big powers within a structure. The small state is supposed to have 
minimal possibilities of influencing the politics and determining the changes within 
such a system, as it is argued that small states do not have sufficient power to do 
this. So, small states are trapped within the power of the structure, or that of the 
dominant powers, in a condition of dependency whereby the nation-state 
continues in its individualist fashion to seek strategies to ensure its own survival 
(Waltz, 1979). 
 
However, Fernández’ (2012) thinking has its limitations. He couches his 
arguments in terms of the following: the international system, balance of power, 
Uruguay’s political system, its developmental strategy, and its resources and 
national capabilities. In the first place, he avoids the acknowledgement that neo-
realism theory failed to explain the end of the Cold War, the downfall of the Soviet 
Union into many small states, and the outbreak of war between the different 
ethnic groups of ex-Yugoslavia. 
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Secondly, there are other factors that may have influenced the behaviour of the 
country as a whole such as the ideological affinity between the governments of 
Kirchner, Lugo, and Mujica. In addition, all were Spanish speakers, were from a 
left-oriented government and from countries with a shared history and shared 
cultures. Hence, the abilities of small state’s population and the quality of their 
self-identification (ignored by most neo-realist theories but highlighted by 
constructivist approaches) are important elements which should be considered 
when studying a state in International Relations.    
 
These social elements, dismissed by neo-realism, became important factors in the 
theorisation of the study of the behaviour of small states in the 1990s, which had 
the aim of understanding the foreign policies of European small states. Goetschel 
(1998) developed a theoretical proposal to explain the changing role of a small 
state caught in the security dilemma of ‘influence or autonomy’. Here, ‘influence’ 
means not only the ability to affect the direction of politics, but also to resist 
exterior pressure, and ‘autonomy’ means the aspiration to have more freedom 
from international regulations and commitments with a bilateral or multilateral 
basis (p. 17-19). 
 
Goetschel (1998) starts highlighting many inaccuracies in the application of realist 
theoreticians’ outdated methodologies. For instance, military power and the size 
of the economy do not completely reflect the power of a state, since international 
war is not at the moment the major danger for the existence of the Western 
European small state. Instead, the identity of small states currently plays an 
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important role in making decisions regarding security (ibid). This is plausible also 
within the South American region in the twenty-first century. 
 
As a consequence, he points out, the behaviour of small states in this new 
international environment should no longer be measured with the old tools, 
particularly, with those used by realist theoreticians, since old conceptions of 
‘power’ are no longer applicable in the present international environment, given 
the changed rules and norms constraining the behaviour of most states, both 
small and large (ibid). 
 
The challenge to the orthodox methodology of neo-realism in IR originated also in 
various theoretical perspectives within small state studies in the post- Cold War 
period. For instance, Elman (1995) based her theoretical framework on the theory 
of domestic politics and explains the formation of small states’ foreign policies 
through pressure exercised by societal groups internally and the social effects of 
the application of such policies by the state apparatus. Here, she uses historical 
institutionalism (ibid, p.180) to situate the design of small states’ foreign policy 
within the constraints of exogenous forces, which can also be influenced by 
domestic policies of the small state. 
 
The rise of such theoretical developments and the influence of social 
constructivism on the study of international relations are likely to have transformed 
small state studies by offering new perspectives to studying political phenomena 
related to small states, which realist and liberalist approaches undermined. 
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For instance, Sheffer (1997) and Møller (1997) note the importance of 
constructivism to help define a small ethnic state and understand ethnicity in the 
formation of new nations within the anarchic environment of Eastern Europe that 
emerged as result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 
Sheffer’s (1997) investigation claims that some small states that throughout the 
history of the twentieth century have been created on the basis of ethnicity are the 
most vulnerable to external threats from hegemonic global or regional powers, as 
the small ethnic state has not consolidated its territorial and economic sovereignty 
or its autonomy in the making of national policies. 
 
The ethnic identity of a state and a maximum population of 15 million are the 
conditions to define a small ethnic state, according to Sheffer’s (1997) study. This 
uses a three perspective framework; global ecological; regional circumstances 
and activities; and internal developments. 
 
However, the references made are not only to small ethnic states as 
internationally recognised sovereign unitary nation-states, but include ethnic 
groups found within a federal-state within a nation-state. This would include 
Chiapas, in Mexico, or the position of Kurdish people within a central national 
state. By definition these do not have the degree of autonomy necessary for 
international influence independently of the central government’s agreement. 
An important insight of this analysis is that small ethnic states are mainly exposed 
to internal threats. This raises the question of why such states based on 
ethnicities present this problem. Within the present study, the case of Ecuador 
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comprises a high number of ethnic groups and a high level of political instability, 
which may both be linked and therefore need both to be taken into consideration. 
 
Hey (2003) avoids adhering to any particular theoretical perspective in order to 
assemble new ideas into her definition of small states. Her theoretical introduction 
develops a three-level analysis framework (individual, state and system) for a 
series of empirical single case studies of the foreign policy and global 
engagement of  Paraguay, English-speaking Caribbean states, Panamá, 
Luxembourg, Austria, Gambia, Jordan, and Laos. 
 
She proposes that a state can be considered as small ‘if a state’s people and 
institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other states’ people 
and institutions perceive that state as small’ (p. 3). She concludes that there are 
three main factors restricting the actions of small states in international relations, 
these are: the influence of international structures which are stronger in less 
developed countries; the level of development of the society (the diplomacy of 
less developed countries tends to be less consistent and more influenced by 
individual governmental leaders); and that less developed small states are likely 
to have regime security as their foreign policy, being more dependent on credits 
from international financial institutions. 
 
As a theoretical contribution, she concludes that most small states would pursue 
regional engagement in their foreign policy agenda and that governmental leaders 
would engage in foreign affairs ‘relatively unfettered by domestic groups’ (p. 194). 
 
26 
 
These two theses have been taken into account in the design of the present 
study. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, the central analytical focus 
is upon Ecuador and Uruguay, treating each as a discrete example of the small 
states, and using agents close to the central state as source of information for this 
study. Secondly, it aims to analyse the engagement of small states in the 
construction of UNASUR. This includes the context of international regionalism or 
integration that according to Hey (2003) appears to be one of the most relevant 
areas of engagement in the foreign affairs of small states. 
 
In conclusion, this review of the literature has shown that first, there is neither a 
generally accepted definition of small state nor an agreement on the factors that 
would be the fundamentals of small state studies. There is a pressing need for an 
agreed set of variables to form the core theoretical elements of this area of study.  
 
Secondly, the literature review has also shown that there are very few studies that 
refer to theoretical ideas originating in Latin or South America, although the 
majority of Latin American states and at least half of the South American states 
could be categorised as small states. This phenomenon might be related to the 
late introduction of International Relations in academic research in South America 
and the low availability of academic programmes within Latin American academia 
as shown by Tickner (2009). 
 
Therefore, this area of study requires expansion and the positioning of itself 
internationally as an operational field of IR study within new regions, as in this way 
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small state studies can make a further contribution to the strengthening of IR 
internationally. 
 
Finally, there are few theoretical frameworks using social constructivist theory to 
study international relations. This study also aims to strengthen constructivism in 
the study of small studies within IR by employing constructivist ideas in its 
analysis. 
 
1.3 The Study of Small States as International Political Agents within 
Regions 
 
Some regional international organisations or international systems can be 
considered as processes of integration whose objectives shape the type of 
organisation and direct the dynamics of international relations. The economic, the 
political as well as the military environment at the time of their creation have 
probably influenced their institutional setting, but the institutions have been 
exposed to transformations. 
 
For instance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was studied by 
Deutsch (1957,1968) as the path to integration and formation of security 
communities. Therefore, and in order to avoid confusion, this section does not 
limit itself to investigations that look at a particular region and or regional 
integration within a conceived geographical area. This section reviews some 
research that can help to develop an understanding of the engagement of small 
states in regions and international organisations worldwide. 
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One character of small states within regions highlighted by the majority of the 
surveyed studies is that small states tend to be region-engaging. This means that 
they tend to voluntarily sign and ratify regional multilateral agreements, organise 
and attend regionally related meetings, among others as suggested in chapter 
two. 
 
Some researchers see the constant creation of new small states and their 
membership in an internationally regulated system as a favourable international 
development for their survival. For example, Goetschel (1998), Hey (2003), and  
Steinmetz and Wivel (2010) suggest that the membership of small states in 
regional or global organisations does not make them less vulnerable, but their 
existence appears to be more protected. 
 
Other scholars propose that international organisations are important sources of 
influence on the international political development of small states. In this sense, 
there is an evident increase in the importance of international organisations as 
well as the role of small states in such organisations (Neumann and Gstöhl, 2006; 
Geurts, 1998; Hänggi, 1998). 
  
For other scholars, such as Barston (1971), Jacquet (1971), and Hirsch (1983), 
international organisations and integration processes have historically been the 
principal international political environment within which small states have been 
able to express their national interests, and to portray their identity and influence 
in regional and global international politics. International organisations are small 
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states’ principal sources of international political influence (ibid). Hence, the likely 
motives for small states to engage in regional organisations are to ensure their 
survival, to enhance their international influential power and to internationally 
position their national identity.  
  
Another view of the motives for action of small states in international organisations 
was voiced before the end of the Second World War. For instance, Marriot (1943) 
employs a historical approach to argue that the way to preserve the small state is 
in a federal system. 
 
Here, he considers small states as a fundamental element of the world 
community, historically conceived among a variety of states as further members of 
the world community and contributors to the world culture. Diplomatic and 
historical cultural elements of small states were considered as important sources 
of world culture and co-makers of the civilisation and as a fundamental element of 
the world community (Fisher, 1914; Marriot, 1943). 
 
The engagement of small states in international organisations is seen by these 
authors as for the purpose of contributing internationally instead of as merely self-
interested acts. Hence, they could be considered as constructors rather than 
followers. 
 
Following the Second World War and until the end of the Cold War, the main 
concerns of researchers of small states within regional international organisations 
appears to be the imposition of a dominant realist approach to defining power in 
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order to favour the arguments of big powers for a redistribution of political power 
within international organisations. For instance, Hirsch (1983) considers 
Luxembourg as his case study within the European Economic Community (EEC) 
applying the theory of dependence as his framework and suggests that ‘the right 
to invoke a national interest is increasingly denied to the small state, especially if 
such interests collide with those of more powerful countries’ (p.130). 
 
Hence, small states tend to support and strengthen supranational organisations, 
since they might consider prioritising mechanisms which would represent the 
collective interest of the member states, rather than the interest of the stronger 
state (ibid). 
 
However, international institutions as agents of integration processes are not 
always structured as a supra-national organisation, and they are exposed to 
changes according to circumstances and the international political environment. 
For instance, the number of European commissioners in the European Union has 
constantly changed according to the number of new member states. Hence, new 
forces for negotiation may reduce the possibility of influence of the single small 
state in an environment of competition and egoism. 
 
Despite this, Geurts (1998) and Kuosmanen (1998) agree that such institutions 
are important sources of power and influence for European small states in the 
shaping of European policies. They apply an institutional framework to investigate 
the role of the European Commission (Geurts,1998) as an actor and ally of small 
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states, and the role of the Council of the EU  (Kuosmanen,1998) in the decision-
making process. 
  
In this context, the new concerns of small states in the twenty-first century appear 
to be related to the appropriate ways of working together within existing 
international institutions to influence their collective policies which allow them to 
tackle shared problems. For instance, Lee (2009) suggests that the new setting of 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has allowed small states to collectively block 
multilateral agreements when these would solely reflect the interest of the 
dominant states. 
   
The questions regarding this are: can we continue analysing new social and 
political international phenomena with the old theoretical tools? Could theorists 
still justify the self-oriented behaviour of the states? Or is this a particular 
characteristic of the small state? It is evident that the role of small states within 
international organisations has changed in the course of the last few decades and 
the academic response to these challenges has been widely discussed. 
 
For example, for Lewis (2009) the present international situation has not 
completely eliminated the fears of domination of small states by bigger 
neighbouring powers, but this period of stability and peace for small states has 
favoured the integration between them and/or with larger entities. For him, there is 
instead a clear instability of international systems as they are constantly 
appearing and disappearing (ibid). 
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This suggests that an international system may not be static and the role of small 
states in international organisations and region formation could be changeable. 
International systems are exposed to change, which takes place in a process that 
could be either long or short. Therefore, Lewis (2009) suggests that the analysis 
of the role of small states within international systems or international processes 
requires the adaptation of theoretical tools to the type of international system and 
to the international environment of the small states being investigated. 
 
This academic requirement can be understood by reviewing Erikson (2009), 
Cooper (2009), and Vlcek (2009). All three case studies involve small states in the 
Caribbean within different international systems such as the WTO, OECD and the 
OAS. 
 
Therefore, each case is presented within a geographical international environment 
based on a similar geographical premise that the geopolitical location of the state 
is important. Although all three case studies refer to a small state’s problem within 
an international system, all of them differ on the theoretical fundamentals as they 
have been adapted according to the nature of the state, the theme of study and 
the international organisation concerned. 
 
A further example of such flexibility and adaptation of various theoretical 
frameworks could be seen in Steinmetz and Wivel (2010). They illustrate the 
present challenges and opportunities that influence small states’ policy-making 
within the framework of the EU and at the same time contribute to the theoretical 
development of the field. The main focus of these studies is the projection of the 
33 
 
influence of small states on policy-making (ibid). However, these studies evade 
providing an answer to the following question: how would such policies affect the 
domestic politics of the small member state? 
 
The transition of the old small states’ foreign policy of ‘hiding’ to the present 
foreign policy of ‘binding’ reveals the importance of the new role of European 
small states in the present international systems (Steinmetz & Wivel, 2010). On 
the one hand, the ‘hiding’ strategy that suggests the inaction and unnoticed 
behaviour of the small state implies neither a follower’s nor a constructor’s trait. 
On the other hand, the ‘binding’ strategy suggests an intentional action of small 
states in regions. Hence, it implies a constructors’ trait. 
 
Moreover, the influential forces of bigger states which influence the behaviour of 
small states within the institutionalised set of norms, rules and procedures of EU 
policy-making may have not disappeared. In this sense, the unchallenged 
acceptance of regional policies directed by bigger states would show a tendency 
of small states towards becoming ‘followers’. 
 
However, European small states in the EU do not depend on their ability to remain 
undiscovered, nor do they submissively accept the impositions of bigger states. 
On the contrary, Steinmetz and Wivel (2010), and Wivel (2010) indicate that 
European small states actively attempt to include larger states in their collective 
projects. In this sense they can be considered as constructors of regions. 
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A further relevant insight into the role of small states in regions is shown in 
Baillie’s (1998) study regarding Luxembourg. The actor-centred institutionalist 
framework suggested by Baillie (1998) uses three hypothetical principles that 
have a constructivist background. These are the historical context of the state of 
Luxembourg as a case study in relation to the formation of the institutions of the 
European Union; the institutional explanations which contain the collective norms, 
procedures of negotiation and rules shaping the behaviour of the states and 
determining the outcomes of international relations; and the actor-centred 
explanations which are based on various bargaining strategies (Baillie, 1998). 
 
The geographical position and the variables of the international projection of a 
particular small state may make Baillie’s (1998) framework workable in the case of 
Luxembourg, but might be difficult to apply generally in the case of all small 
states.  
 
Nevertheless, these ideas need to be taken into account in the cases of Ecuador 
and Uruguay, as both South American small states are geographically situated 
between larger states in a salient geopolitical and geostrategic position, as they 
both have direct access to the exterior through the ocean and to the interior 
through the main continental rivers. 
 
Relevant further factors have been confirmed as the motivations of small 
candidate states to become members of an established international regional 
organisation.  Šabič and Brglez (2000) and Nugent (2006) affirm that Slovenia’s 
and Cyprus’s drive to become a member of the EU were politically and 
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economically influenced, that is to say, politically to affect EU policies and 
economically to become part of a large market. 
 
In Šabič and Brglez’s (2000) case study on Slovenia, the transformation of both 
the national identity and the political system in order to become a member of the 
EU as seen in the discourse of political actors is analysed. The authors 
problematise the formation and strengthening of the national Slovenian identity 
questioning its place in the construction of a European identity. Smallness 
becomes an independent variable to explain the identity formation of a small 
state. 
 
Šabič and Brglez’s (2000) interest is to find out if smallness could be an influential 
factor in the formation of the Slovenian national identity as a contra-factual 
condition to the formation of the European identity by analysing the actors and 
institutions of the country. They consider that this can influence the perception of 
the national identities such as elites, media and public opinion. 
 
Smallness as an independent variable for the formation of the national-identity 
was regarded as unconvincing in their results (ibid). The fact that national 
identities are shaped by strong symbolic, historical, linguistic and ethnic elements, 
among others, may be a reason for the perception of the low value of ‘smallness’ 
as an identity factor. But perhaps, smallness as part of the identity of a nation 
could be considered as one factor within many factors shaping national identity.  
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The studies of Ecuador and Uruguay are also based on similar ideas regarding 
identity formation. A regional feeling of South American identity might help explain 
the engagement of these small states in the construction of UNASUR. 
 
Nevertheless, one evident phenomenon for the formation of national identity  
highlighted in Šabič and Brglez’s (2000) study is that the discourse of a small 
state as a candidate to become a member of a regional organisation and regional 
identity triggers debate and causes tension between the feeling of national-identity 
and those of regional identity. 
 
On the other hand, Nugent (2006) highlights two fundamental characteristics that 
have been theorised and presented as shared elements of the behaviour and self-
perception of small states as well as of other states’ behaviour towards them and 
perceptions of them in international relations and therefore within regional 
organisations. 
 
Nugent’s (2006) work also assures us that in the case of Cyprus a third motivation 
or variable should be considered, notably the factor of security, as the Cypriot 
problem of national security has dominated the foreign policy of the country.  
 
However, the factors presented as Cyprus’ reasons for adapting in order to 
become a member of the EU have been described as stemming from the lack of 
political, economic and security influence associated with quantitatively defined 
‘smallness’ (ibid). 
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In conclusion, the review of the literature in this section has facilitated an 
identification of two important types of small states’ general behaviour in regions 
or regional international organisations. This can be characterised as ‘region-
engaging’ (the constructor model) or ‘region-adapting’ (the ‘follower’ model), which 
both need to be further studied. 
 
Secondly, most of the explanatory variables for the actions and adaptations of the 
small states are related to: economic interests; security in terms of the classical 
assumptions; and politics in terms of political influence in the formation of 
international regional policies. 
 
Finally, most of these explanatory variables are related to European case studies. 
We have to consider the possibility that this could be due to the two following 
reasons: a) the limitations of academic contributions in this area of studies in  
some regions or b) the lack of access to academic resources produced locally. A 
review of the academic work produced in Latin and South America about small 
states could help to clarify this. 
 
1.4 The Study of Small States in Integration Processes in Latin and South 
America 
 
In contrast to the considerable amount of literature on small states carried out by 
European and North American academics, this study has found it challenging to 
identify academic investigations in this field produced in the Latin and South 
American region itself. This statement, it must be said, only represents the 
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perceptions within this study. The limited academic production within the main 
field of International Relations in Latin America as suggested by Tickner (2009), 
and the restricted technological access to resources from foreign research centres 
have further hindered the generation of a more accurate picture of the present 
situation of small state studies in Latin and South America. 
 
The information collected during the field work and some relevant empirical and 
descriptive work conducted across the region identified in the visited academic 
centres in Ecuador and Uruguay are important guides for the identification of cues 
about the motivations of South American small states for the construction of 
regions. 
 
Hence, this review will include some empirical and descriptive studies about Latin 
American small states and integration, particularly, from Uruguay and Ecuador 
that may not specifically underpin any theoretical explanation, but due to their 
significant descriptive character can be important for the development of this 
study. 
 
When one regards the weight of the study of South American small states in 
relation to the formation and strengthening of international organisations and 
construction of regions, it can be observed that the focus taken by researchers 
avoids the categorisation of states. 
 
Studies about the role of small states in such processes can be identified as 
implicit rather than explicit. For this reason, it seems that theoretical output 
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regarding the role of small states in international relations generally and 
specifically the contribution to the formation of small state studies is relatively low. 
  
Secondly, most of the Latin and South American small states appear to have 
traditionally supported a discourse of international regional integration. Some 
small states such as Ecuador and Uruguay have a constitutional mandate towards 
supporting regional international integration and some small states have been 
historically engaged in such projects. 
 
For instance, according to Salgado’s (1994) historical work regarding Ecuador’s 
part in the integration of Latin America, it was Ecuador itself which originally 
directed the meetings and discussions of the 1950s for the creation and 
institutionalisation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC). 
 
Similarly, the publications of  the Ministerio de Hacienda (1962) and of Magariños 
(2000) give a succinct description of the role of Uruguay in the Latin American 
integration process, in which Uruguay is portrayed as one of the most relevant 
region-engaging states of Latin America. Accordingly, these small states can be 
categorised as region-engaging or constructors of regions during the creation 
period of this regional organisation. 
 
Thirdly, the literature shows that most South American small states have been 
geopolitically, militarily and economically engaged in continental integration 
projects as well as in international continental organisations such as the American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) and the Organisation of American States 
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(OAS) since the preliminary meetings for their creation (Connell-Smith, 1966; 
Carrión, 1989; Villacres, 1989; Carranza, 2000; Vieira, 2008). 
 
Therefore, in terms of integration, the South American small states have been 
involved in a regional integration process at four different levels: the continental 
level (TIAR, OAS, FTAA), the Latin American level (ALADI, SELAC), the South 
American level (SAFTA, UNASUR), and the sub-regional level (CAN, 
MERCOSUR). 
 
Carranza (2000) exemplifies two levels of integration in the 20th century in 
America that involve most South American small states. He uses the globalisation 
approach to explain region formation. According to him, integration at a 
continental level carried out in the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the 
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project was being directed by a declining 
hegemony of the USA. On the other hand, the ideas of a South American Free 
Trade Area (SAFTA) have been led by Brazil since the beginning of the 1990s 
(ibid). 
 
On a sub-regional level, according to Salgado (1994) and Vieira (2008), Ecuador 
was one of the founders of the sub-regional international organisation, the Andean 
Pact, now called the Andean Community (CAN), which was originally created by 
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela in 1969. On the other hand, 
Uruguay is a founder state of the Latin American Integration Association 
(ALALC/ALADI) created in 1962 and MERCOSUR which was also created by 
Brazil, Argentina and Paraguay in 1991. 
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In general terms, Latin American academia has invested a large amount of energy 
in empirically investigating integration in South America. Despite it being a 
relatively new regional integration process, UNASUR has become a fundamental 
theme of academic interest at a South American level.  
 
In this context, Peña (2010) and Fernández (2011) suggest that the South 
American small states support the tendency of integration within UNASUR. 
However, this is not only because UNASUR is the first South American regional 
organisation to include all twelve states, but also due to the fact that it offers small 
states suitable means to confront the challenges affecting internal democracy and 
stability in the twenty-first century. 
  
Moreover, regional integration has been a constant factor in the foreign policy of 
most South American states as demonstrated by Cadena and Chavez (2011), and 
Ayuso (2010). Their research employs a historical approach to elucidate the 
political trend of South America and its projection internationally in the twenty-first 
century. 
 
Ayuso (2010) proposes that this historical process of regional integration has paid 
more attention to the local ideological political and economic interests culminating 
in the formation of UNASUR, an organisation that is being constructed with 
principles that purport to reduce the asymmetries of the member states. 
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For Cienfuegos and Sanahuja (2010), regionalism, or integration, was driven by 
most of the South American states in a particular Latin American fashion during 
the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
 
This process of development has been theorised as the South American ‘open 
regionalism’, a liberalist framework that supports regional economic and political 
integration with a preferential system for certain products and countries with 
relatively low development within the region, but does not support the 
regularisation of a common external agenda of the members of the common 
regional market. 
 
According to these authors, the regional and global political context of the twenty-
first century has influenced the dynamics of local politics in the South American 
continent, and South America aims to enter a phase of post-liberal regionalism. 
The interests of societies have been expressed in the election of left-oriented 
governments. 
 
Consequently, the transformation of right-wing liberalist oriented to leftist and 
integrationist governments in most of the South American states has strengthened 
the historical pro-integrationist ideals of the region. 
 
As a response, states have developed new collective projects and integrationist 
strategies to project themselves internationally by focusing on social and political 
shared issues which distinguish UNASUR from previous regional integration 
projects (Cienfuegos & Sanahuja, 2010). 
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Such investigations look at the whole region as a system in order to describe the 
political transformation of South American from a historical perspective. They 
include a general view of the variables that have motivated the formation of 
UNASUR, avoiding an explanation of the behaviour of small states, but prioritising 
the role of larger states. 
 
For instance, Sanahuja (2010) suggests that the South American Community of 
Nations (CSN) was created based on the following principles driven by Brazil: 
coordination and agreement on foreign policies; converging of the existing sub-
regional economic integration processes CAN and MERCOSUR with the 
incorporation of Chile, Guyana and Surinam; and physical integration including 
transport, communication and energy. 
 
In contrast to studies that aim to explain the emergence of the South American 
region as driven by bigger states, the present study will hopefully complement 
earlier studies by using a constructivist perspective to examine the role of small 
states in the strengthening of regional consciousness in South America and the 
creation of UNASUR. 
 
In addition to this, by looking at the small states’ engagement in the process of 
regional construction, the influence of new ideological tendencies in South 
America can be clarified. Buono’s (2006) work concerning the views of academics 
and social civil groups regarding South American integration suggests that 
academics as well as civil society demand a transformation of the old economic-
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oriented integration process into a more socialised and democratic regional 
integration. Hence, Cadena and Chavez (2011) and Sanahuja (2010) propose 
that instead of the ‘open regionalism’ framework of the 1990s and middle of the 
2000s, the projection of integration of South America could be considered as 
‘post-liberal regionalism’. 
 
These different types of regionalism in which small states are involved in the 
present era challenge the understanding of the role of small states in regional 
integration processes. This also hinders the formation of an authentic theory of 
integration of Latin America and/or of South America due to the overlapping 
factors considered within the study of regionalism and integration. 
 
A distinction can be made through the existence of over-governmental 
international institutions with certain legislative and executive powers that are 
characteristics of integration processes. Whereas regionalism can also be 
characterised through the presence of less legally binding international 
arrangements of governments, inter-relationship between societies and further 
international actors, which include an imaginary international geographical region. 
Hence, regionalism could subsume integration processes. 
 
Dabène (2009) collates various theoretical attempts to explain the different 
theoretical perspectives of the Latin American integration processes, 
comparatively exploring the transition from typical economic integration to 
integration from below that involves the democratisation of the region. 
 
45 
 
According to Dabène (2009), the particularity of Latin American integration 
processes is difficult to explain and understand from the point of view of the 
normative European theoretical approaches to integration, as ‘each process has 
its own specificities and has to be evaluated according to its own standards’ (p. 
24-25). 
 
Moreover, as demonstrated by Vieira (2008), each project of international 
integration has its own character and has been adapted and renewed 
progressively according to the circumstances of local and international interests of 
the member states. Therefore, the application of established theoretical 
approaches to the study of South American integration requires a further 
adaptation to the context and time. 
 
This review of the literature has also facilitated an understanding of the 
international environment of small states in the twenty-first century as it has 
focused on two political units, Ecuador and Uruguay within UNASUR as an 
international regional organisation. This includes the geographical area of South 
America with the exceptions of some islands and overseas European territories 
such as French Guiana. 
 
Due to the fact that regional integration is referred to by authors from various 
areas of study and as part of the foreign policy of small states of Latin-and South 
American and sub-regional integration, it is, however, challenging to provide a 
clear analytical overview of the politics of regional integration solely of the small 
states within the whole region. 
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For instance within the area of foreign policy, Muñoz and Tulchin (1996) 
presented one of the first attempts to develop an analytical framework that could 
be applicable to many case studies favouring the comparative approach. 
Nevertheless, more flexibility was suggested (ibid) in the approach due to the 
different perspectives of analysing a variety of political actors and international 
systems. 
  
Similarly, Mora and Hey (2003) assembled the most important aspects of the 
foreign policies of sixteen case studies including the cases of Ecuador and 
Uruguay. Their ‘three levels of analysis’ framework, focusing on the individuals, 
states and systems, allowed the authors to clearly picture the asymmetries 
between the different states. For example, while Ecuador’s main political 
approach to strengthening the CAN was by solving border problems with Peru, 
Uruguayan politics of integration focused on securing a favourable position in 
MERCOSUR (Hey, 2003; Bizzozero, 2003). 
  
The difficulty of presenting a general overview of policies of small states in South 
America can be understood in Hey’s (1995) suggestion that Latin American states 
have not produced a definitive foreign policy agenda and that their policies 
respond to certain ideological cycles (ibid, 1995). In this context, Hey (1995) 
identified two ‘cyclical patterns’ of Latin American foreign policy behaviour: the 
shifting pattern from left to right or right to left, as a response to election results, 
and the ‘neoliberal trend’ where the tendency is to move towards a combination of 
neoliberalism in economic factors and pro-US foreign policy in political matters. 
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On the other hand, Fernández (2011) suggests that the volatile character of 
regional politics could be found in the institutional setting of the political system, 
whereby a stable national agenda of foreign policy and integration has been a 
challenge due to the interdependency of political power and decision-making 
within the presidency and the parliament. 
 
In reference to such pragmatic factors within each state in Latin America, Gardini 
(2011) propose an ‘ideology and pragmatism’ analytical framework to study the 
foreign policy of Latin American states. This can be adaptable to a reality that 
varies from region to region and from small state to small state, as it is a 
framework developed around five fundamental concepts as tools of analysis: ends 
and purposes, means available, agency, process, and structure (ibid: 6-7).  
 
Hence, the areas of small state studies and foreign policy analysis or international 
political economy are often considered to be intertwined. This shows that small 
state studies has not found solid ground within Latin and South American 
academia. 
 
For instance, Bonilla (2008) employs the concept of ‘small state’ to address the 
challenges facing Ecuadorian foreign policy on entering an unknown era after the 
US international political reorientation of the twenty-first century. His concept of 
small states devolves from the principle of the capabilities of a state. 
Consequently, smallness as a defining characteristic of a state appears here as a 
quantitative concept (ibid). 
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However, the concept used in Bonilla’s study is not further defined. Yet within the 
study of Ecuadorian foreign policy, Bonilla (2002) provides wider insight into the 
perspectives and international projection of Ecuador in the twenty-first century 
within international organisations. 
 
It is worth pointing out that the ten articles gathered in this publication tend to use 
a hybrid of theoretical frameworks within the same study. The common feature 
within these studies is the use of the concept ‘weak states’ to highlight the 
difficulties of Ecuador’s  insertion into the international order (ibid). 
 
Ecuadorian foreign policy within the most relevant international organisations such 
as the OAS, WTO, UN and the EU is considered in the studies collected in this 
volume (ibid). However, the theoretical principles of small state studies are limited, 
as they do not further develop the meaning of being a ‘weak’ as opposed to a 
‘small’ state. 
 
Integration studies and international political economy are also fields that touch on 
the principles of small state studies. Investigations in these fields are mostly 
gathered in collections about Ecuador, but they are limited to interpreting the 
nature of the state by means of a subjective concept of ‘small’, as well as by the 
specific nature of their field. 
 
For example, Jaramillo (2010) records the positions of economic political actors 
regarding the transition of the Ecuadorian foreign policy from a bilateral to an 
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integrationist approach; but this study is conducted within the limits of the realm of 
international political economy. 
 
In the Uruguayan academic environment, the situation of small state studies 
appears to be relatively similar. Bizzozero (2000) and Abreu (2000) introduced the 
term estado pequeño (meaning ‘small state’) to investigate Uruguay’s role in the 
integration process of MERCOSUR. 
 
Bizzozero (2000) categorises small states according to material capabilities and 
uses a geopolitical framework to analyse the political position of Uruguay in the 
construction of the region. This means that the geographical position of a state 
plays an important role in the behaviour of small states within integration 
processes. Hence, geographical proximity appears here as a further factor that 
engages small states in integration processes. 
 
The theoretical approach to the study of small states within integration processes 
is based on examples of the European Benelux states (Belgium, the Netherlands 
and Luxembourg). Therefore there is limited theoretical production of an authentic 
South American approach (ibid). A few years later, Bizzozero (2003) provided a 
clear summary of the historical development of the foreign policy of the 
Uruguayan state in the twentieth century. Here, his applied historical approach 
does not refer to the field of small state studies. This is an example of an inter-
disciplinary study to focus on a case study such as Uruguay. 
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The case study developed by Abreu (2000) presents Uruguay as an active 
member state of MERCOSUR in a similar way to Bizzozero (2000). According to 
Abreu (2000), the Uruguayan policy of integration was oriented towards 
geopolitical and economic developments and was able to obtain some important 
concessions from Brazil and Argentina, such as the constitutional guarantee of 
the equality of states when bargaining over shared political and economic issues 
(ibid). 
 
As mentioned above, the regional politics of South America have changed rapidly 
in the last decade from an ‘open regionalism’ to a ‘post-neoliberal regionalism’ 
and the developments of regional organisations such as UNASUR are likely to 
benefit from ongoing research. 
 
Similarly, the role played by small states in the new projection of South American 
regionalism does not seem to be sufficiently analysed. In the case of Ecuador, its 
role in the construction of UNASUR is mainly analysed as part of its foreign policy, 
rather than specifically focusing on its role within UNASUR. 
 
For instance, research conducted by Zepeda (2011), and Zepeda and Egas 
(2011) shows that, since the arrival of Rafael Correa to power, Ecuador has 
established a foundation plan for the development of its foreign policy, in which 
regional integration has occupied a strategic position within Ecuadorian foreign 
affairs. 
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Zepeda (2011) looks at four main themes of Ecuadorian foreign policy in recent 
years by employing a documentary study: regional integration; the bilateral 
relations with Colombia; the existing relations within old partnerships; and the 
search for new partnerships. 
 
In further research, Zepeda and Egas (2011) highlight seven priorities of the new 
Ecuadorian government within the Revolución Ciudadana of President Rafael 
Correa: ‘defence of the national sovereignty, active multilateralism, Latin 
American regionalism, diversification of the international market and support of 
the cooperation South–South, protection of the environment, protection of 
Ecuadorian migrants abroad, and the free mobility of people and universal 
citizenship’ (p. 99). 
 
However, according to Sánchez (2011) these changes mainly reflect the 
intentions of a new government, rather than those of the state. He employs the 
concept of ‘small state’ from the realist perspective and characterises Ecuador as 
a small state that has not been able to determine its own foreign policy agenda 
and instead has functioned in a reactionary manner to external factors. 
Nevertheless, this study suggests that the Ecuadorian foreign policy has changed 
following the peace agreement with Peru in Brasilia in 1998 (ibid). 
 
In conclusion, the study of Ecuador and Uruguay and their motivations to engage 
in the construction of UNASUR is likely to benefit from further investigation. In the 
case of Uruguay, the literature has presented some insights into the probable 
motivations of the South American small state to support the construction of 
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UNASUR and thus the act of engaging in regional politics. The analysis of 
Bizzozero (2008, 2010) is based on a realist perspective. He perceives the small 
state within a regional environment in transition from open regionalism to 
continental regionalism. 
 
He refers to the latter as ‘the new regional organisations’, in other words UNASUR 
and the Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA). Bizzozero (2008) 
analyses the position of a small state in the formation of UNASUR employing a 
three level framework: global, regional and national perspectives. By means of 
this, his study highlights the following variables as motivations of small states, in 
particular Uruguay, to support the creation of UNASUR: the financial and 
economic crises of the region; the ‘bandwagoning’ effect that larger states can 
cause (in this case Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela); and the historical region-
engaging character of Uruguay. 
 
However, his study does not include the developments of UNASUR or the role of 
Uruguay in the years after 2008 which this present study aims to embrace. In 
order to complement Bizzozero’s research, this present study will include 
ideational factors such as the ideas of a collective or regional identity, and the 
interest in a regional and national peace, among others. 
 
As a result, this study aims to look at the engagement of Ecuador and Uruguay in 
the construction and strengthening of UNASUR until 2012 from the constructivist 
perspective. Hence, small states are considered as social actors whose purpose 
is to identify issues affecting both the national and international community, look 
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for solutions that benefit the whole community and collectively resolve them within 
an amicable international environment whereby states’ actions are directed by the 
common interest and shared identity, as suggested by Wendt (1994, 1999), 
Finnemore (1996), and Adler (2002). 
 
From the perspective of constructivism, small states do not need to be considered 
as weak, vulnerable, threatened, self-centred or in competition within the 
international arena as states enter into an interrelationship within a friendly 
environment. Small states as well as larger states have the same aims and are 
interested in finding a common position to make a communal effort to resolve 
common issues. 
 
Small as well as larger states interact with each other within a ‘Kantian culture of 
anarchy’ (Wendt, 1999: 297). The construction of the meaning of smallness takes 
place within this harmonic interaction of international political actors. This also 
makes it possible for small states to be seen as potential ‘region-engaging’ actors 
from the point of initial contact, and the result of collective action is the product of 
a communal effort. 
 
The history of the formation of UNASUR shows this fundamental principle, and 
looking at the Preamble of UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty, the South American 
Integration contained in UNASUR envisages building a union amongst its peoples 
on the basis of a set of ideational factors, including the cultural, social, economic 
and political fields (UNASUR, 2008). 
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The primacy, as fuctionalists suggest, of economy and technology over politics, or 
the imposition by great powers of their own interests do not apply to this process 
of integration. On the contrary, this process is based on common principles: on 
the shared cultural heritage, shared history and interrelationship between 
societies, amongst others, which can be best understood as a process of 
regionalism within which small states can take leading international roles. 
 
For these reasons, a constructivist framework may be the most appropriate 
approach with which to look for answers to the leading research question of this 
study, namely why Ecuador and Uruguay have supported the creation and the 
strengthening of UNASUR. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
  
The survey of the literature suggests that authors categorise the small state in 
many different ways: namely as small ethnic states, industrialised small states, 
underdeveloped small states, and micro-states, among others. 
 
The roles of small state in international relations and particularly the formation of 
regions referred to in the reviewed literature tend to respond to the theoretical 
perspective adopted by the investigation and the theoretical perspective and 
research questions seem to have influenced each study’s characterisation of 
small states. 
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As a result, small states can be characterised as followers which could also be 
considered as ‘region-adapting’ states, or as constructors which could be 
considered as ‘region-engaging’ states. 
 
In summary, the major factors that appear to have greatest impact on a state’s 
interest and engagement in the process of construction and consolidation of 
regions seem to be their drive to maximise their relative power, their economic 
interest, their opportunity for political influence, their geographical proximity, their 
national interest in security, and their ‘small’-ness. 
 
It is no coincidence that most of the theoretical approaches applied in these 
studies are grounded mainly in realist and neoliberal theoretical principles. 
Studies are planned and structured to identify what the researcher aims to explain 
or understand, and undertaken with the tools that they possess. 
 
Another observation contained in this literature survey is that studies have mainly 
been conducted within the main sub-fields of IR such as the study of international 
security, international organisation and cooperation and of international political 
economy. 
 
On the one hand, this facilitates access to studies underpinning various 
perspectives and theoretical views, as suggested above. On the other, the lack of 
agreement about a common agenda within small state studies has not allowed for 
the positioning of this field as a wider area of research in academic centres. So, 
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there is a low cumulative rate of research and limited progressive knowledge 
creation in this field in relation to other fields of International Relations. 
 
This study has also shown that only a few investigations have analysed Latin 
American small states as agents in the construction of regions, and fewer studies 
have focussed on the role of identity in the behaviour of small states in the 
construction of regions. 
 
This current state of small state studies in this region of the planet presents a 
promising opportunity to make a contribution to the field and to the discipline of 
International Relations. With that in mind, the next chapters of this study aim to 
look at the agency of Ecuador and Uruguay within international relations in order 
to further develop an understanding of small states’ motivation when they act in 
favour of, or against, the construction of regions. 
 Chapter 2. Understanding the Role of Small States in the 
Construction of Regions: A Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter further develops the suggested concepts of small states as ‘region-
engaging’ or ‘region-adapting’ that were identified in the previous chapter. It also 
clarifies the complementary concept of small states as ‘region-constraining’ as a first 
step to further construct a conceptual framework to analyse Ecuador and Uruguay as 
regional political agents in the construction of UNASUR. 
 
In order to address this, the first part of this chapter clarifies the definition of small 
state and further single concepts as conceived in this study. This will help to avoid 
theoretical pitfalls and possible misunderstandings. The second part of the chapter 
develops concepts to characterise the engagement of small states in region-building 
processes. The terms ‘region-engaging’, ‘region-constraining’, and ‘region-adapting’ 
are considered here as fundamental characteristics of small states as international 
actors in possession of a role as ‘member’, ‘leader’, ‘defector’ or as ‘candidate’ in the 
construction of regions. 
 
This set of concepts is based on the ‘conventional’ social constructivist ideas used to 
explain international relations (Fierke, 2010), elements of role theory in international 
relations developed by Nabers (2011) and Harnisch (2011), in combination with 
elements of Adler & Barnett’s (1998) conceptual framework to analyse the 
emergence and development of security communities. 
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The third part of this chapter presents and further clarifies the emerging framework to 
analyse the cases of Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction of UNASUR, and the 
final section explains the methodology employed in this study. 
 
2.2 Clarifying Concepts that Underpin this Study: Small State, Region and 
Identity 
 
The previous chapter showed that there is no single agreed meaning of the concept 
‘small state’ and that the definitions proposed tend to be related to the theoretical 
perspective taken by the individual researcher. Whereas realist approaches view 
small states as international actors that respond to material and security needs, 
rationalist approaches consider them as free-riders, calculating actors that are driven 
by the results of a weighing up process of costs and benefits. On the other hand, this 
study sees small states as social actors of international politics driven by identity-like 
charactristics, values, norms and meanings that enable them to relate to further 
international actors, help them to clarify what they are and to define what their 
agency is. 
 
The representatives of the small state in the international arena, including 
presidents, ministers, members of the military elite, diplomats and further special 
envoys of the state and government, are not only the carriers of a collective reality, 
but they are also the holders of their subjective reality. Consequently, norms, rules , 
language and context are important social factors that can influence the behaviour of 
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small states in international politics. These are some of the core fundamentals of 
social constructivism. 
 
Hence, this study endorses the main constructivist assumptions that bind the various 
constructivist branches together, such as the view that international relations are the 
product of human action in the social world. Politics between national states is also 
‘a world of our making’ (Onuf, 2002). Political international structures have been 
constructed through social action. The behaviour of political actors in the 
construction and in the modification of such structures can hardly be explained using 
the scientific tools of natural sciences. Therefore an interpretative approach to 
knowledge is considered here to be the most appropriate perspective to understand 
the social reality of small states in international relations. 
 
In looking at the role of Ecuador and Uruguay in the South American process of 
region construction, this study also supports the view that small as well as bigger 
states are built of a politically organised social group that give meaning to further 
elements that form the state, and to the actions in international politics of their 
representatives. The ideas, history, culture, norms, values and further identity-like 
elements of the representatives of the small state are fundamentals for their action 
and for the shaping of the agency of the small state in international politics. What 
small states portrait as their agency is intertwined between both the collective ideas 
which shape the international politics of the small state as well as the subjective 
ideas of the international political actors. 
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However, the various constructivist views that have proliferated in the historical 
developmental path of constructivism could lead academics to prioritise or explicitly 
endorse certain nuances in the explanations and different understandings of the 
actions and behaviour of small states of international relations. These various views 
can direct the specific focus of the investigation about small states in IR.  
 
For instance, by taking a ´modernist linguistic´ constructivist approach to study small 
states and disregarding the ´modernist´ and the ´radical´ constructivist views (Adler, 
2002), academics may focus on the language and rules that enable them to explain 
the behaviour of small states, as well as the discourse of power and its employment 
in the construction of social reality (Adler, 2002). Fierke (2010) refers to this 
constructivist view as ´consistent constructivism´ whereas Adler´s ´modernist 
constructivism´ (2002) is referred to here as ´conventional constructivism´. 
 
This study adheres to the conventional or modernist constructivism which has a 
´cognitive interest in understanding and explaining social reality´ (Adler, 2002: 97-
98). Hence, it firstly adheres to the assumption that there is a social reality that 
contains the social fact that a social international reality has been constructed at a 
certain time, place and historical circumstance. International Relations as a Social 
Science aims to explain and understand such reality. Secondly, ideas play a 
fundamental role not only in shaping the social reality of each small state, but also in 
the process of understanding such social reality. 
 
For instance, it is plausible that South America contains various states, many of 
which can be considered as small states. The reality that such small states have 
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been historically created cannot be denied, and that they play certain roles in the 
processes of regionalism is evident from any theoretical perspective as suggested in 
the previous chapter. The historical South American as well as Latin American ideas 
are fundamental for the understanding of such a South American and Latin American 
reality as well as the role of South American small states in the context of 
international politics. 
 
Here, the task is to clarify how such small states are defined from a constructivist 
perspective in order to understand their role in the formation of UNASUR. Firstly, 
small state is considered here as a corporate political actor that maintains 
relationships with other states or other political actors engaged across national 
borders. Despite the fact that there are more actors than the state itself that influence 
international relations, the South American states seem to have maintained their 
prevalence in the conduct of, and final decisions about, the relations between states. 
 
So, this study focuses on the actions of the state as a unit of analysis, considering 
that the actions of the state include the political discourse, decisions, declarations, 
policies and agreements made by the main actors in the international relations of the 
South American small state: governments, diplomatic and military bodies. 
 
In order to define the small state as a unit of analysis, this study departs from the 
assumption that the ‘state’, as a well established political concept, a sovereign 
political entity, is not open to further debate. 
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Hence, the controversial term within the whole concept is ‘smallness’ as an intrinsic 
characteristic of the identity of a state, and how it is understood and conceived from 
within by the unitary nation-state itself and from without by the international 
community. 
 
In this sense, ‘smallness’ can be based on the inter-subjective understanding of the 
meaning of small shared within an international community and in a distinct context. 
This perspective is intrinsic to Hey’s (2003) definition of small state whereby she 
suggests that a state should be considered as small ‘if a state’s people and 
institutions generally perceive themselves to be small, or if other states’ people and 
institutions perceive that state as small’ (p. 3). 
 
In the inter-subjective understanding of smallness from the point of view of people’s 
nation-state and its institutions, and of the people from other states and exterior 
institutions, as suggested by this study, material as well as ideational elements could 
be dimensions of the definition. 
 
As suggested by Väyrynen (1971) in his ranking of typology, exterior and interior 
dimensions on one hand, and objective and subjective measurements on the other, 
can help to define the characteristic of small. Hence, it is the inter-subjective 
understanding of what will be taken into account for measurement that defines the 
character of smallness. 
 
Singer (1972) attempts to avoid this subjective perception by introducing the term 
‘weak’ to characterise small states, a term which also takes into account the socio-
63 
 
economic, socio-political and socio-psychological patterns of the state’s formation 
and structure. Nevertheless, a certain level of subjectivity is hardly avoidable in 
defining a small state. Moreover, the kind of definition developed is ideologically 
based and context-specific.  
 
In the light of such suggestions, this study presents a definition on the basis of Hey’s 
(2003) proposition that also needs to be set into a cognitive context. For example, in 
the context of the international religious community, the Vatican City could well be 
considered as a world leading state. 
 
Hence, small state is considered in this study as the social construction of a 
sovereign political entity based on the shared understanding and collective 
recognition of the state category of small within the national and international 
community. It exhibits an identity, possesses agency, and as such presents an arena 
for the action of a group of representatives of the national population considered 
here as a cognitive community. 
 
It is within this arena that the notion of small state is shaped on the basis of an inter-
subjective idea of smallness. In this way, the perception of smallness becomes a 
distinctive characteristic of a particular state. Here, the context is a fundamental 
element of the understanding of smallness.  
 
For the purpose of this study, smallness of the state is considered in the context of a 
South American cognitive community-region. According to Adler (2005) such 
‘community-regions are regional systems of meanings (an interdependent group of 
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meanings among individuals or collectivities) and are not limited to a specific 
geographic place’ (p. 181). In this sense, the quality of smallness is based on a 
subjective perception and conceptualised inter-subjectively, whose characterisation 
could also be considered as an element of type identity. 
 
Type identity is the second concept that is employed in this study and requires 
clarification due to its ubiquitous usage. The concept of identity employed in this 
study is based on Wendt’s (1999) definition of type identity. He describes this as the 
characteristics shared between many people within a social group in a national state 
as well as among an international community. In the case of small states, one of 
their shared characteristics is being ‘small’ as an element of their type identity. 
 
According to this, the following six states can be considered small states within the 
South American socio-political context: Bolivia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, 
Surinam and Uruguay. This would reflect the categorisation made by the Economic 
Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (CEPAL), which looking from a 
macro-economic perspective also characterises these states as small states 
(CEPAL, 2005). 
 
These states have a variety of further elements of their national identity that link 
them with the other states of South America. For example, all were once European 
colonies and went through a process of political independence. 
 
In this respect, they have a shared history. The symbiosis of various ethnicities in 
their national societies is a similar link. Moreover, all have maintained democratic 
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elected governments since the 1990s, and most have also been voluntarily involved 
in various projects of regional international integration. 
 
It could easily be said that they share a set of norms and values. This claim, in 
conjunction with the (identitarian) elements of shared identification I have mentioned 
are the basis of a collective regional identity. This suggestion forms another concept 
I shall employ in this study. 
 
A third concept to be clarified as a requirement before an understanding of the 
international political action or inaction of small states can be reached is the 
definition of a region as the international political arena of the small states. It is the 
context of small state study in this investigation. 
 
The environment of the small state is at present inundated with a variety of sub-
regional, regional, continental and global international organisations. This has 
obscured the limits and meaning of region; as ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ are concepts 
used in many different ways in the study of regional integration, and form a variety of 
theoretical approaches (Riggirozzi, 2012; Rittberger and Zangl, 2006; Wiener and 
Diez, 2009). 
 
Leaving aside for a moment the idea that UNASUR includes a region, not only in 
geographical terms but also in cognitive terms, since the whole of South America 
forms the international political environment of Ecuador and Uruguay, the 
requirement is here to define region. 
 
66 
 
Regions can be defined and understood as intergovernmental political, commercial 
or military arrangements that organise the relationship of states within a generally 
conceived geographical area (Hurrell, 1995). 
 
According to Riggirozzi (2012), there are levels of region formation which 
demonstrate an inclination towards it becoming a global actor. A region could be said 
to comprise a geographical space progressively transformed into a ‘deeper 
institutionalised polity with a permanent structure of decision-making and stronger 
acting capability as a global actor’ (p. 425). 
 
Adler and Barnett (1998) define regions as ‘a transnational region comprised of 
sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful 
change’ (p. 28). They maintain that the catalyst for its emergence as a region could 
be one of normative or material interest and could be motivated by the desire to 
coordinate relations, which may be caused by ‘exogenous and endogenous factors’ 
(p. 35). 
 
According to the requirements for the presence of a security community as 
suggested by Adler and Barnett (1998), UNASUR cannot be categorised as a 
security community, due to various premises that will be clarified in the process of 
this study. 
 
One reason for this incompletion is the presence of military forces along some 
national borders whereas a security community demands the absence of troops 
along the interior borders of member states (ibid). 
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However, UNASUR shows its unique development in the process of cooperation. It 
demonstrates some characteristics that resemble a security community. For 
example, there is a collective regional discourse of collective defence. Moreover, 
some states may aim to go beyond mutual commercial and defence considerations 
towards harmonisation of its members’ social development and security policy. 
Greater cooperation and peaceful co-existence might then develop on the basis of 
shared culture and values. 
 
Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the South American region contained by  
UNASUR can be considered as a pluralistic cooperative community: by that I mean 
an internationally organised region comprised of sovereign states whose people 
maintain expectations of peaceful political change and human development through 
cooperation between the national states at various levels of their national and 
international politics. 
 
International politics is considered here as the interaction of states, as corporate 
actors, through their national governments or representatives who shape and 
express their national interests across national borders. This can still be applied to 
the cases of states within the continent of South America, since the decision to 
participate, support or reject collective bilateral, or multilateral political actions is 
mainly influenced and defined by elites and by the government in power as 
mentioned above. 
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Furthermore, when studying security communities as defined by Adler and Barnett 
(1998), security goes beyond the traditional military concept of security, as it also 
includes elements of material and social welfare, human rights, reducing poverty and 
social inequality, and promoting ecological development, among others in a 
pluralistic cooperative community. 
 
In 21st century South America, the meaning of security includes, in addition to its 
traditional meaning, ‘specific priorities of every state that contribute to the 
consolidation of peace, integral development and social justice based on democratic 
principles, solidarity and respect for national sovereignty’ (Serbin, 2010: 18), among 
others. 
 
On the one hand, the understanding of security can be related to the interest of the 
national state in its role as protector of, and provider for, the whole nation. On the 
other, sovereignty can be considered as the aim of the South American states to 
retain their traditional international right to govern within a determined territory 
without exterior interference. However, how can a collective regional security be 
implemented without encouraging the mutual enforcement of internationally 
institutionalised norms in order to maintain peace at home and abroad? 
 
It is worth noting that the emergence of UNASUR took place during a time of 
implementation of democratic political systems throughout South America with 
mainly left-oriented governments, and relative friendship between most of the South 
American national states. 
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In this context, the manifestation of cognitive communities such as the similar-
minded political elites as suggested by Adler (2005), can play a relevant role in the 
formation of regions. This would concur with the view that within South America as a 
whole, international political decisions continue to be influenced [disproportionately] 
by a few individuals in each respective government. 
 
As a result, the ideological concurrence of national leaders regarding both domestic 
government and regional integration may henceforward be seen as another 
contribution to explain small states engagement in the creation of regions. 
 
The suggestion that intensive and extensive interactions between states can help to 
form a region has been further developed by Adler and Barnett’s (1998) concept of a 
pluralistic security community; this applies equally to the concept  of a pluralistic 
cooperative community. 
 
The original ideas of security communities can be traced back to Deutsch’s (1957) 
seminal theoretical approach to the study of their rise at that time. In concurrence 
with Adler and Barnett’s (1998) constructivist framework, the idea of an international 
cooperative community is best understood in terms of constructivist principles. As a 
result, a qualitative analysis of the interaction of states in the process of constructing 
a region becomes necessary. 
  
But, it is important to be aware of pluralism as a factor here. This leads us in the 
direction of the principle of transactionalism referred to by Deutsch (1957) and 
improved theoretically by Adler and Barnett (1998). 
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For the purpose of this study, pluralism is instead conceived in terms of the variety of 
areas of international cooperation. By this I mean the acknowledgment of the 
complex interplay of ideas, cultures, identities and nations in the formation of a 
region, when the common aim is to incorporate the national states’ various policies  
and engage all small states in the consolidation of a union. 
  
At the early stages of this community’s formation, the pluralism is contained in, and 
represented mainly by, an elite or a group of elites and experts that govern the 
different countries of the emergent cognitive community (Adler, 2005). This is so 
despite the presence of elements of an international collective identity among the 
region’s national populations. Nevertheless, it is within this interaction that the 
elements of shared or collective identity are identified. 
 
So the role of charismatic international politicians can also be included as an 
important influence on the formation of collective identity, an identity which will be 
expressed in the national political constitution (in international treaties in the case of 
regional identity) and further political regulations, such as the national foreign policy 
of a state (collective/regional defence policies in the case of international 
communities). It could even motivate other community members to agree on shared 
issues within the region; though, of course, for some states that may not have the 
same relevance. 
 
This is particularly important in politically unstable small states where foreign policy 
is formed as a reaction to external political developments, and where new political 
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regimes would constantly redefine the national interest according to the ideology of 
the governing political party as suggested by Gardini and Lambert (2011). 
 
Another important concept that underpins the concept of cooperative international 
communities and needs clarification is the definition of international community. The 
definition of a community at an international level presents various difficulties due to 
the difference of meaning between an international organisation as an international 
community or as an international association. 
 
The difference here is that the construction of an international community is based 
on an understanding of the political as an instrument for cooperation rather than as 
an approach that favours a power-related conceptualisation of the political in 
international relations. 
 
Adler and Barnett (1998) distinguish between the forming of a group of self-
interested member states and the forming of a group of non-self-interested member 
states which they refer to respectively as ‘an association’ and ‘a community’. To 
clarify this, they suggest that the ‘members of a community have shared identities, 
values and meaning’ (p. 29). 
 
Important features of a community are the direct and many-sided relations; long-term 
common interests; the awareness of other community members; a sense of 
solidarity, self-responsibility and obligation; and particularly the fixed decision to 
avoid the use of violence to solve conflicts (ibid). 
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It can therefore follow that an international cooperative community might emerge 
within a friendly culture of anarchy, characterised by Wendt (1999) as the ‘Kantian’ 
culture of anarchy. 
 
Within this Kantian culture of anarchy there is a possibility of evolving a collective 
interest in cooperation between like-minded states. This kind of cooperation can be 
considered as international communitarian cooperation which in other words is an 
expression of the voluntary will of states to identify common interests, 
complementary capabilities and shared issues in order to collectively solve them on 
the basis of solidarity and shared features, as manifested in the treaty of UNASUR. 
 
These shared features of national South American states across the international 
regional community constitute the platform of a collective or regional identity. They 
can be mainly identified and strengthened through the interaction and inter-
subjective understanding of meaning regarding the shared cultural aspects within a 
process of collective identity formation as suggested by (Wendt, 1994; 1999). 
 
Hence, elements of a collective identity or regional identity can also help to explain 
the engagement of small states in the construction of regions. As suggested by 
Wendt (1999), collective identity is the identification of elements of the Self as being 
shared by the Other. ‘This identification, this sense of being a part of a group or “we”, 
is a social or collective identity that gives actors an interest in the preservation of 
their culture’ (ibid: 337). 
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According to this, a South American “we-ness” or South American identity can be 
defined here as the set of shared values and beliefs, shared identification features 
and institutionalised norms that enable a person, a group of people or a polity to 
consider itself as belonging to a South American community. 
 
In conclusion, the international arena or environment of action of the small states, 
Ecuador and Uruguay, is framed in this study both by the process of creation, 
ratification and strengthening of UNASUR, and by the ideas of a shared South 
American identity based on shared values and beliefs. 
 
The set of such shared South American values and beliefs may include the belief in 
individual freedom, a feeling of solidarity, religious beliefs based on the symbiosis of 
Christianity and Amerindian spirituality, the values of human rights, democracy and 
social justice, among others. 
 
The set of shared identification features may embrace the symbiosis of Amerindian, 
Western European and African ethnicities and cultures, including the diversity of 
languages, architecture, music and film; a shared history and a unitary geographical 
space, among others. 
 
The set of institutionalised shared norms could include the lack of requirement for a 
visa to travel across the region; the permission to drive across it with national driving 
licences; states’ sovereignty and the self- determination of the people, and the trade 
of selected products across the region. These, and other norms, have been 
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regulated by the South American states through treaties, agreements and 
declarations. 
 
2.3 The International Role and Small States as Region-engaging, Region-
constraining, and Region-adapting 
 
Small as well as relatively larger South American states have played dissimilar roles 
in the process of constructing UNASUR. Some small states such as Guyana, 
Surinam and Paraguay have been more reserved in positing a South American 
discourse, whereas others such as Bolivia and Ecuador have shown strong support 
for this project. Therefore, it is crucial to identify factors and actions that can fit the 
character of ‘region-engaging’, region-cosntraining’ or ‘region-constraining’ small 
states. 
 
Moreover, it appears that the roles played by the different small states were 
changing throughout the process of creation and consolidation of UNASUR. Since 
this is so, it is necessary to clarify how this study defines the character of an 
international role for small states in the construction of regions. 
 
There is a variety of national and international role definitions and approaches within 
International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. Studies see states’ roles in 
international relations as functional (i.e. satellite) or as constitutive (i.e. member 
states) (Holsti, 1970; Walker, 1987, 2004, 2011; Harnisch, 2011; Harnisch et al., 
2011; Breuning, 2011; Nabers, 2011). 
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Nabers (2011) identifies five theoretical approaches to the study of the role of states 
in international relations: structural, interactionist, functional, organisational and 
cognitive role theory. These theoretical approaches are linked to the main theoretical 
approaches to the study of international relations (ibid). 
 
The description of small states’ roles in international relations tends also to be 
influenced by the theoretical perspective taken in the studies of such states. In order 
to reduce such possible influences in this study, this section clarifies the approach 
taken here to understanding the role of Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction of 
UNASUR. 
 
The particular role considered for the purposes of this study is that of UNASUR 
member and the engagement of small states in the process of constructing the 
region [figure 1], which concerns the action of signing, confirming and depositing 
treaties, declarations and conventions with regional international relevance. 
 
Small states engage in the construction of regions when they participate, present 
and develop integration projects. They promote the creation of new institutions for 
cooperation within the process, and convert regional integration into national policy. 
 
During this process of constructing a region as an international regional community, 
small states can play various roles -considered here as identity role or social role, 
and defined as a guiding cognitive representation for expected actions generally 
related to social behaviour within an organised social group (Nabers, 2011). 
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Inherently, such roles also form the identity of political international actors, such as 
states. Harnisch (2011) also suggests that, in the context of IR, roles can be 
considered as twofold. First, they are considered as constitutive to the group, in that 
the same expectations are set for those agents within a specific international 
environment. In the case of the construction of UNASUR as a pluralistic cooperative 
community, the role designed and assigned to all states is that of community 
member. 
 
Secondly, a role could be considered as functionally specific. This means further 
expectations are assigned to the role and the same expectations are required in 
different international settings (ibid). For example, the expectations required of a 
‘leader’ state within UNASUR could be the same within further international 
organisations. In the case of UNASUR, the role of President Pro Tempore gives 
member states the power to coordinate common projects, policies and meetings, 
among others, for one year. 
 
In relation to a constructed or consolidated regional international community, three 
functional specific roles could be identified: ‘leader’, ‘defector’ and ‘candidate’. The 
roles of leader and defector are entwined with the constitutive role of community 
member, while the role of candidate is related to the expectations upon possible 
members of an international community. 
 
However, these functionally specific roles are not necessarily present in the process 
of construction or in the emergence of a region within a ‘Kantian’ culture of anarchy, 
since the structures and their functions are themselves under construction. 
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Hence, roles are not necessarily defined. Therefore, in order to characterise small 
states according to their engagement in the construction and strengthening of 
international regions, small states can be categorised in the following types: small 
states as region-engaging, region-constraining, and region-adapting. 
 
A set of conditions has also been developed in order to clarify these categories. This 
can help to understand the process of changing behaviour and the shift between the 
differing roles of small states, since states in international relations play various roles 
as well as possessing various identities (Nabers, 2011; Harnisch et al., 2011). 
 
On the one hand, this categorisation can help to avoid the division into functional and 
constitutive roles for the determination of the character of small states in the 
construction of regions. On the other, the focus on the identity of small states and the 
elements of identity they share with other states of the region as well as with extra-
regional political actors can help us to understand their behaviour in the region’s 
construction. 
   
For this purpose, small states could be firstly characterised as ‘region-engaging’ 
when they voluntarily support the region-building process by signing, ratifying and 
officially depositing the majority of treaties, declarations, conventions and further 
instruments that support and enhance the cooperative community/region. In this way 
they assume the role of community member. 
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It is crucial to highlight that, just as in security communities, in cooperative 
communities an increasing number of interactions between states are required for 
the strengthening and maintenance of trust and the formation of institutions to 
coordinate state policies for material progress and peaceful change; even here 
conflict can occur, sometimes unpredictably (Adler & Barnett, 1998). 
 
So we can see that the role of a state is being constructed at the same time as the 
cooperative community is coming into being, and once this community is 
established, states’ roles have simultaneously taken shape. In that way, the 
behaviour of the small state during this process can contribute to its ultimate 
character. 
 
Moreover, small states actively and voluntarily engage in the process by presenting 
projects for the creation of institutions, their further development of them, and for the 
strengthening of the community. Furthermore, they call special meetings and 
organise events which enhance the cohesion of the region. Finally, region-engaging 
states are those states that have made regionalism a policy of national interest. 
 
In such circumstances, such ‘region-engaging’ small states may also have similar 
patterns of commitment within other forms of region-building processes, as in the 
case of Ecuador and Uruguay within Latin American regionalism, and the sub-
regional commitment to CAN and MERCOSUR, which themselves contain other 
identity roles. 
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Breuning (2011) suggests that in addition to the material imperatives that influence 
the role adopted by a state in international relations, both the national states’ 
ideational elements and international political ideas, such as democratic and liberal 
thought, can shape the identities and cultures which play an important part in a 
state’s behaviour and its development of a role. Moreover, both role diversity and the 
interaction with other groups could influence the state’s identity formation and its 
change of role. 
 
During this process, a role conflict within an actor may arise causing the actor to 
weigh up its preferences and interests -and within a cooperative community, rivalry 
within the members can exist, but members tend to avoid the use of violence to 
settle their conflicts. 
 
This, however, offers no assurance, due to intra-regional or extra-regional 
influences, actors will necessarily define their national interest by reference to the 
interest of the community despite the fact that harmonisation of national and regional 
collective interest is expected. So we can see that the roles and identities of small 
states are exposed to change. 
 
Finnemore (1996) suggests that while national interests are being formed, states are 
assisted by norms and values in order to make such decisions. Hence, the role of 
states and changes in this role are influenced by the national state’s own norms and 
values and could also be influenced by regional and extra-regional values, norms 
and further forms of identity with which the state has interaction. 
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In conclusion, ‘region-engaging’ small states have a constitutive role to play as 
‘community member’ within a regional project or consolidated region, and they can 
opt to play the functional role of ‘leader’. This is not static and the motivation for role 
change could be materially and ideationally driven. 
 
On the contrary, and as an inference of the above, small states within a cooperative 
community could also be characterised as ‘region-constraining’ when they oppose 
the region-building process by ignoring, disapproving of and unsubscribing to 
treaties, declarations, conventions and further instruments that support and enhance 
the formation and development of regional cohesiveness. To do this requires that a 
state assumes the role of community member. 
 
Region-constraining small states can engage in activities that oppose or weaken the 
process of region-building, such as breaking the norms and rules that regulate the 
interrelationship of states within the system, or forming alliances with extra-regional 
forces to oppose the norms and principles cultivated within the region. Finally, 
‘region-constraining’ states could also be those that consider regionalism as  
opposition to their national interest. 
 
As suggested by Adler and Barnett (1998), nascent security communities are 
exposed to many constraints, such as those posed by single national identities, by 
the processes of learning each other’s interests and conceptualisation of shared 
issues. 
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This phenomenon is similar in pluralistic cooperative communities. The development 
of a collective identity is progressive and reaches a more cohesive level at the 
mature stage of a cooperative community. 
 
Within this process, opportunities for developing ‘region-constraining’ characteristics 
are present throughout the process of community consolidation and development, as 
some states may disregard some elements of common interest due to a lack of 
understanding of it. 
 
Moreover, the ‘many-sided’ and ‘directed relations’ of the members of a community 
suggested by Adler & Barnett (1998) offer them a wide scope to shape and reshape 
their singular identity as well as to change their role within their community. 
 
This could also be influenced by changes in the international regional or global 
political environment impacting on the role enactment and role change of community 
members. For example, after the creation of the Organization of American States 
(OAS), some small states openly opposed, refused or ignored important norms and 
principles cultivated within the regional system. 
 
Since the revolution of the 1950s, Cuba has refused to transform its political system 
to return to the OAS from which it was suspended following a change of its political 
system which was highly influenced by the international expansion of communism. 
 
Another example is Paraguay’s behaviour towards the region in 2012 while playing 
the role of President Pro Tempore of UNASUR. The Paraguayan parliament 
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impeached President Fernando Lugo and removed him from office whilst breaking 
democratic norms considered fundamental for the strengthening of democracy in 
South America. This could be understood as ‘region-constraining’ behaviour since 
the region found itself without a President Pro Tempore and with a weakened 
collective identity. 
 
Finnemore (1996) suggests that institutionalised norms and values, as well as the 
interaction of social international life, are factors that assist states to define and 
redefine their national interest. However, this can also influence states to change 
their view of region-ness and we-ness influencing the shift of roles while the 
cooperative community is emerging or is in the process of strengthening itself. The 
following illustration [figure 1] summarises the indicators for the analysis: 
Figure 1. Indicators of role enactment and role change in region formation 
Role type and 
main charac-
teristic of small 
state as actor 
Indicators of actions and character of 
actors 
Theoretical factors that 
impact on the engagement 
of small states 
 
Community 
member and 
region-engaging, 
toward ‘leader’ 
 
 
- Signing, confirming and depositing 
treaties, declarations and conventions 
- Participation, presentation and 
development of integration projects 
(intensive transactions) 
- Creation of new institutions for 
cooperation within the process 
- Convert to integration as policy of 
national interest 
 
- Normative, cultural and 
value driven 
- Identity or self-
identification with the 
process, shared issues, 
common aims and interests 
 
Community 
member and 
region-
constraining, 
toward 
‘defector’ 
 
 
- Ignoring, disapproving, or unsubscribing 
to treaties, declarations and conventions 
- Breaking regional norms, rules, values 
- Forming alliances with extra-regional or 
intra-regional agents to damage the 
development of the international 
community 
 
- Cultural, value and 
heuristically driven: within 
the region and in relation 
to extra-regional factors 
- Role and interest conflict, 
and identity change 
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- Opposing the development of the 
international community if considered a 
danger to national interests 
 
Candidate and 
region-adapting, 
toward 
‘community 
member’ 
 
 
- Formally applying for membership to a 
international community  
- Adapting national policies and 
institutions according to the norms, rules 
and values of an international community 
 
- Cultural and value driven 
- Self-identification with the 
identity of a community 
- Identity change and 
interest 
 
In conclusion, small states within an international cooperative community have a 
constitutive role of ‘community member’, but can adopt ‘region-constraining’ 
behaviour and become a ‘defector’, which should not be considered as a static 
stage. In addition, the motivation for change could be materially, ideationally or 
heuristically driven, or according to Harnisch et al. (2011) through role contention 
and identity change. 
 
Finally, there is one further characteristic that a small state may show, whereby the 
state functions mainly as a receiver of norms and values regulated and 
institutionalised within the main mechanisms of regionalisation. 
 
Such a state has the functional role of a ‘candidate’, oriented toward becoming a 
member of a cooperative community. In this case their role is exteriorly related to the 
international cooperative community and its main characteristic could be defined as 
‘region-adapting’. 
 
In a similar way to Adler and Barnett’s (1998) proposal regarding the emergence of a 
security community, a pluralistic international cooperative community could be built 
around strong powers and this can be attractive, predominantly to ‘weak’ states that 
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may become members in order to ‘enjoy economic, security and potentially other 
benefits’ (p. 37). 
 
However, in the international political arena, this requires that region-adapting states 
formally apply to become a community member in which case they have to adapt 
themselves to signed treaties, conventions and resolutions in order to be integrated 
in a process of region-formation or in a consolidated regional organisation. 
 
Sometimes states might have to adapt their own system in order to sign, ratify and 
be able to deposit the official requirements of community member. This also requires 
that region-adapting states learn and internalise the principles and norms of the 
community in such a way that ‘they do not only behave like us, but they learn to be 
one of us’ (Adler, 2005: 184), as in the case of becoming a member of NATO. 
 
In conclusion, small states are exposed to a variety of motivational factors for role 
change and influential intra- and extra- regional actors that might impact on their 
behaviour within a process of constructing a cooperative community. States could 
play various roles which on one hand may make them multifunctional and adaptable 
to many environments (Nabers, 2011). On the other, their interaction and the 
enactment of many subordinate roles could motivate them to change their main role 
or even defect. 
 
In view of this, Adler and Barnett (1998) emphasise the formation and strengthening 
of trust between members, defining trust as ‘a social phenomenon and dependent on 
the assessment that another actor will behave in ways that are consistent with 
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normative expectations’ (p. 44). However, conflicts, as a social phenomenon, do not 
disappear within a cooperative community due to unclear decoding of common 
interests, shared issues and identity conflicts. 
 
2.4 An Emerging Conceptual Framework for the Study of Small States in the 
Construction of UNASUR 
 
One problem with a theoretical framework created to study the role of small states in 
the construction of regions can be that the focus is mainly on small states as single 
units of analysis, and that it consequently ignores the region as a whole. 
Consequently, it can disregard the relationship between domestic factors and 
exterior factors. 
 
Another problem could appear when the international context of the relationship 
between small states and regions is neglected, although the study of these can allow 
the researcher to gain a closer insight into the factors that motivate or force small 
states to construct, or support the construction of, regions. 
 
In order to minimise such issues, this study suggests that an emerging theoretical 
approach is required to understand why Ecuador and Uruguay have supported the 
creation of UNASUR and continue supporting its development. 
 
This emerging theoretical approach is developed on the basis of the leading 
research question for this study in combination with preliminary insights obtained 
through the first contact with the empirical data, such as the UNASUR treaty, the 
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constitutional charter of the Ecuadorian and Uruguayan states, as well as the first-
person semi-structured interviews. 
 
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that the procedure of quizzing qualitative data 
with the research question can help to identify an appropriate existing theoretical 
framework or design a framework for the analysis of qualitative data. 
 
This study adheres to the idea of an emerging theoretical framework and bases it on 
the concepts explained above and on the social constructivist perspective to study 
international relations. Hence, this study relies upon the idea of an inter-subjectively 
constructed reality. Shared ideational factors constitute the driving force for the 
construction of social international structures, and the identities and interests of 
international political actors are shaped by shared ideational factors. 
 
For the purpose of this study, identity, as one ’property of intentional actors that 
generates motivational and behavioural disposition’ as suggested by Wendt (1999: 
224), provides the main explicatory basis for the characterisation of small states 
within the construction of a pluralistic cooperative community. This perspective is in 
congruence with the concepts of identity and pluralistic cooperative community as 
clarified above. 
 
Further factors, such as the interest in constructing, maintaining and strengthening 
national and regional peace, a collective identity, and international communitarian 
cooperation are also relevant. Nevertheless, as suggested by Finnemore (1996), the 
formation of national interest takes place within the realm of identity. Hence, 
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elements of the identity of national actors can be influential factors in the 
engagement of small states in the formation of regions. 
 
According to the clarified approach to categorising small states in the formation of 
regions, both material as well as ideational factors are significant for the 
understanding of their actions or inactions. 
Figure 2. Conceptual framework: identity as factor of influence in the region-engaging character of 
small states 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These actions or inactions in international relations are social behaviours and take 
place in a historical context that is important to understand. Therefore, this 
framework includes antecedent political phenomena relevant to the understanding of 
the process of South American integration [figure 2]. 
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Regarding this, the first step of the analysis requires the identification of such 
relevant international political events to be understood. Interaction with the data and 
the direction given by constructivism, as well as the research question, have helped 
to select the themes and political phenomena to be analysed [figure 2]. 
 
According to social constructivism, international political events and the 
interdependence of states also facilitate the construction of identities and of interest 
in a process of identification of shared identitarian elements. 
 
However, identity as defined above can be progressively shaped through the 
constant interaction of states and through the socialisation of these shared elements 
of identity by one or many actors (Wendt, 1994, 1999). Hence, the interaction 
enables states to identify the ‘me’, the ‘other’, and the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a process of 
progressive feedback which enables them to arrive at a position of the ‘us’ 
phenomenon as illustrated in figure 2. 
 
Moreover, an understanding of the regional and identitarian elements are the basis 
for comprehension of the decision-making process. This reaches agreement with 
Finnemore’s (1996) suggestion that identity plays a decisive role in the decision-
making process regardless of material or ideational return. 
 
Furthermore, from the theoretical elements viewed above, it has been possible to 
infer that within the context of regionalism small states that strongly identify 
themselves with a regional identity or have more identitarian national elements 
reflected in the regional identity are more likely to be region-engaging states. 
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It is for this reason that the study of the shared identitarian links of the single small 
states, Ecuador and Uruguay, alongside the idea of the South American identity, 
should be investigated in order to identify the motivations for their support for the 
construction and consolidation of UNASUR. 
 
In this context, it is significant to ask in the research if the construction of UNASUR 
has received support by Ecuador and Uruguay due to identitarian motivations which 
can be found by discovering identitarian links and identifying the arguments of 
political actors supporting this. 
 
Similarly, the constructivist view of role and behaviour change suggest that once 
identity and a role are defined the results of cooperation are more likely to be as the 
expected rules determine (Nabers, 2011; Harnisch et al., 2011). This idea has 
helped to identify the third step to be studied here as suggested in figure 2. 
 
Step three includes study of the actions of states as international actors in order to 
understand the result of the role they play within the whole process of action and 
interaction of states in UNASUR’s framework. 
 
The selection of political events has been based on the role played so far by the 
case studies, Ecuador and Uruguay. Ecuador has already played the role of 
President Pro Tempore, the leader, within UNASUR, whereas Uruguay has merely 
been a member. But, it has the opportunity to play the role of President Pro Tempore 
in the future according to the agreed regulations of the UNASUR Treaty. 
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This region-engaging action finally leads to integration as the end result of the 
process of interaction of states. This end as suggested above can take the form of a 
pluralistic security community, or can also remain as an international cooperative 
community which requires further theorisation. 
 
However, this study’s objective is not to theorise such kind of cooperation. It aims to 
find some insights that help the understanding of the region-engaging character of 
Ecuador and Uruguay for their support for the construction and strengthening of 
UNASUR. 
 
The focus on the factor of identity and ideas aims to explore the explanatory power 
of social constructivist perspectives in studying small states in the construction of the 
South American region. This is based on the assumption that Latin American and 
newly South American ideas about cooperation, collective values, norms and further 
elementes of a regional identity are fundamental factors for understanding the 
behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay in this process. The following section will shed 
more light on the application of this framework and on the empirical analysis of the 
data gathered for this study. 
 
2.5 The Process of Analysing the Region-engaging Character of Ecuador and 
Uruguay in UNASUR: A Case Study Methodology 
 
The proposition that small states, specifically Ecuador and Uruguay, are considered 
as region-engaging countries can be explain and understood from various 
perspectives. It is related to the way researchers look at the engagement of small 
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states in the construction of the UNASUR and how the different perspectives define 
a case of study. 
 
The materialist perpective to study small states as highlighted in the previous 
chapter would suggest that Ecuador and Uruguay are region-engaging states as 
they are interested in some material and security benefits. In order to explain such 
claims, approaches indebted to a materialistic view would employ a positivist 
approach to knowledge as they are commited to such view (Kurki & Wight, 2010). 
 
The use of a variety of ‘hard’ data, including the numerical data and statistics about 
the investment in the military of the South American countries in the years that 
enclose the creation and strengthening of the UNASUR could form the basis of such 
analysis. This would also highlight the geopolitical weaknesses of the small countries 
in regard to regional or extra-regional powers as shown by Fernández (2012).  I do 
not want to claim that the use of such an approach is wrong, but it dismisses factors 
such as the idea of a South American identity, the meaining of values, norms and a 
collective South American history which are fundamental elements for the formation 
of the UNASUR. 
 
On the basis of the theoretical thinking of instrumentalists as shown in the previous 
chapter, including neo-constitutionalists and neoliberalists, small states would 
engage in the construction of the UNASUR as there is no major cost to join the 
UNASUR. The hypothetical questions could be why should small states not join the 
UNASUR when they would not have major loses when adhering to the idea of a 
South American identity, and does constructing the UNASUR not demand major 
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economic costs? However, the fundamental assumptions of instrumentalists such as 
the principle of a competitive international environment are not the fundamentals of 
the UNASUR. The settings of the UNASUR is based on the principle of equality of 
the states and the principle of communitarian cooperation wherein states 
complement each other for the solution of similar issues and interests. 
 
Moreover, in a similar way to the materialists, instrumentalists base the construction 
of knowledge on a positivist philosophy which has been linked to the gathering of 
numerical data (mainly by using statistics) that would help to ratify or reject certain 
conjectures made about small states that are supposed to act in a competing self-
interested international environment. However, important factors for the 
understanding of such social realities of small states being either ‘region-engaging’, 
region-constraining’ or region-adapting’, including complex factors of collective 
identity, historical context and international political circumstances are disregarded 
by these perspectives. 
 
Firstly, ideas of a collective South American identity are one of the fundamentals for 
the construction of the UNASUR as mentioned above. Such ideas can be explained 
and understood by employing an interpretivist methodology and on the basis of a 
qualitative interpretative analysis as ideas are exposed to contain subjectivity. A 
certain grade of subjectivity is unavoidable particularly in the selection of purposive 
case studies. 
 
Secondly, the historical context is important in the study of international relations. 
South America of the twenty-first century is different to that of the 1960s. World 
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politics of the twenty-first century are different to those of the 1980s, and as Hay 
(2003),  Goetschell (1998a), and Wivel (2010) suggest, small states are now not 
underthreat of being overun by big powers as was the case at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, instead they look for strategies to construct a safe and peaceful 
international environment (ibid.). 
 
Furthermore, the importance of the historical context of the time frame of this study 
as well as the studied historical period is important for the understanding of the role 
of small states in the construction of regions. This perspective allows the country’s, 
region’s and global history, as factors that can influence the behaviour of small 
states, to be taken into consideration. Hence, an interpretative approach is the most 
appropriate perspective to understand the role of Ecuador and Uruguay in the 
process of constructing UNASUR. 
 
The historical particularities of the creation of UNASUR and the historical collective 
background of the majority of the South American countries would be dismissed if an 
alternative approach underpinning a positivist philosophy to knowlegde such as 
statistic analysis was taken into consideration. Moreover, the fact that UNASUR as a 
concept or as a meaningful idea did not exist until its foundation in 2008 can hardly 
be explained and understood from the perspectives that disregard ideas of a South 
American identity and the process of development of the ideas for the creation and 
establishment  of UNASUR as an international organisation. 
 
Thirdly, the historical circumstance of the individual country as well as of the region 
as a whole are also factors that are dismissed by non-interpretivist perspectives. 
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Historical circumstance is conceived here as the dynamics of national and 
international politics and the transformation of the national small state politically and 
socially. These are fundamental factors of certain South American small states of the 
twenty-first century that have influenced their engagement in regional politics and 
should not be disregard when studying their behaviour in regional as well as extra-
regional politics. 
 
Finally, the employment of case studies along with formal modeling and statistical 
studies are the dominating methodologies in international relations (George & 
Bennett, 2005; Harvey & Brecher, 2005). Whereas statistical studies and formal 
modeling focus on mathematical and quantitative related methods driven by positivist 
approaches to knowledge, case studies are related to qualitative analysis. 
Qualitative analysis, on the other hand, can also take either a positivist or an 
interpretative approach. Hence, case studies can also have a variety of types. Most 
of them are related to Miller’s approach to the selection of case studies to reduce 
bias (Gerry, 2007, 2008), but some academics classify them according to the nature 
and aims of the case study (George & Bennett, 2005; Levy, 2005; Maoz, 2005). 
 
Positivist driven methodological case studies underpin the idea of objectivity in the 
process of acquiring knowledge and aim to explain factors of causality (King, 
Keohane & Verba, 1994; Gerry, 2007, 2008). These assumptions are not applied in 
this study for the following reasons. Firstly, the selection of small number cases 
(small-N cases) imply a purposive method. Hence, it  implies subjectivity by nature. 
There is an aim attached to such selection which contains a subjective factor. 
Secondly, the construction of knowledge of subjectively selected cases suggests 
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certain personal intervention in the ways of obtaining data and its analytical 
interpretation as factors of proof. Thirdly, a constructed reality to which this study 
adheres unavoidably contains certain subjectivity that is not possible to objectibly 
explain. Such social reality can be interpreted and understood, but is unlikely to be 
objectively explained. Finally, the expressions of ideas, desires and subjective views 
that form the data collected for this study contain elements that enable us to 
understand the behaviour of political actors, and as such remain intrinsic to the 
cases of study. 
 
Hence, this case study is closely related to what Levy (2005) calls ‘interpretative or 
discipline configurative’ case study as it focusses on specific aspects of single small 
states and the process of analysis is based on the constructivist view that the idea of 
collective South American identity plays an influential role in South American 
regional politics. 
 
Ecuador and Uruguay as case studies have been purposively selected. This means 
that there has been a certain degree of subjectivity in the selection of small-N cases, 
and in the selection of comparative factors within each case which will be clarified 
below. Firstly, researchers aim to design research frameworks that could allow data 
to be collected cumulatively as suggested by Bennett and Elman (2007). 
 
The proposed constructivist (emerging) research design has been constructed in 
order that it enables the study of the region-engaging, region-constraining and 
region-adapting character of small states as single case studies or as in a 
comparative study. The suggested indicators of actions of the international actors 
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and the theoretical assumptions affecting the engagement of small states would 
facilitate this. Hence, the selection of case studies is related to the aims of the study 
and to the understanding of a case. Here, a ‘case’, as suggested by George and 
Bennett (2005), is ‘an instance of a class of events’ which could involve a variety of 
phenomena taking place over time (p. 17). For Miles and Huberman (1994) the 
phenomenon of interest to a researcher in a case study may be a person, process, 
event, group, organisation, or state, among others. In this study, the main 
phenomenon of interest is the small state as an agent in international relations, and 
more specifically the region-engaging character of Ecuador and Uruguay in the 
process of construction and consolidation of UNASUR as mentioned above. 
 
Moreover, this study aims to empirically present and discuss some insights about 
why the small states, Ecuador and Uruguay, have supported the formation and 
strengthening of UNASUR, and highlight identitarian or identity-like elements that 
have probably influenced the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay in the process of 
UNASUR’s construction and consolidation, as highlighted in the previous chapter. 
The term empirical is understood here to mean the process of interpreting both 
directly and indirectly produced data in order to discuss them in contrast with existing 
studies and the theoretical principles underpinning this study. 
 
Hence, the scope of this study embraces a variety of elements of the field of small 
state studies in combination with regionalism considered here as a form of 
international cooperation on various levels within a geographically imagined South 
American area, as suggested above. This constitutes the main international political 
environment of the states investigated here, and the process of construction and 
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consolidation of UNASUR is considered here as the pillar of the South American 
region. 
 
The selection of these cases has been based on a combination of factors including 
the prominence of these states in the construction and strengthening of the 
UNASUR. In the first place, the prominence of such states has been inferred from 
the preliminary analysis of primary data (historic documents) and secondary 
literature. At the same time, the suggested purposive selection facilitates a deeper 
study of the two particular cases of, Ecuador and Uruguay, within the context of the 
whole region, in order to better understand factors of national identity and elements 
of collective regional identity that have possibly influenced the region-engaging 
character of these small states. 
 
Secondly, this pursposeful selection facilitates the analysis of possible explanatory 
factors of a progressive political event allowing the understanding of changes that 
may have happened over a period of time. Thirdly, it adjusts itself to an interpretivist 
epistemological approach without having to deviate from the principles of a 
constructivist ontology that underpins this study. This is also compatible with the 
ontological and epistemological principles of social ‘conventional’ constructivism that 
aim to take the middleground between the radicalist positivists and radical 
reflectivists (Adler, 1997; Fierke, 2010). 
 
Fourth, the selection of these cases present the fundamental advantage for studies 
attempting to examine factors of shared identity that have likely influenced the 
behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction and strengthening of 
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UNASUR as both small states share such historical and cultural factors. Hence, 
these cases can be analysed comparatively on the basis of the following criteria: 
first, since they have been involved in regional international projects on a sub-
regional, Latin American and continental level, it is assumed that they have also 
supported the formation and consolidation of UNASUR. It follows that, they can be 
considered as region-engaging small states as a fundamental basis for comparison. 
 
Secondly, both states now have a democratic political system following a military 
dictatorship. Both are relatively old small states; since they both became 
independent in the 1830s they are among the oldest republics on the planet. They 
share a language, a history, and some of their norms, values and beliefs with their 
fellow members of UNASUR. In other words, they have elements of a collective 
regional identity that can be compared in this study. 
 
But whereas Uruguayan political institutions traditionally belong to the most 
respected and professional of the South American continent, Ecuadorian political 
institutions have suffered from relative weaknesses and low levels of 
professionalism. For instance, Uruguay has historically been a state with high 
political stability. Since returning to democracy the state has not suffered from major 
political or institutional disturbances, whereas Ecuador has suffered throughout its 
history from political instability; from 1997 to 2007 it was presided over by seven 
different governments. These have all helped to shape a national identity that can be 
an obstacle for the development of a collective South American identity. But, has 
such differing history had its effect on the politics, both domestic and international, 
and particularly on the engaging character of these small states? The comparison of 
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these factors can help to deeply understand the power of national as well as of 
collective ideas, and identiarian elements supporting the construction of the 
UNASUR. 
 
Moreover, Ecuador is a very diverse country. It has a national society built by a large 
group of mestizos; and in addition, it possesses 14 nationalities which trace their 
roots to pre-Hispanic ethnicities. In contrast, Uruguayan society is relatively 
homogenous and does not possess such social groups as pre-Hispanic ethnic 
nationalities. Here too, the comparative study of such a difference between these 
two small states can help to understand if such factors have influenced their 
international politics in different ways. 
 
Furthermore, Ecuador is the South American small state with one of the highest 
records of border conflicts with its neighbouring countries. This means it has 
developed a culture of insecurity, whereas Uruguay has enjoyed relative 
international peace and a good relationship with its neighbour states for the last 140 
years. Has this impacted on their different approaches to conducting international 
politics, particularly in relation to the construction of the UNASUR?  
 
Finally, Ecuador has played the role of President Pro Tempore of UNASUR, 
whereas, as yet, this role has not fallen to Uruguay. It may be fair to assume that the 
possibility of a small state like Ecuador or Uruguay being able to play such a leading 
role of President Pro Tempore, and thus make a strong contribution to the region’s 
consolidation, might have proved a motivating force to each in its support for the 
construction of UNASUR. The contrasting analysis of Ecuador’s role as President 
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Pro Tempore and Uruguay’s role as member state of UNASUR can provide more 
insights into the factor of the power of roles within an international organisation and 
the importance of identifying itself as a part of the group in order to achieve collective 
aims. 
 
Various other factors may also influence the behaviour of these two small states 
within the framework of UNASUR. Those pointed out here are merely factors linked 
to the purposive selection and the main aims of this study. Others of importance will 
be further analysed later in the study as explained below. 
 
2.6 Sources of Data and its Interpretative Dimension 
  
This study, as clarified above, considers the engagement of small states as 
embodied in the signing, ratification and depositing of treaties, declarations and in 
conventions with regional international relevance, and conversion to integration as a 
policy of national interest. It aims to show that these actions are an expression of a 
nationally binding consensus within both countries, since the study considers the 
small state to be a corporate actor. 
 
Small states’ participation in the politics of the region, such as in presidential and 
ministerial meetings, their presentation and development of integration projects and 
their promotion for new institutions for cooperation are considered here as further 
evidence on which to base this interpretation. 
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A variety of factors may have influenced the formation of UNASUR, as suggested by 
Sanahuja (2010). Many others may also have played a part in the support from small 
states’ support in constructing a regional organisation of states, as demonstrated in 
the literature review. 
 
My use of the theoretical principles which inform this study’s conceptual framework 
and, indeed, the research question itself (why have Ecuador and Uruguay supported 
UNASUR’s construction and consolidation?) stem from these observations, and 
became my guidelines for selecting my data collection and data analysis methods. 
 
When I first came into contact with documents such as the 2008 UNASUR Treaty, 
the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, and the Uruguayan Broad Front Party’s 2005-
2009 Governmental Plan, I was further prompted in the direction of a cross-case 
analysis method. 
 
My first interview with an ex-official of the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
confirmed my decision; the collection of data from a combination of three sources 
(documents, interviews and political speeches) would capture the debates of the 
decision-making process and clarify why both countries support UNASUR’s 
construction. 
 
Following various interviews and the gathering of more data, I identified six main 
themes related to the engagement of Ecuador and Uruguay in the construction of the 
South American region: 1) visions of national and regional peace, 2) the similar 
political ideology of their political elites and national leaders, 3) the expectations they 
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placed on a new form of international cooperation, 4) their identification of links 
between national and regional identity, 5) the influence of external forces, and 6) a 
dissatisfaction with existing mechanisms for international economic cooperation as a 
means of integration. 
 
The evidence to illustrate their vision of national and regional peace and international 
cooperation are defined here as narratives of international regional projection and 
statements of the national political objectives entertained both by governments 
themselves and by influential elite groups. This includes documents such as treaties, 
declarations, agreements and memoranda signed in unanimity within the framework 
of UNASUR and its predecessor organisations. 
 
Evidence can also be drawn from statements made by members of the political elite 
or national leaders calling for international cooperation in the area of security; for 
maintaining and strengthening national and regional peace, and documented in their 
speeches addressed to the nation’s population and to other states of the region. 
 
Features of a national and regional identity can be furthermore recognised in claims 
made in the preamble of treaties and agreements as well as in the promotion of 
integration projects and the public speeches of members of the political elite and 
national leaders within an international political environment.   
 
Similar narratives concerning both national and integration politics, documented in 
statements and governmental programmes of the national parties in power and the 
speeches of members of the political elite and national leaders, can show the extent 
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to which political ideological similarities between national political leaders and 
cognitive communities exist. Moreover, the study also relies on information gathered 
through field trips, and taken from my own personal experience. 
 
Increasing dissatisfaction with regional international mechanisms for economic 
cooperation and integration, and the influence of external forces are considered here 
to be reflected in the narratives of members of the political elite and national leaders, 
and in the claims they have made, as documented in interviews and political 
speeches.  
 
These can also be identified in official governmental press releases, and bilateral 
and multilateral declarations and agreements. It also comprises ideas, objectives 
and projects expressed in the Ideological Manifestoes; Political and Action Plans of 
the governing parties from both, Ecuador and Uruguay. 
 
The use of statistical or quantitative methods has been avoided in this study based 
on the conviction that such methods narrowly enable the understanding of historical 
transformation, political processes and political actions that underpin ideas, and 
identitarian elements of a collective identity that form the core of this investigation. 
Moreover, the kind of data gathered (documents, semistructured interviews, and 
political speeches) can be satisfactorily analysed by employing a qualitative 
interpretative method as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). So, the use of 
cross-case analysis has been selected, and it relies on an interpretation of the levels 
of action or interaction of states, or of the factors influencing the small states’ 
behaviour. These levels are regarded as high (H), medium (M), and low (L). This 
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categorisation is based on the degree and significance of engagement evident in the 
data in accordance with the criteria for a region-engaging small state as suggested 
above. 
 
As can be seen, the study relies on an appropriate analytical judgement of the level 
of significance of the evidence identified in the data that is inferred by contrasting 
with the indicators of political action of small states proposed in the analytical 
framework, in relation to the research question and on the basis of an interpretation 
which, as suggested by Hey (1995), facilitates accurate insights into the environment 
and dynamics of the local and foreign politics of the researched states. 
 
This qualitative interpretative analysis has been conducted by examining a set of 
speeches made by political officials in both countries, by conducting semi-structured 
interviews of members of both their political elites, and by reading documents from 
South American presidential and ministerial meetings between 2000 and 2012. 
Firstly, I isolated the meanings, narratives and statements they contained. These I 
have then interpreted and developed chronologically, to form two single case 
studies. To them I applied a cross-case analysis approach as developed by Miles 
and Huberman (1994). They suggest that the cross-case analysis method can be 
applied to develop descriptions of cases, explore their similarities and divergences, 
build explanations, develop propositions and make generalisations across them. This 
study explores the similarities and divergences of cases and also aims to gain 
explanatory insights into the influence of identitarian collective elements in the 
behaviour of small states, as mentioned above. 
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Moreover, this method supports the examination of various kinds of qualitative data, 
and in order to strengthen the results of the analysis, the insights gained in each 
case study are further discussed and contrasted with each case and with existing 
studies. 
 
Finally, the use of special analytical software and further digital tools is also possible 
in cross-case analysis (ibid.). However, this study has employed NVivo software for 
qualitative analysis as a sole tool for the organisation and manipulation of raw data. 
The data is drawn from archival documents from 2000 to 2012. These include 
information regarding the introduction of the Initiative for Integration of Regional 
Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), and the creation of the South American 
Community of Nations (CSN). They also describe the creation of UNASUR and its 
development until the sanctions imposed on Paraguay in 2012, (obtained from 
http://www.iirsa.org  and http://www.unasursg.org). 
 
This data has been selected and reduced to 184 documents, which were 
chronologically classified with the support of NVivo, coded according to the emergent 
themes or within-cases mentioned above and analysed using a preliminary within-
case method. These documents are referred to in this study as IIRSA and UNASUR 
documents with their respective year of publication. 
 
This information was then complemented by 800 chronologically classified official 
press releases from foreign offices and national media regarding the political 
participation, action and inaction of Ecuador within regional international processes 
(acquired from http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec ; http://www.elciudadano.-gob.ec ; 
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http://www.movimientoalianzapais.com.ec). Further important data includes the 
minutes of plenary sessions of the Ecuadorian National Assembly within which the 
debates for the ratification of the UNASUR treaty were conducted. 
 
The documental data for the study of Uruguay comprise a set of 159 chronologically 
classified archival documents, official press releases and governmental publications 
regarding the involvement of Uruguay in the processes of integration (obtained from 
http://www.presidencia.gub.uy ; http://www.frente amplio.org.uy and 
http://www.mmrree.gub.uy). 
 
Further important sources of information used are the minutes of the plenary 
sessions of the Chamber of Representatives and the Chamber of Senators of the 
Uruguayan Parliament where the debates were conducted and the decision made to 
ratify the UNASUR treaty. 
 
I have made use of five semi-structured personal interviews with high profile 
members of the Ecuadorian political elites and a set of nineteen political speeches of 
governmental officials regarding South American politics (seven were personally 
recorded during direct participation in academic events in Quito in June 2012, and 
twelve are transcripts of political speeches made by the presidents and ministers 
during the period 2000-2012. These were obtained from http://w 
ww.presidencia.gob.ec and http://www.cancilleria.gob.ec). 
 
The study of Uruguay also draws on six semi-structured personal interviews to 
political figures from past and present governments. I have also made use of a set of 
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nineteen political speeches of governmental officials (seven were personally 
recorded during direct participation in an academic event in Montevideo in April 
2012, and twelve are transcripts of speeches and debates obtained from 
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy and http://www.presidencia.gub.uy). Appendix 1 
includes the clarification of the selected, organised data of the three types of data for 
both cases. 
 
Finally, these public speeches of high governmental authorities regarding their 
foreign policies within UNASUR were recorded and gathered over a ten-month 
period of fieldwork in Ecuador and Uruguay between September 2011 and June 
2012, and include public speeches made by the Ecuadorean president, Rafael 
Correa, and the Uruguayan president, Jose Mujica, before 2013. 
 
The semi-structured personal interviews with members of the political elite of both 
states were conducted from February to June 2012, and in June 2013. Appendix 2 
shows the process of data collection and a sample of questions asked to the 
interviewees. 
 
On the basis of the cross-case analysis as suggested by Miles and Huberman 
(1994), the documents, the transcribed political speeches and interviews were first 
analysed singly within each case, in the following six stages. 
 
First, the chronologically organised documents, transcripts of speeches and 
interviews were preliminarily coded. This facilitated the inductive application of a mix-
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match method of descriptive or topical coding, structural or interpretative coding, and 
pattern coding according to the themes identified in the first contact with the data. 
 
This also enabled the development of ten descriptive codes and ten interpretative or 
structural codes3 in accordance with the main focus of this study and its 
underpinning theories, which were inductively applied in an analysis of each case’s 
internal data, as suggested by Miles and Huberman (1994). This also helped to find 
the links between the national and international historical contexts contained in the 
different kinds of data. 
 
Secondly, the results of this process were further examined and categorised into 
patterns of nodes and organised in folders according to the main focus and the six 
study themes for each case study. Appendix 3 contains the list of the most relevant 
emergent themes and nodes identified and developed throughout the data analysis. 
 
This enabled a refinement of the data and determination of its location in the 
chronologically ordered list for a deeper within-case study, in relation to the historical 
context of the most relevant narratives, terms and expressions that convey my 
evidence. 
 
Thirdly, further analysis facilitated the identification of a pattern of nodes. This was 
carried out on all sets of themes. These nodes and theme patterns were interpreted 
                                                          
3 The literature uses codes and nodes in an alternating way to mean the same. In this study, codes and nodes 
are tags or labels that assign meaning to themes, expressions and concepts that are found during the data 
analysis. 
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in accordance with the circumstances and historical context within which the 
utterances, statements and claims were made. 
 
This was complemented with memos concerning the insights, perceptions and 
inferences noted down as the research was conducted. This constituted a 
preliminary step for the writing and discussion stage. 
 
Fourth, the contrast between memos with the most salient themes and nodes and a 
comparison with theoretical explanations facilitated interpretation of the evidence 
and the improvement of the written memos. These memos formed the foundation for 
the final inferences and written stage. 
 
Fifth, on the basis of the theoretical framework, the patterns of information and codes 
previously created were examined and relationships identified. This helps delineate 
connections or links between the relevant factors that help to understand by 
inference the engagement of Ecuador and Uruguay in UNASUR.  
 
The use of three sources of data, namely documents, interviews and speeches, 
further enabled comparison of the inferences from the different data sets with each 
other, and the observation of corresponding themes emerging throughout the data 
analysis process. As recommended by Bryman (2012), this can help to avoid pitfalls 
and potential preconceived notions of propositions’ proof. 
 
To conclude, the insights obtained through the study of each individual case of 
Ecuador and Uruguay, either as single case studies or within-case study, were 
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subsequently analysed by contrasting the two cases as suggested by Miles and 
Huberman (1994). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has aimed to clarify some concepts underpinning this study, to define a 
theoretical framework and to depict the methodology employed in the investigation. 
Consequently, ‘small state’ has been defined here as the social construction of a 
sovereign political entity whose quality of small-ness is based on the shared 
understanding and collective recognition of states characterised as  ‘small’ within the 
national and international community. Such a state exhibits an identity and 
possesses agency, and as such it prompts an arena for government action beyond 
its national borders. 
 
A region has been considered here as a cooperative community which develops 
from the interaction of states, and from their decision to cooperate on the basis of 
shared identitarian elements which allow them to identify with one another, define 
collective interests and shared issues, and collectively resolve any problems that 
spring from them. 
 
Small states as international political actors in the construction of regions can be 
classified as ‘region-engaging’, region-constraining’, or ‘region-adapting’. This 
categorisation of small states constitutes the first step towards defining a 
constructivist framework for the study of Ecuador and Uruguay in UNASUR. 
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The conceptual framework is based on elements of social constructivism. Wendt’s 
(1999) social constructivism and Adler and Barnett’s (1998) theoretical framework for 
analysing emerging security communities, characterised here as pluralistic 
cooperative communities, are combined with elements of role theory developed by 
Nabers (2011) and Harnisch et al. (2011). Moreover, this framework is underpinned 
by fundamental constructivist assumptions such as the influence of identity on a 
state’s behaviour and the definition of its interests, as suggested by Finnemore 
(1996) and Wendt (1999). 
 
It highlights the way of understanding identity and identity change as concepts  
which help to explain the behaviour of small states in the formation of regions as 
pluralistic cooperative communities. This chapter has also given an account of a 
case study methodology, which can fit the type of interpretative case study as 
suggested by Levy (2005), as the purposive selection and the aims of these case 
studies are entwined with constructivist theoretical principles of collective identity 
formation and interest.  
 
Finally, this chapter clarifies the process of data analysis through the use of cross-
case analysis. The qualitative data gathered and analysed comprises semi-
structured interviews with members of the political elite, archival documents from 
Ecuador and Uruguay, and political speeches. 
 
In order to answer the research question, these data have been selected according 
to information evident in them concerning the interest in maintaining national and 
regional peace, the similar political ideology of the political elite and national leaders, 
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the interest in international communitarian cooperation, the elements of identification 
of a collective or regional identity, the influence of external forces, and an increasing 
dissatisfaction with existing regional organisations. 
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Chapter 3: Small States in the Construction of the South 
American Union of Nations (UNASUR): Case Study Ecuador 
 
3.1 Introduction 
   
In July 2009, Ecuador ratified the UNASUR Treaty that had been signed by all South 
American heads of state and the government in May 2008. Consequently, Ecuador 
became the second South American state after Bolivia to support the consolidation 
of this new project of South American integration. 
 
This decisive position of Ecuador demonstrated an evident endorsement for the 
construction of the South American region on the basis of creating an authentic 
South American identity, as is stated by the UNASUR treaty. 
 
This region-engaging behaviour of Ecuador is in contrast with its position regarding 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project driven by the United States of 
America. Ecuador had been negotiating with the USA for the creation of this 
continental free trade area, as had many of the South American states, but 
discontinued its negotiations shortly before signing the foundational treaty of 
UNASUR. 
 
On the basis of the research question for this study (namely, why has Ecuador 
supported the creation and consolidation of UNASUR?) and the set of concepts 
clarified above, my investigation has analysed a set of archival documents, 
interviews and political speeches, as explained in the previous chapter, and has 
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identified an increasing interaction of the Ecuadorian state with most of the South 
American states over the last decade. 
 
This political dynamic of Ecuador with the region is likely to have influenced its 
behaviour in international relations, and its preferences in regional politics. 
Consequently, it has probably influenced the Ecuadorian role in regional integration. 
 
This chapter presents an interpretative insight into the process of Ecuadorian action 
in the creation and consolidation of UNASUR. Its first section elucidates the historical 
context of the Ecuadorian domestic politics before the creation of UNASUR. The 
second section further clarifies the underpinning motivations for Ecuadorian support 
for the creation of UNASUR, and the third section looks at the role taken by Ecuador 
in the process of consolidation of UNASUR, exemplified through the process of 
creation of the South American Defence Council (CSD), and the process of 
ratification of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR. 
 
3.2 The Sick State and Disappointment with the Economic Mechanisms of 
Integration: Historical Background 
 
The analysis of the minutes of the plenary sessions of the Ecuadorian National 
Assembly shows that the representatives of the Ecuadorian people did not hesitate 
to approve the UNASUR treaty, nor did they amply question the significance of this 
new South American integration project. The Ecuadorian National Assembly 
discussed it between March and May 2009, and ratified it following a short debate in 
a plenary session of the house on 14 May 2009. 
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There was minimum objection to the ratification of the treaty. Out of the 59 
Ecuadorian Assembly members, 51 voted in favour, two voted against and there 
were six abstentions. This legally enabled the Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa to 
sign and publish the declaration ratifying the foundational treaty of UNASUR on 15 
July 2009. 
 
One of Ecuador’s motivation for the ratification of UNASUR membership is based on 
the compatibility of the UNASUR treaty with the new Ecuadorian Constitution of 
2008. Articles 423, 417, and particularly article 416 of Title VIII, clearly emphasises 
from paragraphs nine to eleven that Ecuador: 
 
‘9. Recognises international law as a norm of conduct of the states and demands the 
democratisation of the international organisations with a fair participation of the 
member states within them. 10. Fosters the construction of multipolar global order 
with an active participation of the economic and political regional organisations, and 
the strengthening of the horizontal relationships for the construction of a solidary, 
diverse, multicultural, and just world. 11. Primarily promotes the political, cultural and 
economic integration of the Andean region, South America, and Latin America’ 
(Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2008:186). 
 
Moreover, the President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the National 
Assembly, in Housing Act 040, 2009, justifies this Ecuadorian decision by arguing 
that UNASUR contains hope for a new political direction for South America with a 
shared history and values, a decision that set up the foundation of the Great 
Fatherland envisaged by the Libertador, Simón Bolivar. He assures that their 
decision to support the consolidation of UNASUR by ratifying its treaty also contains 
the hope for: 
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‘…another future, one which will enable us to live as humanity deserves, which is 
much more than just a response to the crisis of global capitalism. One which is much 
more than a cultural and political response to the North American imperialism…’ 
(Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2009: 111). 
 
‘…the Union of South American Nations is justified by the imperative vocation to 
unify and create integrated spaces between our states, our cultures and languages, 
to unify our peoples with a universal destiny, as South America is much more than 
one culture, nationality and state. It is a real entity in itself …which when 
consolidated will have tasks to fulfil’ (Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2009: 113). 
 
This analysis identifies three historical aspects prior to the signature and ratification 
of the UNASUR treaty that help to show why Ecuador found it  imperative to support 
the consolidation of this project of regional integration. 
 
One is the national political situation, the other is Ecuadorian external relations, 
particularly, and its relationship with the United States of America, Colombia and 
Peru; the third stems from the Ecuadorian disappointment about economic 
integration. 
 
The first aspect has been elucidated by looking at the Ecuadorian cultural 
configuration on the one hand, and at the political developments of Ecuador in the 
decades prior to the signature of the treaty on the other. 
 
Regarding the Ecuadorian cultural configuration: not including the mestizos4 and the 
white population, the Republic of Ecuador embraces fourteen nationalities which 
have been built on the basis of their ethnic origins.  Together, they form an 
                                                          
4 Mestizo is a term that according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Academy of Language is used to describe 
descendants of a mixed race, namely, of a white and Amerindian race. 
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Ecuadorian population of about 14.5 million. This composition of the population 
challenges any attempt to speak of a cohesive Ecuadorian nation. 
 
Hence, the Ecuadorian identity is the ‘unfinished’ and ‘fragmented’ (Zepeda & 
Verdesoto, 2011: 21) jigsaw, which gathers values, norms and traditions from a 
mixture of Andean, European and African cultures. 
 
This diversity of ethnicities, cultures and civilizations has, as a result, historically 
affected the consolidation of Ecuador’s collective identity. Hence, exclusion of the 
rural social population, of the indigenous nationalities5 and further ethnic minorities 
has been a customary aspect of the administration of the Ecuadorian state. 
  
Moreover, Ecuadorian politics and economy has been dominated by a small elite 
group, who disregarded national common welfare in order to protect their personal 
interests (Barreiro, 2002). This dominant elite described as mainly ‘”white” from 
European Spanish origin’ (Silva, 2004: 34) once had equal influence on the 
principles of the Ecuadorian state’s international relations. 
 
However since the end of the 1980s, throughout the country more Ecuadorian 
people from ethnic minorities and discriminated rural areas have also been able to 
access higher education and have begun to request more social and political 
participation, as well as more social services. This is an Ecuadorian phenomenon 
shared with other Andean states such as Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela. 
                                                          
5 The Ecuadorian constitution of 2008 considers the Ecuadorian state as ‘plurinational’ state, a reference to the 
various ancestral ethnic and cultural groups that have historically inhabited Ecuadorian territory. This study 
uses the typical notion of nation, state or country to refer to the Ecuadorian national state as a political 
organisation that includes all ancestral nationalities. 
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These social groups have demanded more political participation in the national as 
well as in the international affairs of the state (Ramírez, 2011). 
 
These demands caused a period of social unrest which threatened to paralyse the 
entire country, as roads were blocked and complete cities were occupied by the 
indigenous movements and civil groups. Hence, a formal recognition of the diversity 
of cultures, ethnicities and identities was made by the state through the National 
Constitution of 1998. This declared Ecuador as multicultural and multi-ethnic state. 
 
Nevertheless, the social unrest did not cease as the economic neo-liberal policies 
implemented in the country collided with the demands of a more distributive justice 
demanded by the ethnic groups, a justice founded on a community-based economy 
which some Ecuadorian indigenous communities have traditionally maintained until 
now (De la Torre, 2006). 
 
This view of national economy radically differed from the individualist capitalist-based 
economy of the state, but has indisputably influenced the transformation of national 
policies as well as the construction of a new Ecuadorian identity in recent decades. 
 
In relation to the Ecuadorian political situation and its historical transformation, 
Ecuador was constitutionally founded as a member state of the Federative Nation of 
the Republic of Colombia with an independent government in September 1830.  
 
From 1830 to 2012, it became one of the states with the highest number of 
constitutional and governmental changes. It had 105 governments, an average of 20 
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months per government, including many dictatorships. The last military dictatorship 
lasted from 1972 to 1979. 
 
The Ecuadorian national constitution has changed 20 times, three times since 
returning to democracy, namely in 1979, 1998, and 2008. And the Ecuadorian 
nationalities have only been recognised in the political affairs of the state since 1996 
when the Plurinational Unity Movement, Pachakutik Party, was created. 
 
In the decade prior to the signature of the UNASUR treaty in 2008, Ecuador 
experienced the most politically unstable period of all the South American states. It 
had seven different governments: Abdalá Bucaram Ortiz, August 1996 - February 
1997; Fabian Alarcón Rivera, February 1997 – August 1998; Jamil Mahuad, August 
1998 – January 2000; Gustavo Noboa, January 2000 – January 2003; Lucio 
Gutiérrez Borbúa, January 2003 – April 2005; Alfredo Palacio, April 2005 – January 
2007; and Rafael Correa Delgado, January 2007 – until the present. For good 
reasons this period can be characterised as the decade of the Ecuadorian sick state. 
 
Political instability driven by the various ethnic groups and the socially excluded was 
exacerbated by nationalist and military groups who did not agree with the project to 
sign a peace treaty with Peru. 
 
This project started during the Presidency of Sixto Durán Ballén, 1992-1996, 
following the last Ecuadorian-Peruvian border conflict in 1995, and culminated with 
the signature of the Treaty of Itamaraty in 1998. 
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The situation nationally deteriorated during the presidency of President Abdalá 
Bucaram, when he lost the support of the National Congress which removed him 
from power in 1997, illegally nominating as his successor the President of the 
National Congress, Fabian Alarcón, for the rest of the governmental period. This kind 
of political phenomenon repeated itself for the following ten years. 
 
The global financial crisis further complicated the political situation as Ecuador’s 
economy started shrinking. The newly elected government led by Jamil Mahuad in 
conjunction with the political and economic elites, further exacerbated the socio-
economic situation due to the implementation of inappropriate economic policies 
(Correa, 2011), resulting in a banking and monetary crisis. 
 
This caused the closure of several banks, the retention of citizen funds for more than 
a year, the devaluation of the currency by 245% and its replacement with the US 
dollar (ibid). 
 
Consequently, a civil-military alliance led by Antonio Vargas, leader of the 
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), and Colonel Lucio 
Gutiérrez overthrew President Jamil Mahuad on 21 January 2000, placing the Vice-
president, Gustavo Noboa, in power for the rest of the governmental period. 
 
These events catapulted Colonel Lucio Gutiérrez, of the newly created Patriotic 
Society Party, into power. This party, in alliance with the Ecuadorian indigenous left-
wing party, Pachakutik, won the national elections in 2002. 
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In 2003, Gutiérrez assumed the presidency within a political environment of high 
mistrust and instability. Moreover, Gutiérrez’s national allies, the indigenous political 
organisations and other left-oriented social movements, campaigned for the 
cancellation of the US-American driven Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
negotiations. Instead they demanded the prioritisation of national socio-economic 
and Latin American-oriented integration policies (Buono, 2006). 
 
These contrasting political views created a disturbing political environment as 
Gutiérrez’s government continued to negotiate the FTAA, causing the rupture of the 
political alliance only a few months into power. Consequently, social uprisings 
intensified across the country, becoming a daily routine in the capital city of Quito. 
 
This discontentment manifested itself violently when President Gutiérrez, in an 
alliance with legislators of the Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriano (PRE) and the Partido 
Renovador Institucional Acción Nacional (PRIAN), dismissed the Supreme Court of 
Justice, violating fundamental democratic principles and the National Charter which 
guaranteed the independence of the judiciary. 
 
Consequently, a combination of social movements and the withdrawal of military 
protection for the president forced President Gutiérrez to abandon the presidential 
residency and look for protection, originally in the Brazilian embassy, on 19 April 
2005. Some time later, he was flown to Brazil in a rescue manoeuvre agreed by 
Ecuadorian military forces (Lucas, 2005; De la Torre, 2006). 
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Following the overthrow of Gutiérrez, Vice-president Alfredo Palacio assumed the 
Ecuadorian presidency on 20 April 2005, whereupon he proclaimed the re-
foundation of the state and the obligation to negotiate the Free Trade Agreement 
with the USA on an equal and sovereign basis. 
 
However, the negotiations froze a few months later. Although the threatening political 
unrest had not ended completely by the end of his mandate in 2007, an economic 
recovery enabled him to claim that his government had recovered national 
independence and sovereignty, re-established democratic institutions, and 
reconstructed the national state in consensus with the rural communities and 
ethnicities. 
 
A final factor considered here is the new Ecuadorian politics when the political 
movement Revolución Ciudadana or Movimiento País emerged in 2005. The 
Revolución Ciudadana can be characterised as a new tendency of left-wing oriented 
politics in Ecuador that emerged on the basis of an ideal of transforming the 
institutions of state. This can also be considered as the resulting civil reaction to a 
decade of high political instability, as highlighted above. 
 
The idea of re-establishing the Ecuadorian state with a socialist-oriented agenda 
began taking shape with the creation of the Moviemiento Patria Altiva I Soberana 
(País) in 2005, otherwise known as Alianza PAIS and Revolución Ciudadana, and 
the election of a new government led by President Rafael Correa. 
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Rafael Correa originally served the state as a finance minister for the government of 
Palacio in 2005, from which he resigned following a difference of opinion with 
financial advisors from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). He then stood 
victorious after the general elections of 2006 becoming the seventh president to lead 
Ecuador in ten years. In January 2007, he assumed power while the social unrest 
appeared to lessen. 
 
In contrast to previous Ecuadorian presidents, who came from economically 
privileged families, Rafael Correa grew up in a lower-middle class family from the 
coastal city of Guayaquil. His Catholic beliefs and involvement in various social 
projects in the Ecuadorian Andean regions have helped him gain a clear 
understanding of the various life perspectives of the Ecuadorian nationalities as well 
as the opposing views of the role of the state amongst the Ecuadorian people. 
 
Moreover, his education in Ecuador itself as well as his sponsored, post-graduate 
studies in Belgium and the USA have helped him to have a more accurate 
understanding of international political and economic dynamics and their influence 
on the affairs of the Ecuadorian state. 
 
Furthermore, his experience as a lecturer in Political Economy in Quito, his direct 
contact with indigenous communities as a volunteer as well as his basic 
understanding of the Quechua language, the main means of communication 
between the indigenous nationalities, has allowed him to portray himself as a 
politician who gathers under his leadership the diversity of the country and defies the 
threats of sectarian, regionalised or elite groups in Ecuador. 
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President Rafael Correa’s identification with the diversity of the whole nation as well 
as with the Western democracies has been supported by his political discourse. This 
entailed disapproval of the traditional political and economic elites and accused them 
of speaking in Spanish but dreaming in English. 
 
The combination of these factors with a pro-South American discourse has helped 
Rafael Correa and the Alianza País to present themselves as possible saviours of a 
country that had been on the edge of a political tragedy between 1997 and 2007. 
 
Alianza País was then in need of major popular support. They won this by their 
decision not to put forward candidates for election to the National Congress, in a 
symbolic rejection of the political practices of the past. 
 
In this way, the legitimacy of Correa’s governmental policies was based on the 
support of the electorate for his socially-oriented project for Ecuador. His political 
movement governed without a single representative in the National Congress in 
2007, and many of the members of his cabinet were recruited from universities, with 
no major political experience. This displaced a distance from the old political 
practices, and was seen as a signal of renewal. 
 
The proposed reconstruction of Ecuadorian political institutions still represented one 
of the major challenges for Correa’s leadership and his political organisation 
Movimiento País, since the process required the approval of the National Congress, 
the legislative house, still dominated by some of the old political parties. It was the 
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National Congress’s prerogative to approve a referendum to elect a National 
Constitutional Assembly to formulate the new National Constitution. 
  
However, public polls showed the continually increasing acceptance of Correa’s 
political leadership. He has reached the highest level of approval obtained by a 
leader in recent decades at about 82% (Vazquez and Saltos, 2011). 
 
Hence, following various civil demonstrations in front of the National Congress 
building, the National Congress was forced to approve Alianza País’s plan of electing 
a National Constitutional Assembly for the formulation of a new Ecuadorian 
Constitution. 
 
The elected National Constitutional Assembly started its deliberations on the new 
legislation for a new constitution in Montecristi, Manabí, on 30 November 2007. The 
new Ecuadorian Constitution was then approved by a national referendum on 28 
September 2008. 
 
This political transformation ended a decade which I have characterised as the 
decade of the sick Ecuadorian state. At the same time, it was a political 
transformation which set up new norms for the Ecuadorian state’s political action in 
the regional integration process. 
 
This political instability and the consequent transformation of Ecuadorian norms are 
deeply embedded within the second aspect to be considered in this section, namely 
Ecuadorian external relations. 
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My investigation has identified one process that ends with the arrival of the 
Revolución Ciudadana to power, and another starting with the beginning of the 
reform of the Ecuadorian state. The latter process took place while the UNASUR 
treaty was being negotiated. As a result this process will constantly reappear, 
embedded in the further historical events analysed here and throughout this study. 
 
In relation to the period prior to the arrival of Rafael Correa to power, this study has 
identified that Ecuadorian external relations were dominated mainly by its 
relationship with the USA, and to its neighbour states Colombia and Peru. However, 
there is little evidence of an Ecuadorian foreign policy during this period. The 
Ecuadorian exterior policies were mainly improvised and determined by its 
responses to other states’ actions. 
 
Francisco Carrión, one of the senior Ecuadorian diplomats and a Foreign Minister 
during the last years of Palacio’s government, assured me in a personal interview in 
2012 that ‘there was neither a state policy nor a governmental political strategy’ 
during this period. 
 
Nevertheless, analysis of documents from the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
from 2000-2008 shows an attempt to design a national plan for foreign policy, the 
PLANEX 2020, in 2006. 
 
This was intended to redirect Ecuadorian international relations. Here, relations with 
the United States of America, Colombia and Peru were still considered the 
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Ecuadorian state’s international priority. In regard to this, Ecuador maintained closer 
relationships with these three states in two main fields. One is related to national 
security in military terms and the other involves the area of international trade. The 
other contains economic cooperation. 
 
In the first place, following the Second World War, the Ecuadorian and US American 
relationship in the field of security can be described as discreet due to the US 
American guarantor role for the Ecuadorian and Peruvian signature of the Rio de 
Janeiro Protocol from 1942. This was signed following the Ecuadorian-Peruvian 
border conflict in 1941. 
 
However, Ecuador as well as the other Andean states such as Colombia, Peru and 
Bolivia, fell into a dependent and compliant relationship with the USA at the 
beginning of the 1990s (Barreiro, 2002). 
 
In the case of Ecuador, this tendency was further radicalised when the Ecuadorian 
air force base of Manta was conceded to the USA in 1999, and the Plan Colombia 
implemented by the neighbour country of Colombia with support of the USA in 2000.  
 
Secondly, Ecuador traditionally aimed to maintain cordial relationships with Colombia 
in the area of security. Hence, the Northern Ecuadorian borders shared with 
Colombia were not substantively conceived as a major security problem for 
Ecuadorians until the end of the twentieth century, despite the evident Colombian 
national crisis caused by the presence of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
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Colombia (FARC) and further militarised groups on the other side of Ecuadorian 
territory. 
 
However, these armed groups became an obvious issue for Ecuadorian security 
when the Colombian government launched Plan Colombia in 2000 (López, 2004; 
Saavedra, 2007). This aimed to eradicate coca plantations in the Colombian 
Amazonian region by the use of military force. This region had largely been under 
the administrative control of the FARC. Hence, the implementation of Plan Colombia 
caused the displacement of Colombian refugees from the zone of combat to 
Ecuador. 
 
Moreover, the use of the military base of Manta by the USA and the support of the 
USA for Plan Colombia transformed Ecuadorian neutrality in the Colombian conflict 
into indirect support of Plan Colombia. These issues started challenging Ecuadorian 
security in the North Amazonian region. 
 
At the same time, the concession of the Ecuadorian air force base of Manta to the 
USA for a ten year period in 1999 exacerbated the discontent of civilian groups with 
the government led by President Jamil Mahuad, as this compromise was made by 
breaking the constitutional laws of Ecuador. 
 
The Ecuadorian Constitution of 1998 in its Article 161, sub-section 2, ruled that 
treaties or agreements establishing a military alliance required the approval of the 
National Congress. 
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However, analysis of documents of the audit made by the Commission for Foreign 
Affairs of the National Assembly in 2009, shows that this agreement, signed by 
Ecuador with the USA under the government of Jamil Mahuad, was without the 
approval of the Ecuadorian National Congress. 
 
Finally, the relationship with Peru in the field of security started improving as the 
historical border conflict was solved through the Peace Agreement of Itamaraty, 
Brasilia, in 1998. 
 
Three military conflicts had been conducted by Ecuador against Peru in the twentieth 
century. Two of them were fought in the final decades of the last century as a 
consequence of undefined borders. 
 
One of these arose in 1981; and a new border conflict occurred in 1995, and 
threatened to stifle attempts to establish an amicable relationship between the two 
countries. But the resulting peace agreement terminated a long period of 
international instability in the region, and facilitated the coordination of projects for 
development on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. 
 
Regarding the area of economic cooperation and international trade with the USA, 
Ecuador (as most South American states) has been exposed to the strong economic 
influence of the USA since the beginning of the last century. 
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This is, quite simply, related to the lack of diversification of Ecuadorian international 
trade. Ecuadorian products have been sold mainly to the US market. In this way, 
trade became a means of political manoeuvring in the Ecuador-US relationship. 
 
The Ecuadorian trade concentrated so intensively on the US market that some of the 
Ecuadorian members of the elite accepted ’99.5 per cent’ dependence on the USA in 
the 1980s and 1990s. In this bilateral relationship, its position as a small state 
converted Ecuador into a country of dependency and compliance with the USA (Hey, 
1993: 553; 1995a). 
 
Moreover, the Ecuadorian elite groups were blinded by their personal interests and 
could not envisage a state united by a common good (Barreiro, 2002). They 
implemented neo-liberal measures which did not consider the welfare of the majority 
of Ecuadorians. For example, they implemented policies in accordance with the 
Washington Consensus which clearly did not favour all state’s inhabitants. 
 
This Ecuadorian-US relationship was further influenced through the US Free Trade 
Area of the Americas (FTAA) project which aimed to expand the newly created North 
American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) to the whole of America as a continent. 
 
Members of the Ecuadorian elite from the field of international trade and politics 
supported this US project until the late years of the Presidency of Alfredo Palacio. In 
contrast, civil groups and the indigenous population opposed the FTAA, refused the 
governmental priority of paying foreign debts at the expense of social services, and 
rejected pro-US foreign policies. 
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However, negotiations for the FTAA intensified at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. Meetings were conducted in Quito under the leadership of Ecuador within 
the various Sectorial Committees. Ecuador, as part of the group of small economies 
and as a member of the Andean Community of Nations, held regular meetings on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis in order to find common South American positions and 
negotiate with the USA. 
 
Despite this, the FTAA project found various hindrances related to the vulnerability of 
small states and the opposition of civil and political groups. The arrival of the 
indigenous party, Pachakutik, to form the government in 2003 can be associated 
with the collapse of negotiations over the FTAA in Ecuador, as they and other left-
oriented social movements demanded their cancellation. 
 
However, President Lucio Gutierrez’s open statement of a special friendship with, 
and commitment to the USA, and his signature complying with the demands of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) impacted on the stability of his government and 
lost more popular support. 
 
This ended with his removal from power in April 2005. Nevertheless, as the failure of 
the FTAA was envisaged, it was transformed into the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 
on a bilateral basis. Ecuador undertook such negotiations under the government of 
Lucio Gutiérrez, but the US and Ecuadorian FTA project was frozen during the 
government of his successor, President Alfredo Palacio. 
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The failure of the FTAA can be related to the third part of this section, namely, the 
disenchantment of Ecuador with economic cooperation. The disappointment 
increased not only within the civil society, but also within academic circles and 
among new political organisations. Moreover, their scepticism was expanded to 
existing mechanisms of economic cooperation in the region, despite their 
functionality. 
 
In relation to this, Ecuadorian membership of various regional mechanisms for 
economic cooperation such as the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI), 
the Andean Community of Nations (CAN), and the Economic System for Latin 
American and the Caribbean (SELA) shows an evident tendency to support regional 
integration. 
 
The CAN is one of the most relevant mechanisms of economic cooperation and 
integration for Ecuador, in terms of economic, cultural and historical relationships 
with its immediate neighbours Colombia and Peru. For that reason, this study has 
focussed on Ecuadorian disappointment with the CAN. 
 
The case of the CAN portrays one of the most salient examples of Ecuadorian 
disenchantment regarding economic integration. Although the Andean Community of 
Nations (CAN) is one of the oldest instruments of economic integration of the 
Andean states, it has not been able to offer its member states sufficient strength to 
make them feel a crucial part of the community. 
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It was created in 1969 as the Andean Pact and included Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela, but the departure of Chile in 1976 and Venezuela in 2006 
are evident examples of an identity weakness. This disenchanting process of 
integration has been viewed by some researchers as a failed economic integration 
process (Vieira, 2008; Dabène, 2009). 
 
Notwithstanding this, the CAN is still considered as an important source for the new 
idea of integration of the whole of South America. In the eyes of the Ecuadorian 
political and academic circles interviewed for this study, the CAN may not have 
delivered its projected objectives and expectations, but it is still considered as a 
fundamental resource for the integration of the South America of the twenty-first 
century. 
 
These views overlap with the establishment of UNASUR within which the CAN, 
MERCOSUR, Chile, Surinam and Guyana are considered as the basis for the 
framework of UNASUR and are expected to converge into an economically 
integrated South American region (UNASUR, 2008). 
 
Further weaknesses could be identified, such as a poor sense of mutual commitment 
as an Andean community. Although the institutions of the CAN such as the Andean 
Corporation Fund (CAF) and community links such as the Andean passport 
represent indisputable elements of an Andean communitarian identity, the fragile 
CAN was further weakened by the introduction of neoliberal measures into South 
American economies, and the overwhelming economic influence of the USA in 
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recent decades. The effect was to further detach the member states of the CAN from 
one another. 
 
On the other hand, Ecuador’s strong economic ties to the USA developed a close 
bond amongst certain economic elites with the USA, and influenced Ecuadorian 
behaviour to the detriment of its commitments with the CAN. 
 
For instance, the US American oriented policies introduced by the Ecuadorian 
president, Febres Cordero, violated Decision 24, the Statute on the Common 
Treatment of Foreign Capital and Technology of the Andean Pact, to favour an 
agreement with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), an agency 
dependent on the US government (Hey, 1993). 
 
Hence, Ecuador’s tenuous economic interaction with the South American states due 
to the military dictatorship led by Guillermo Rodriguez Lara 1972-1979 was 
weakened further. The role of Ecuador as a member and founder of the CAN 
changed, taking on the role of defector. 
 
Moreover, the unsolved border conflicts of the Andean states put a further strain on 
the development of an integrated Andean area with an authentic identity. The border 
conflicts of Ecuador with its neighbouring partner states clearly affected commercial 
exchange. 
 
For instance, the economic and commercial interaction between Ecuador and Peru 
was reduced from a value of approximately $170 million in 1990 to about $109 
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million in 1995, the year of the border conflict (Jaramillo, 2010). And although the 
reconstruction of the Andean Pact as the Andean Community of Nations in 1997 
aimed to include diverse social and political areas in a process of economic and 
market-related integration, the old political practices of the members permeated 
CAN’s functioning. 
 
For instance, Venezuela’s defection from the CAN in 2006 was considered a radical 
protest of President Chavez against the decision of Colombia and Peru to 
individually negotiate a Free Trade Agreement with the USA, arguing that the CAN 
mainly favoured goals related to the liberalisation of the market (Vieira, 2008). 
 
Furthermore, the CAN could not find real measures to help solve the conflicts 
between Ecuador and Peru in 1981 and 1995, despite initiatives introduced to 
persuade the Andean states to construct a zone of peace, such as the Declaration of 
Peace and Reciprocal Trust agreed in the Galápagos in 1989. 
 
Finally, open regionalism which involved the deregulation and liberalisation of the 
regional market in the 1990s without taking into account the collective aims of the 
CAN did not bring positive results for Ecuador. Instead, documents both from the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL, 2005) and 
from the Andean Corporation for Development (CAN, 2005) -presented to the High 
Commission of Delegates for the treatment of asymmetries, benefits and challenges 
of the South American integration- show that, particularly in Ecuador, the existing 
level of economic integration contributed to increased unemployment, the decrease 
of life expectancy, and a widening social gap between rich and poor. Ecuador was 
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considered as one of the most vulnerable small states in South America in the 
integration process based on a competitive economic framework. 
 
This disappointment has been corroborated within the political speeches I analysed. 
These express an evident support for a new kind of integration which reflects the 
reality of the South American states. That view is shared by most of the interviewees 
consulted for this study, who describe CAN as obsolete, an organism that is not 
working, a divided organisation. They see UNASUR as timely and as a sign of hope 
for a new kind of South American integration. 
 
3.3 Overlapping Factors between the Ecuadorian Nation-state and the Idea 
of UNASUR: The Prospect of a New Kind of Cooperation 
 
Some of the further factors this study has recognised as influential in Ecuadorian 
engagement in the construction of UNASUR are, in the first place, the harmony 
between Ecuador’s political ideology and the UNASUR project, after the arrival of 
Alianza País and Rafael Correa to power. Secondly, there is also an argument for 
Ecuadorian support based on the overlapping elements of Ecuadorian identity with 
the collective or regional identity portrayed in UNASUR. 
 
In relation to the first factor, this study has not identified clear evidence of an 
ideological correlation between Ecuadorian governments and other South American 
governments regarding the idea of a South American Union until the end of 2006. 
 
During the last year of the presidency of Alfredo Palacio, from 2005 to 2007, many 
South American countries already had left-wing oriented governments. The socialist 
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president, Hugo Chávez, had been in power for six years in Venezuela, Brazil was 
governed by left-wing president, Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva, Argentina had had 
another left-wing oriented president, Néstor Kirchner in power for one year, and 
Uruguay elected a left-wing government lead by President Tavaré Vazquez in 2004. 
 
This new wave of left-oriented governments tended to define the kind of integration 
to be constructed in South America, namely where a socio-political oriented 
integration was prioritised over a more market and commercially-directed integration. 
And this tendency was being strengthened in response to the national electorate’s 
preferences in most of the South American countries. 
 
Whereas Chávez in Venezuela, Lula in Brazil, Kirchner in Argentina, and Vazquez in 
Uruguay were able to play a more active role in the construction of the South 
American region as well as in the development of a positive relationship with their 
national civil groups and political activists, the Ecuadorian presidents were not able 
to share a consensus with the nation’s social groups. Additionally, as shown above, 
Ecuador was not in a position to influence either regional or continental politics until 
the beginning of 2007. 
 
The arrival of the political movement Alianza País/Revolución Ciudadana and 
President Rafael Correa to power in 2007 shows, in the first place, a change in the 
Ecuadorian approach to the relationship with the USA. Secondly, there was now a 
predisposition towards more South American integration as a new projection of 
Ecuadorian integration politics. Indeed, this position was decided before the arrival of 
Alianza País/Revolución Ciudadana to power. The Ideological Manifesto or Action 
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Programme of this political movement from 2005, and updated in 2010, states that 
Alianza País, 
  
‘…defends the sovereign presence of Ecuador in Latin America and the world with 
neither foreign tutelage nor servitude to powers and foreign projects that are alien to 
the reality and well-being of our people… …and strives for the integration, 
solidarity and cooperation with the people of Latin America and its compromise with 
the creation of alliances South-South’ (Alianza País, 2010: 11). 
 
‘…the UNASUR generates further areas of integration that promote Latin American 
and Caribbean interest. Hence, it requires being strengthened and equipped with 
institutions and provided with the building for its headquarters in the centre of the 
planet’ (Alianza País, 2010: 48-49). 
 
The political campaign of Alianza País promised the revision of contracts between 
Ecuador and international oil corporations, the evaluation of foreign national debts 
and a mandatory request to the USA to withdraw her military forces from the air base 
of Manta when the agreement ended in 2009, among other items. 
 
Once in power, President Rafael Correa announced the reduction of the payment of 
the national debts to foreign creditors from about 40 percent of the national budget, 
as had been the priority under previous governments, to below five per cent. Most of 
the debtors belonged to investment corporations with US participation. 
 
Moreover, an Integral Auditing Commission for Public Credit of Ecuador (2008) 
declared that some Ecuadorian international debts were irregular and fraudulent. 
The expulsion of the representatives of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) from 
Ecuador further sharpened these measures, which were based on the argument that 
the IMF’s representatives had tried to impose their ideas on the affairs of the 
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Ecuadorian state during Correa’s first engagement in Ecuadorian politics as a 
Finance Minister in 2005. 
 
These measures are also connected to the Ecuadorian discourse regarding the new 
kind of South American identity within UNASUR. Support for this position became a 
fundamental support for the new government of Alianza País’ platform, and 
UNASUR became the focus of its integration politics. President Rafael Correa’s 
statement about the construction of the premises of the General Secretariat of 
UNASUR in Quito on 11 March 2011 shows this plainly when he points out that, 
 
‘…we have left behind that region which once used to be insulted, humiliated and 
dishonoured by everybody, starting with arrogant foreign diplomats and ending with 
international bureaucrats who came to check on us, to oversee our data, to tell us 
what to do and what not to do. These days, if a commission of the IMF offers to 
come with such intentions, they will have to return as soon as they disembark, as no 
country will tolerate it anymore’ (Presidente Rafael Correa, 2011). 
 
Moreover, Rafael Correa’s approach to South American politics was implemented by 
incorporating promises of the political campaign into the National Developmental 
Plan 2007-2010. This document stated that the contract with the USA regarding the 
military base of Manta would not be renewed. 
 
Instead, Ecuador would, ‘…establish an understanding with Brazil for the utilisation 
of its Amazonian security system to tackle illegal activities in Ecuadorian territory’ 
(Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e Integración, 2007: 25). As a result, 
the US military forces withdrew from Ecuador in 2009. 
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These new Ecuadorian policies are also related to an Ecuadorian intention to 
harmonise new national policies with the contents of the UNASUR treaty, which at 
that point were under construction. These ideas were conveyed in the Ideological 
Manifesto of Alianza País from 2005 and 2010, which stated that, 
 
 ‘…Alianza País supports the socialism of Buen Vivir [the good life]. It identifies itself 
with the common welfare and happiness of every individual, which is neither 
achieved by accumulating large quantities of wealth nor by excessive consumption, 
but by maximizing the personal and collective talents and capabilities…’ (Alianza 
Pais, 2010: 6). 
 
‘…one strategic objective of Alianza País is Latin American integration and 
cooperation, and solidarity with the struggle of oppressed social groups around the 
planet…’ (Alianza Pais, 2010: 9). 
 
The Ecuadorian National Plan for Development 2007-2010 also integrates this in its 
strategic guidelines for Ecuadorian foreign policy, in which the construction of 
UNASUR is highlighted as a priority area for Ecuadorian foreign policy. 
 
Here, Ecuador’s contribution to the definitive version of the constitutive treaty of 
UNASUR was also considered as a particular strategy. Ecuador’s aspirations are 
explicitly manifested in its support for a new model of integration, as long as this is 
based on complementary and cooperative principles, rather than of a competitive-
oriented integration process. 
 
Many of these ideas are also highlighted by the report of the Reflective Committee 
regarding the challenges and opportunities offered by South American integration. 
Consequently, both Ecuadorian and regional objectives began to merge, due to the 
fact that the distribution of wealth within the population, the reduction of the social 
gap between rich and poor, the reduction of quantitative and qualitative asymmetries 
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within the nation-state, and within the South American states as a whole, are also 
principles incorporated into the UNASUR treaty. 
 
Moreover, a connection between Rafael Correa’s views on South American 
integration and those of the leaders of other South American states with left-wing 
oriented governments started to consolidate as the regional tendency of a socialist-
oriented UNASUR overlapped with the national policies introduced by the new 
government. 
 
At this point in history, President Hugo Chávez had been in power for seven years in 
Venezuela, Brazil had been governed by Luiz Ignácio Lula da Silva for three years 
and Argentina had also had President Néstor Kirchner in power for three years. At 
the same time, socialist-oriented governments were also leading other countries 
such as Tabaré Vazquez in Uruguay, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Michelle Bachelet 
in Chile.  
 
Finally, this correlation of views on national and regional integration with those of the 
new Ecuadorian government enabled Ecuador to obtain the consensual nomination 
of Quito as the permanent seat of UNASUR’s administration during the presidential 
meeting at Margarita, Venezuela, in April 2007. 
 
Equally region-engaging was Correa’s proposal of an Ecuadorian representative as 
the first Secretary of UNASUR. This Ecuadorian proposal was echoed by the South 
American states during this meeting. Both, the holder of UNASUR’s first 
secretaryship and the seat of the Secretariat were confirmed by the South American 
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states in 2008. However, the Ecuadorian ex-president, Rodrigo Borja, declined the 
offer of this leading regional role and UNASUR’s immediate inception as an 
institution was postponed. 
 
The other relevant factor mentioned throughout this study is the link between 
Ecuadorian identity and the collective identity of the region. This analysis has 
isolated various identitarian elements of Ecuador that overlap with those of the 
region portrayed in UNASUR. 
 
Both Ecuadorian political actors and the documents studied show various references 
to these as motivational factors for Ecuadorian support of the  UNASUR’s 
consolidation. These identitarian elements are classified here into three categories: 
institutionalised shared norms, shared identification features, and shared values and 
beliefs. 
 
The construction of an authentic South American identity and its consolidation has 
been progressively introduced and expanded since the Communiqué of Brasilia and 
further documents that give an account of the first meeting of South American heads 
of state on 31 August and 1 September 2000. 
 
In the Cusco Declaration 2004 on the creation of CSN, this idea is expanded and 
strengthened and a long list of South American states’ shared characteristics are 
included, arguing that these have motivated, 
 
‘…[the development of] a South American integrated area in politics, economy, 
environment and infrastructure that strengthen, the distinctive South American 
identity in order that …it contributes to strengthen Latin America and the Caribbean 
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in order to achieve a weighty presence and representation in international fora’ 
(IIRSA, 2004). 
 
Four years later, the signature of the foundational treaty of UNASUR 2008 further 
expanded this list and instituted a set of norms, identification features and values as 
shown in figure 3. Most relevant is the expressed idea of a, 
 
‘…consolidation of the South American identity by progressively recognising the 
rights of national citizens of member states residing in any of the other member 
states, with the objective of achieving a South American citizenship…’ incorporated 
in the treaty (UNASUR, 2008). 
 
The kind of documents displayed in figure 3 contain the national and regional norms 
that have been instituted and form the basis for Ecuadorian support for the 
construction and strengthening of UNASUR. 
 
Nationally, the main four documents shown in figure 3 are the basis for justification of 
Ecuadorian engagement in the construction of UNASUR. In particular, the 
Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, the National Plan for Development 2007-2010, and 
the Plan of Action of Alianza País, the political movement in power since 2007, 
contain consistent expression of elements of identity as one of the justifications for 
Ecuadorian engagement in UNASUR. 
 
Regionally, the UNASUR treaty is the main regulatory document, which following 
signature and ratification by Ecuador, constitutes an abiding international instrument. 
Moreover, the norms derived from this treaty are also mandatory (see below), and 
most find justification in the idea of a South American identity and the consolidation 
of South America as an integrated political region. 
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Figure 3. Institutionalised Ecuadorian and UNASUR’s norms that legitimise political action 
 
In contrast to this clear 
regional drive to consolidate a 
South American identity, 
which was mainly driven 
within a collective of regional 
political elites, the Ecuadorian 
national political discourse 
shows minimal evidence of 
belonging to and inputting into 
the construction of a South 
American collective identity, 
until the arrival of Alianza País 
and Rafael Correa to power. 
 
For instance, Gustavo Noboa’s speech in Brasilia 2000 did not highlight the 
identitarian features Ecuador shared with the other countries of the region. Instead 
he suggested that, 
 
 ‘…the process of hemispheric integration, Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), 
poses a serious challenge owing to the economic impact that it will have on our 
countries. Ecuador trusts that this process, when concluded, will produce high 
economic growth…’ (IIRSA, 2000). 
 
Similarly, Lucio Gutiérrez did not make any appeal to the other countries on the 
basis of national identitarian elements and shared South American values in his 
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speech via video conference regarding the preliminary meeting to the creation of the 
CSN in Cusco, Peru on 7 December 2004. Instead, he emphasizes that, 
 
‘…it is important to construct a proposed and strategy to confront the impact of the 
free trade agreement, the FTAA and the deepening of the free trade zone between 
CAN and MERCOSUR…’ (Presidente Lucio Gutiérrez, 2004). 
 
In contrast, the Ecuadorian reference to a shared identity with the other states of 
South America began capturing the political discourse nationally and internationally 
with the arrival of the Alianza País and Rafael Correa to power in 2007. 
 
The use of symbolic discourse associated with South American identity is 
progressively and consistently used by President Rafael Correa and other members 
of the Ecuadorian government. This has been given prominence particularly by the 
international appearances of President Rafael Correa, as in the meeting for the 
creation of the Banco del Sur, South American Bank, in Buenos Aires in December 
2007, where he started his speech by recalling the major historical integrationist 
figures of South America in the following manner, 
 
‘…ʺFor us, the fatherland is America”, said Bolívar, and such a statement, that 
appeared utopian or misguided due to the resignation and submission of the 
governments of the continent to the absolute powers, is becoming reality…’ 
(Presidente Rafael Correa, 2007). 
 
Ecuador’s new regional political discourse is underpinned by the institutionalisation 
and strengthening of new identitarian elements in how the nation perceives itself. 
This process includes shared norms introduced and reinforced with the creation and 
approval of the new Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008. 
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The Ecuadorian Constitution 2008 in its title VIII specifies with Articles 417, 423 and 
425 the Ecuadorian procedures to support Latin American integration. Article 423 
specifically states the obligation of Ecuador with regard to regional integration in 
seven sub-sections, including collective strategies in the management of natural 
resources, and strengthening the harmonisation of the national legislation systems. 
 
The new Ecuadorian normative also overlaps with the regional normative which ties 
the Ecuadorian norms to the regional normative in accordance with Article 12 of the 
Treaty of UNASUR which states that, 
 
 ‘…the normative pieces originated in the organs of UNASUR are obligatory for all 
member states as long as these have been incorporated into the juridical system of 
every state in accordance with their internal procedures...’ (UNASUR, 2008). 
 
 
By means of the above, together with the consensus clause required at all levels of 
the decision-making process and the allowance made for any member state to 
present projects of common interest, which may be developed and implemented 
within the objectives of UNASUR, as stated in Articles 12 and 13, Ecuador was 
offered an unusual opportunity to become the leader of the South American region 
and to act at the same level as larger neighbouring states such as Brazil and 
Argentina. 
 
So it can be seen that the policies agreed by Ecuador within the framework of 
UNASUR are full of potential with regard to Ecuador’s new politics and bind the 
country to the regional project. 
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These policies include norms created by decisions and declarations of the councils 
of heads of state and government, the resolutions of the Council of Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs, the declarations of the sectorial councils and the regulations of the 
council of envoys. 
 
The other category in which Ecuador is connected to the South American region is 
through shared identification features. As shown in figure 4, the main elements of 
collective identification on which South American region-construction has been 
based include various features of the Ecuadorian identity. 
 
These, among others, would be its multi-ethnic (including Indo-American ethnicities), 
its multi-lingual character (including Spanish and Indo-American languages) and its 
multicultural nature as a nation, combining the influences of European and African 
immigrants, the legacy of its status as an ex-European colony and shared history 
with other states. 
 
These regional features incorporated in the UNASUR treaty are enshrined in sub-
section four of Article 423 of the Ecuadorian Constitution, which states that Ecuador 
aims: 
 
‘…to protect and promote [the following]: cultural diversity, multicultural practice, the 
conservation of the cultural heritage and the common Latin American and Caribbean 
historical memory, as well as the creation of a communication network and a 
common market for cultural industries’ (Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2008: 188). 
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Figure 4. Shared identitarian features of Ecuador and the region 
 
Figure 4 shows these 
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as the basis of the collective regional identity. 
 
Similarly, the constitutional ratification of Ecuador as a state with a diversity of 
cultures, languages, nationalities, ethnic minority groups, communities and 
collectives has been regulated by Articles 56 and 57 of the Ecuadorian Constitution 
of 2008. 
 
These norms specifically develop the rights of the nationalities and collectives of 
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reflects the transformation of the Ecuadorian state and shows the links with the 
aspects that underpin the construction of the South American identity within the 
UNASUR project. 
 
In order that such Ecuadorian principles of multi-nationality and interculturality are 
implemented and further consolidated nationally and regionally, the National Council 
for Equality has been created whose duties are, among others, to oversee the 
development of such principles (ibid). 
 
Moreover, a mechanism for strengthening and presenting Ecuador as a multicultural 
and multi-national state abroad was implemented by recruiting and incorporating 
more than 50% of the 70 civil servants for the diplomatic service from the fourteen 
ancestral nationalities and ethnic minority groups in 2012 (Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores, Comercio e Integración, 2012). 
 
The possession of newly graduated diplomats from various ethnic backgrounds 
presents the possibility to the country to be represented abroad by a multicultural 
diplomatic team, including within UNASUR. 
 
This Ecuadorian identity-transformation can also be reflected and guaranteed in the 
agreement made by the South American states, as the UNASUR treaty guarantees 
to support the diversity, inclusion and development of the various existing ethnicities 
and corresponding nationalities of the region, as highlighted above. 
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In this context, UNASUR tends to be viewed by Ecuador as a strategic lever to 
propel Latin American integration, as well as to maintain and strengthen the main 
elements of Ecuadorian and collective South American region identification which 
lies in the shared history of solidarity of our multi-ethnic, multi-lingual and 
multicultural nations that have fought for emancipation and South American unity, 
enabling South America to emerge as a region (UNASUR, 2008). 
 
Figure 5. Shared values and beliefs between Ecuador and the region 
 
This social orientation of 
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representation as part of 
the Ecuadorian projection 
were fused together in the 
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Constitution 2008 which in 
its Article 1 states that 
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sovereign, independent, 
unitary, multicultural, multi-
national6 state of social 
justice. 
Finally, a third set of 
identitarian elements, on which the motivation of Ecuador for supporting the creation 
                                                          
6 The Ecuadorian Constitution 2008 states that Ecuador is a multi-national state. This statement recognises the 
various ethnic and social groups with ancestral-cultural background as nationalities which comprise the 
Ecuadorian state. 
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and consolidation of UNASUR is also based, has been distinguished and consists of 
the shared values and beliefs. 
 
As shown in figure 5 many Ecuadorian values are reflected in the set of values 
underpinning the whole regional identity. The idea of a region of peace is a 
correlative of the Ecuadorian national idea of a territory of peace; the regional values 
of self-determination of the people and non-intervention are consistent with the 
Ecuadorian national values of sovereignty.  
 
Hence, many of such values are bonded with the values of fellow South American 
states through the UNASUR treaty which forms the South American region’s set of 
values. 
 
These values underpin internal political decisions which govern Ecuador’s foreign 
policy. For instance, the Ecuadorian strategic plan for foreign policy 2011-2013 
specifies the nature of Ecuadorian engagement abroad following the arrival of the 
Alianza País and Rafael Correa to power and the institutionalisation of new values in 
the Ecuadorian national charter. 
 
Moreover, there is a new view of social development linked to the idea of regional 
integration operating in Ecuador. This is conceptualised from a human development 
perspective that goes beyond the typical macro-economic concept of the 
development of a state as the pre-condition for development of a society –a concept 
that operated in most third world countries in the twentieth century. 
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The Ecuadorian new view of socio-economic development underlines the social and 
ethical values linked to the Ecuadorian belief in integration. The Ecuadorian strategic 
agenda for foreign policy, Agenda Estratégica de Política Exterior 2011-2013 
clarifies this, pointing out that Latin American integration processes should, 
  
‘…take diversity into account, and so abandon the single dominant single idea of 
recent decades, that solely pursued objectives for the improvement of 
macroeconomic results. [It should] prioritise the social justice and equity, the 
preservation of the environment for future generations, the technological 
improvement for the organisation of economic structures, the gradual eradication of 
external dependency, the reduction of asymmetries within the region, and an 
international role that facilitates a reduction of the gap between poor and rich 
nations’ (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e Integración, 2011: 105). 
 
This vision is also related to further values in foreign affairs such as the protection 
and development of human rights, international solidarity and ideas of equality, and 
the aforementioned non-intervention in internal affairs, national sovereignty and the 
self-determination of the people. The latter two have traditionally been supported by 
the Latin American states throughout the twentieth century within the context of the 
United Nations as values of national sovereignty (Waltz, 2001). 
 
In relation to these latter values, the Ecuadorian decision-maker in international 
affairs is also bound to the Preamble of the new Ecuadorian constitution before 
making decisions about international agreements. This is of more relevance for the 
region-engaging character of Ecuador regarding the construction of UNASUR as the 
preamble of the Constitution of Ecuador 2008 states that the Ecuadorian people 
decided to construct, 
 
‘…a new form of coexistence, in diversity and harmony with nature, in order to reach 
the good life; sumak kawsay … democratic country, committed to Latin American 
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integration (dreams of Bolívar and Alfaro), and peace and solidarity with all states of 
the earth’ (Ecuador: Asamblea Nacional, 2008: 21). 
 
The sumak kawsay, or good life, refers to the aim of achieving certain standards of 
well-being by living in harmony with nature in a democratic country (Secretaría 
General de Planificación y Desarrollo, 2009). This clearly includes the symbiosis of 
the diverse elements of Andean and Western-oriented thought that forms the new 
Ecuadorian identity.   
 
On the other hand, the inclusion of the dreams of Alfaro, one of the liberal 
Ecuadorian presidents who made considerable efforts to unify the country at the 
beginning of the 20th century, symbolises the new nationalism projected by President 
Correa in relation to the idea of a Latin American integration associated with Simón 
Bolívar, the protagonist of the emancipatory revolutions in South America. 
 
As shown in figure 5, values such as social justice, solidarity, social equity, 
strengthening of the democratic institutions, a culture of peace, and protection of 
nature, were also introduced as fundamental values of the South American region 
which underpin South American identity. 
 
The incorporation of this set of shared values into the UNASUR treaty has been 
supported by Ecuador in consensus with its fellow South American states to 
‘consolidate a South American identity through the progressive recognition of rights 
of national citizens from any other member state of UNASUR in order to attain South 
American citizenship’ as mentioned in Article 3 of the UNASUR treaty. 
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The rationale presented in document 040 about the minutes of the Ecuadorian 
National Assembly to ratify the UNASUR treaty on 14 May 2009 also refers to the 
above, and to further Ecuadorian values inserted into the treaty of UNASUR in order 
to construct and consolidate a South American identity. The Assembly member and 
Vice-president of the Commission for Foreign Affairs, Pilar Núñez expresses this 
with the following statement: 
 
‘…what a coincidence, I must admit, that the elements that definitely guided the 
construction of a libertarian constitution in Ecuador find expression in those values 
that substantiate the ideal of the Latin Americans, and of the twelve mutually 
engaging peoples of our countries that signed the treaty…’ (Ecuador: Asamblea 
Nacional, 2009:115-116). 
 
In conclusion, the political development within Ecuador for the reconstruction of the 
state found a parallel regional political development that was constructing the South 
American region. The tendency to harmonise the norms, identitarian elements, 
values and beliefs responds to an underpinning motivation of Ecuador to support the 
construction and consolidation of UNASUR. 
 
3.4 The Prospect of Communitarian Cooperation and the Creation of 
Councils within UNASUR 
 
This analysis has enabled comprehension of the distancing behaviour of Ecuador 
towards the South American project in the decade prior to 2007, which changed in 
the following years when the idea of South American integration itself changed into 
one of socio-politically oriented integration. 
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It also provides an insight into the incorporation of the idea of the free market for 
South America as an important basis for the whole idea of UNASUR. In the end, 
UNASUR prioritised the political, social and security fields as the primary areas of 
cooperation, and subsumed the area of economic cooperation as a complementary 
and long term objective. 
 
Across this analysis, it has also been possible to identify that Ecuador hosted more 
presidential meetings between 2007 and 2012 than in the seven preceding years. 
From 2000 to 2004, the heads of state and governments of South America met three 
times and the aim of that initiative was primarily one of physical and energetic 
integration. Whereas from 2008-2010, they met nine times and the areas of 
discussion and cooperation included many new areas such as political dialogue, 
security and defence, health and education, which were coordinated by the 
corresponding councils and technical teams. 
 
This investigation has focussed on two special events within these areas of 
cooperation that further elucidate the reasons for Ecuador’s intensive engagement in 
the consolidation of UNASUR. These are the Ecuadorian role as President Pro 
Tempore and the creation of the South American Defence Council. 
 
Regarding the Ecuadorian role as President Pro Tempore, it is useful to remember 
that the constitutional bodies of UNASUR are the Council of the Head of State and 
Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Presidency Pro 
Tempore, the Council of Envoys and the General Secretariat. In addition, the Energy 
156 
 
Council of South America was created, and the creation of the Defence Council of 
South America was agreed by December 2008.  
 
These initial bodies needed further functional regulations in order to be operative 
despite the fact that the constitutive rules of the Foundational Treaty regulated the 
membership and foundational roles as well as specific functions. According to this, 
the Presidency Pro Tempore must be led by every member state and must be 
passed on annually to a new member, in alphabetical order. 
 
Moreover, Ecuador was nominated Depository of the Instruments for the UNASUR’s 
legal international recognition which in conjunction with the role of President Pro 
Tempore of UNASUR transformed Ecuador into a direct actor in the consolidation 
process of UNASUR since the signature of its treaty. 
 
Ecuador assumed the role of President Pro Tempore of UNASUR on 10 August 
2009 and maintained it until November 2010. It was the second state after Chile to 
lead the regional integration process during a period of high significance for the 
country, the region, and the planet. 
 
The main economies of the globe were experiencing one of the worst financial crises 
in the last fifty years. So tension ran high over possible effects on South America, as 
the South American states were just recovering from the economic crisis of the end 
of the twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first. 
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The USA announced the installation of military bases in Colombia following 
Ecuador’s refusal to extend permission for its forces to remain in Manta, and the 
whole Ecuadorian political system was in transition following the approval of a new 
National Constitution in September 2008. 
 
Then following the initiation of the Ecuadorian mandate as President Pro Tempore 
on 9 August 2009 further coordination was required as the Council for Health was 
created, and the consolidation of the Council for Defence also needed further 
coordination. 
 
Furthermore, four new councils were created during Ecuador’s Presidency. These 
include the Council for Development, the Council for Education, Culture, Science, 
Technology and Innovation (COSECCTI), and the Council for Infrastructure and 
Planning (COSIPLAN), by means of which the IIRSA was subsumed onto the 
coordination of the Council of Infrastructure and Planning, and by the end of 2012, 
UNASUR had twelve councils from which Ecuador coordinated the COSECCTI until 
the end of 2011. 
  
Hence, more meetings and workshops within these new councils and corresponding 
technical groups were called into being during this period in order to set up the 
functional frameworks. This strengthened the Ecuadorian perception of belonging to 
a collective identity, its autonomy in decision-making and its ability to freely engage 
in the region that it was considered to be part of. 
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A statement from Ecuadorian Foreign Minister Ricardo Patiño demonstrates this 
Ecuadorian perspective regarding the construction of a sense of ‘we-ness’ and of 
belonging to a region that follows when small states are included in regional affairs 
and in the construction of such collective projects. In his speech  on integration on 17 
May 2012, he suggests that the Ecuadorians are now the designers of their own 
destiny as: 
 
‘…we are now the agents of progress… we are the architects of this new political 
and economic moment that is no longer suppressed by any doctrine or by any 
international entity that defines what constitutes the global economy. Now, we are 
defining our own international and national path… …But integration is not just a set 
of declarations and good intentions. No, in the twenty-first century, integration is 
characterised by the cessation of the old paradigms… Today, integration has as its 
priority the strengthening of interior institutions in order that exterior institutions are 
also strengthened’ (Ministro Ricardo Patiño, 2012). 
 
This affirmation is also related to the choice of Ecuador as host country of the 
General Secretariat of UNASUR, which aims to be the centre of coordination of the 
different regional politics of the member states. This and the Ecuadorian role as the 
depository of the instruments for the ratification of the UNASUR treaty have driven 
Ecuador to engage in regional political affairs. 
 
As depository of the instruments of ratification of the UNASUR treaty by all its 
members, Ecuador was in a position to maintain continuous diplomatic interaction 
and dialogue with all its fellow member states. Similarly, Ecuador as the host of the 
permanent General Secretariat was eager to coordinate the negotiations for the 
choice of the first Secretary of UNASUR in order to consolidate UNASUR’s 
institutions. 
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This new international role of Ecuador has been strengthened further since 2010, as 
the government of Rafael Correa and its political project was supported by the 
people for the fifth consecutive time after winning the general elections in April 2009. 
This is corroborated by the statements made by the interviewees for this study who 
in 2012 considered the region-engaging character of Ecuador in UNASUR as a 
strategic Ecuadorian move. 
 
In January 2010, Ricardo Patiño was appointed Ecuadorian Foreign Minister and 
during his time in office he was able to gather support from outstanding member 
states to achieve a timely ratification of UNASUR’s treaty. This role was strategically 
combined with the role of President Pro Tempore of the Sectorial Councils, and of 
Foreign Ministers of UNASUR which further legitimised the treaty in the eyes of the 
South American states. 
 
Following the ratification of the treaty by Ecuador in July 2009, the ratification by 
further South American states also became a national aim due to Ecuador’s new 
constitutional mandate which makes integration a fundamental objective of the 
Ecuadorian state. 
 
Consequently, the Ecuadorian government have based their political action in the 
region on this constitutional mandate. In an academic event regarding Ecuador’s 
participation in UNASUR and the construction of a South American citizenship in 
June 2012, high Secretaries of the Ecuadorian state, Lorena Escudero and Carlos 
Larrea, affirmed that, 
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‘…Ecuador has much to propose regarding this, the construction of a South 
American citizenship, due to its strong constitution…. which supports multilateralism, 
and prioritises Latin American integration, and peoples’ diplomacy for achieving 
human development…’(Escudero, 2012).  
 
 ‘…the constitution of 2008 inspires social qualities and an integrationist spirit, and 
recovers basic functions of the state in terms of national sovereignty and national 
interest…’ (Larrea, 2012). 
 
Hence, Ecuador has engaged in this project due to national as well as regional 
obligations, as Article 12 of the UNASUR treaty states that all norms are binding to 
the member states, and Article 26 regulates that the ratification instruments should 
be deposited with the Ecuadorian government, and 30 days after the reception of the 
ninth ratification, the Treaty should enter into force. 
 
The newly appointed Ecuadorian Foreign Minister, Ricardo Patiño, made the 
achievement of UNASUR’s ratification a national objective and campaigned across 
the region. This made possible the ratification of the UNASUR Treaty by six further 
states, namely Argentina, Chile, Guyana, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela. And by the 
end of the term of Ecuador as President Pro Tempore only Brazil, Colombia, 
Paraguay and Uruguay had not yet ratified the Treaty. 
 
Only a few months later, on 11 March 2011, the treaty entered into force following 
the ratification by Uruguay. Finally, the confirmation of Brazil and Colombia at the 
end of 2011 consolidated the region and the UNASUR Treaty has been enforceable 
in the whole of South America since 2012. 
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The role of President Pro Tempore was also intertwined with the Ecuadorian input 
into the consolidation of the South America Defence Council (CSD), another 
institution to be referred to in this section. 
 
The construction of the CSD can be traced back to two major issues highlighted 
during the first meeting of South American presidents in Brasilia 2000. One is the 
collective protection of the region’s natural resources, and the other is international 
organised crime. Two more issues were included later when political instability and 
the presence of the US American forces in South America became an issue to the 
security of the region. Therefore, this section will merge these issues into two major 
Ecuadorian concerns that have influenced Ecuadorian support to consolidate the 
CSD. 
 
The first issue, Ecuadorian security, includes the idea of strengthening the new state, 
which according to the new Constitution 2008 aims to be a territory of peace. This 
means that the state aims to guarantee internal peace free of violent social unrest 
and to enable democratic political stability. 
 
At the same time, it promotes peaceful relationships internationally. The aim of 
internal peace is a clear reaction to the continuous years of political instability and 
undermining of the role of the state in Ecuadorian society, as outlined above. The 
second stems from an agreement with its neighbours to construct a region of peace. 
This agreement has been maintained since the signature of the Peace Treaty of 
Brasilia in 1998. 
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The latter event became one of the bases for the strengthening of the idea of South 
America as a zone of peace. This can be seen in the Brazilian Communique of 2000 
which states that, 
 
‘Peace and an environment of friendship and cooperation between the twelve South 
American states are characteristics that favourably distinguish the region in the 
international context. The permanent solution of territorial disputes, following the 
example of the 1998 treaty between Ecuador and Peru, constitutes a recent 
demonstration of the prevailing spirit in South America that will create a region of 
peace and cooperation from this part of the world….’ (IIRSA, 2000a). 
 
With the creation of the CSN in 2004, this idea was introduced within a political 
context as one of the bases for the creation of the South American region. Only two 
years later, this idea further developed into the creation of an entity that allows South 
American military systems to cooperate, as the police forces of these countries had 
previously been doing. 
 
The Conference of the Military Chief Commanders of the extended MERCOSUR 
(including Bolivia and Chile) in 2005, in Chile, took this initiative and signed an 
agreement in Santiago in June 2008 while the Brazilian initiative to create the South 
American Defence Council was officially promoted in order to include all South 
American states. 
  
The appointment of Nelson Jobim as Brazilian Defence Minister enabled Brazil to 
promote this project across the region between March and May 2008. The project 
was presented on 23 May 2008 to the heads of state of South America during their 
official meeting for the signing of the Foundational Treaty of UNASUR. 
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As Brazilian Minister Jobim clarified, this initiative was an idea which required joint 
planning and agreement by all twelve South American states. It did not aim to be a 
military alliance similar to NATO. Instead it was envisaged as a forum to discuss 
defence policies in order to construct a common South American position in 
multilateral international forums such as the Inter-American Junta of Defence. 
 
Out of the twelve South American states, Colombia initially hesitated, but following 
the official reception of the project by UNASUR on 23 May 2008, Colombia 
announced its participation in the negotiations to define the goals and institutional 
contents of the CSD. 
 
In contrast, the initiative was seen by Ecuadorian officials as a clear signal that all 
twelve South American states were determined to consolidate their union and create 
an authentic South American identity reflecting their national interests and 
strengthening national and regional sovereignty (Rivera, 2009; Ponce, 2010a, 2012). 
 
In March 2008, diplomatic relations between Ecuador and Colombia broke down 
after the bombing by Colombia of Angostura, in the north-east of Ecuador. Ecuador 
was reassured when it became clear, from Brazil’s promotions of its ideas at the time 
that the CSD initiative was in accordance with Ecuador’s own aim for a peaceful 
region. But the 2009 announcement that US forces must withdraw from Manta 
presented a risky challenge due to the fact that the USA had been Ecuador’s major 
trading partner. 
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Again, the announcement of a reform to the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defence caused 
serious issues to be confronted. It was alleged there was a conspiracy against the 
government’s policy of modernising the system by introducing civilian administration 
into the roles traditionally filled by military officers. The death of Guadalupe Larriva, 
first ever civilian Minister of Defence, in an helicopter accident  on 24 January 2007, 
only nine days into service, emphasised the difficulty of this undertaking. 
  
The Brazilian Defence Minister, Nelson Jobim, visited Quito on 20 April 2008 to 
promote their CSD initiative and found official support from President Correa and 
Defence Minister Ponce. This project was accepted by a meeting of the Heads of 
state in Brasilia on 23 May 2008. 
 
A working group composed of military and civil representatives drawn from of all 
twelve states was set up. After four negotiating meetings, a final set of principles had 
been agreed in Santiago de Chile by December 2008. These principles were 
officially endorsed in the declaration by the heads of state which created the CSD on 
16 December 2008. 
 
This declaration states three general and eleven specific objectives of the CSD, 
including: a) to consolidate South America as a zone of peace, both as a basis for 
the stability of democracy and the integral development of our people, and as a 
contribution to world peace, b) to construct a South American identity in the area of 
defence, taking sub-regional and national characteristics into consideration, in order 
to strengthen the union of Latin America and the Caribbean, c) to generate 
consensus in order to strengthen regional cooperation in the area of defence. 
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In order to accomplish these aims, a commission for the setting up of the CSD 
constructed an Action Plan for 2009-2010 between January and March 2009. This 
Action Plan focused on the formation of a South American identity with regard to 
defence, and another central common goal, around which further areas of interest 
were discussed, was the promotion of regional peace and development. 
 
Relevant conclusions for Ecuador are, the promotion of peace and the pacific 
solution of controversies; identification of measures to foment mutual trust through 
dialogue; the construction of a common South American position to present in the 
international world order; identification of measures to reduce asymmetries and the 
fortification of cooperation in security in order to consolidate the South American 
identity in defence (Consejo Suramericano de Defensa, 2009). 
 
Ecuadorian involvement in South American politics intensified when Ecuador 
obtained the Presidency Pro Tempore of UNASUR on 10 August 2009. According to 
the UNASUR regulations, the Presidency of the South American Defence Council 
(CSD) also had to be transferred to Ecuador, and Ecuador had a duty to follow the 
Action Plan for 2009-2010 agreed in Santiago, Chile in March 2009. 
 
The guidelines for policy and for involvement of the member states of the CSD 
demanded the coordination of CSD’s activities in the following four areas: defence 
policy, military cooperation including humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping 
operations, defence industry and technology, and education and training. 
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Ecuador concentrated on modernising the Defence Ministries to bring it more under 
social control. In many South American countries, including Ecuador, Defence 
Ministries were still influenced or directed by military officers. 
 
Hence, residue of the dictatorships became an issue for civilians and politicians. The 
democratisation and civil direction of the defence ministries has also been a 
particular challenge for Ecuador, since the democratic system was relatively weak 
and the military continued playing an influential role in national politics as ‘guarantors 
of the juridical system’ of the state (Pérez, 2010: 133). 
 
The transformation of the Ecuadorian Ministry of Defence propelled by the 
Ecuadorian constitution of 2008 is therefore also linked to the transformation of 
defence systems at a regional level. 
 
Other areas pursued by Ecuador include the reestablishment of the political dialogue 
with Colombia and assurances given by Colombia of a policy of non-violence. This 
followed suspected misuse of the Ecuadorian Airbase of Manta by the US Air force 
to support the Colombian forces in the 2008 bombings in Ecuadorian territory. 
 
In turn that triggered a wave of mistrust in the behaviour of the US American forces 
and Colombia, due to the fact that Colombia had offered to host seven US American 
military bases since 2009. 
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Both events caused a negative reaction from most of the South American states and 
a diplomatic breakdown between Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela, which had the 
effect of identifying a common threat to the majority of South American states. 
 
As a result, Ecuador called an extraordinary meeting on 28 August 2009, at which 
the heads of state and government of UNASUR confirmed the position of Ecuador in 
the Declaration of Bariloche highlighting that: 
 
‘…the presence of foreign military forces, with their means and resources tied to their 
own interests, must not threaten the sovereignty and integrity of any South American 
nation, and consequently the peace and security of the region’ (UNASUR, 2009a). 
 
These events furthered the construction of new mechanisms for the establishment of 
trust and transparency between the South American states under the coordination of 
Ecuador as holder of the Presidency Pro Tempore of UNASUR and of the CSD. 
 
The meetings of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Defence of the CSD on 15 
September and 27 November 2009 in Quito yielded an agreement to work together 
to achieve the three common objectives for the construction of mutual trust: 
transparency in the defence policy of the member states, reassurance to all member 
states about the non-use of national military bases by extra-regional forces to 
intimidate or threaten any South American state, and the bolstering of South America 
as a zone of peace as proposed by Ecuador. 
 
These first steps also included negotiations for an action plan to further construct 
mutual trust. The action plan negotiated and agreed between January and May 2010 
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was created in four meetings held in various Ecuadorian cities. They defined specific 
procedures for work on transparency and exchange of information. 
 
These covered the defence system and military budget, intra- and extra-regional 
activities, measures in the security field, specification of guarantees, and the 
procedure for accomplishment and verification of these mechanisms. 
 
This process was reinforced with a further meeting of the working group and 
representatives of the CSD member states on 15 July 2010. Here a new agenda for 
2010-2011 was agreed. This aimed to continue the same themes and areas of work 
until there was ratification, and invoked the UNASUR treaty in order to deepen 
cooperation. 
 
All these efforts by Ecuador to construct international regional peace were obscured 
by an attempted coup d’état on 30 September 2010 by a mutiny of the Ecuadorian 
police and some members of the military. This demonstrated both the weaknesses of 
Ecuadorian institutions and the challenges to the consolidation of UNASUR. 
 
Both, the nation itself and the zone of peace found themselves under threat, as 
Ecuador was still the holder of the Presidency Pro Tempore of UNASUR and the 
CSD. 
 
However, there was an immediate reaction by Ecuadorian civil society in support of 
the government. In addition, UNASUR met the same day in Buenos Aires and gave 
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a clear message of zero tolerance to the disruption of democracy in Ecuador and in 
the region. 
 
The Declaration of Buenos Aires from 1 October 2010 and the continuation of CSD 
meetings on 23 and 25 November 2010 ratified the way to consolidation of the 
region as a community. An agreement regarding mechanisms for the development of 
mutual trust in the region provided evidence of the willingness to strengthen the 
process. 
 
This was confirmed in meetings on 26 November 2010. As a result a mechanism for 
upholding democracy and political stability was introduced, making sanctions a 
consequence of any attempt at internal disruptions. 
 
To conclude, the following years showed a decrease in national and international 
tension. Ecuador’s relationship with Colombia and Venezuela stabilised as a result of 
a timely mediation by the Secretary of UNASUR, the ex-president Néstor Kirchner 
(now deceased). 
 
The policies of transparency and mutual trust were further developed within the 
CSD, which clearly shows an improvement in the development both of South 
American identity and of regional international trust. 
 
The initiative to create a South American School of Defence in Ecuador with the 
remit of training and screening both civil and military personnel from the South 
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American states is one such instruments for the consolidation of trust, peace and the 
region. 
 
This Ecuadorian idea, voiced in November 2012 in the VI official meeting of 
UNASUR and in the IV meeting of the CSD in Lima, Peru, is a current example of 
Ecuadorian region-engaging politics. 
 
In another direction, Ecuador’s diplomatic relationship with the USA deteriorated in 
April 2011. Ecuadorian president, Rafael Correa, declared the US Ambassador, 
Heather Hodges, persona non grata after electronic messages released by 
WikiLeaks suggested possible interference in Ecuadorian political affairs. 
 
The tensions caused by this event were revived one year later when the founder of 
WikiLeaks, Julian Assange, was granted asylum by Ecuador and was consequently 
allowed to reside in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has aimed to clarify the motives for Ecuadorian support for the creation 
and consolidation of UNASUR. In summary, six main factors need to be highlighted 
again. They are: 
 
- the expectations embodied in the change from a politically unstable state to a 
state with functions in accordance with the democratic principles of the region 
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- the way in which disenchantment with the economic mechanisms for regional 
integration has gone hand-in-hand with the perspectives offered by the 
UNASUR, of a more socially-oriented regional integration and of 
communitarian cooperation 
- the overpowering military presence of the USA and Ecuadorian economic 
dependence on USA have triggered a negative reaction from Ecuadorians. 
This was associated both with the insecurity created by diplomatic impasses 
with Colombia, and at the same time with Ecuador’s determined efforts to 
construct a territory and region of peace in accordance with its new national 
constitution. 
- the role of President Pro Tempore enabled Ecuador to promote its political 
priorities regarding the discussion and formulation of solutions for regional 
issues 
- the strong identitarian ties between South American states that have been 
collated into one regional collective identity in the UNASUR 
- the arrival to power of the political movement Alianza País and Rafael Correa. 
This brought a new order into national and integration politics, showing how 
Ecuador’s ideas of regional integration overlapped with the ideas of most 
South American governments during the years of UNASUR’s consolidation. 
 
All these can be considered as influential factors on the Ecuadorian region-engaging 
approach to the construction of UNASUR and the formation of a South American 
region. This process has already been confronted by various challenges, such as the 
diplomatic breakdown between Colombia and Ecuador, the presence of the US 
American forces in South America and constant political instability in its member 
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states. Notwithstanding the above, this study has shown that small states can be 
region-engaging states, and that identity can play a fundamental role in their 
international political action and decision-making processes. 
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Chapter 4: Small States in the Construction of the South 
American Union of Nations (UNASUR): Case Study Uruguay 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
On 15 December 2010, Uruguay officially published a governmental document, Ley 
N- 18.708, ratifying the Constitutional Treaty of UNASUR which had been signed by 
the South American Heads of State in 2008, and was approved by the Uruguayan 
parliament following debates in the Chamber of Representatives and in the Senate 
on the 4, 25 and 30 November 2010, respectively. 
 
With this, the minimum requirement, the ratification of the nine national parliaments 
or assemblies was accomplished, and UNASUR obtained the status of an 
international organisation with legal significance. 
 
In contrast, the Uruguayan support for the US project of building a Free Trade Area 
of the Americas (FTAA) was withdrawn after thirteen years of negotiation and shortly 
before the signature of the UNASUR treaty. 
 
In addressing the research question for this study, namely why has Uruguay 
supported the creation and consolidation of UNASUR, it has become transparent 
that this support can be traced back to a change in the Uruguayan electorate’s 
political preference, in favour of a government which sought a new type of  regional 
integration and cooperation in South America on the basis of political dialogue 
between states that share a collective identity and ideological affinity, among other 
factors. 
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This chapter presents this and further insights obtained through an interpretative 
analysis of the nature of Uruguay’s region-engaging activity in the creation and 
consolidation of UNASUR. The idea of a region-engaging small state, as well as 
those of national and regional collective identity, cooperation, integration and 
regionalism continue to inform the constructivist conceptual framework within which 
this case study is conducted. 
 
Analysis of archival documents, of political speeches, and of six interviews with 
members of the political elite and some secondary literature has also enabled me to 
identify in the first part of this case study, the informative historical factors  
antedating this process which are elucidated in the first section of this study. 
 
The second section presents the main identitarian ties of Uruguay with the region as 
arguments for the Uruguayan support for the creation of UNASUR. And the last 
section of this investigation examines Uruguayan involvement in the process of 
creation of the South American Defence Council (CSD) and the South American 
Council for Health (CSS) within UNASUR as examples of the the Uruguayan role as 
member of UNASUR and of a new way of Uruguayan regional communitarian 
cooperation in twenty-first century South American integration. 
 
4.2 Uruguay in Transformation and its Dissatisfaction with the Mechanisms 
of Economic Integration: Historical Background 
  
Uruguay is one of the smallest states in numerical terms within the South American 
region. It emerged as an independent political entity in 1830 following its struggle for 
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independence from Spain. This was a result of agreements between those who 
fought for the creation of an independent political entity, the empire of Brazil, and the 
newly created Republic of Argentina regarding an independent Republic of Uruguay. 
 
Brazil and Argentina also aimed to avoid further disagreements about claims of both 
larger countries on Uruguayan territory by creating an independent state. So, 
Uruguay, one of the oldest South American small states, is historically bound to its 
neighbour states, and has maintained friendly ties with them, being one of the states 
with fewest international armed conflicts in South America. 
 
Moreover, Uruguay’s geographical position between Rio de Janeiro and Buenos 
Aires, some of the largest economic and population centres of the American South 
Atlantic coast, combined with the influence of European emigration to alternative 
commercial ports established in Uruguayan waters, have converted Uruguayan 
society into a society of immigrants with a relatively cohesive identity,  maintaining 
close ties to neighbouring national societies and to its European ancestors. 
 
Moreover, its relative wealthy society, its respect for state institutions and support of 
liberal thinking were also characteristics that underpinned Uruguay’s image as the 
‘Switzerland of the Americas’ until the 1960s (Roniger & Sznajder, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, Uruguay was traditionally a country with a high level of political 
stability, and with the continuity of a bi-party political culture until the end of the 
twentieth century. The Colorado party and the (Blanco) National party were created 
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shortly after the nation’s foundation and governed alternately until the beginning of 
the 2000s. 
 
Uruguay is also one of the South American small states that historically has 
maintained its original national political charter, though allowing modifications. One 
of these was enacted in 2004, following a civil demand that lasted since the return to 
democracy in 1985.  
 
Modifications in the main tenets of the state are also related to a transformation of 
Uruguayan political culture, which began to change following the expansion of 
socialist and communist thought throughout the Latin American region in previous 
decades. 
 
This transformation of the socio-political culture also impacted on Uruguayan society 
in the late 1960s, affecting national pride and identity, as the clash of divergent 
political groups ended in a rupture of the democratic system. The civil-military coup 
d’état on 27 June 1973 installed a military dictatorship in the following years which 
became one of the bloodiest in South America and split Uruguayan society into 
offenders and victims. 
 
This period of Uruguay’s socio-political transformation can be considered as a 
political development it shared with most South American states which functioned 
together under military dictatorships by means of undisclosed military cooperation. 
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Studies suggest that the level of secret military collaboration and action across 
borders to combat and even annihilate communists, socialists and left-oriented 
political activists, as well as personalities critical to the military regimes, were highly 
coordinated and planned across the region (Slack, 1996; McSherry, 1999, 2002; 
Paredes, 2004). 
 
 For instance, ‘Operation Condor’, which involved Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Paraguay and Uruguay, later joined by Ecuador and Peru, caused thousands of 
killings including those of women and children (Slack, 1996; McSherry, 1999, 2002). 
 
In this way, Uruguay’s socio-political issues became increasingly similar to those in 
South American states. Following the 1985 return to democracy, Uruguayans were 
confronted by a challenging democratisation process, in common with the other 
South American societies. 
 
Not the least of their difficulties were the peaceful reincorporation of the military into 
a democratic system, and reconciliation with the left-oriented political activists and 
other affected citizens. This was more challenging within a small national population 
of about 3.5 million people within which the possibilities of personal and direct 
contact between the parts are higher compared to countries with larger populations. 
 
In contrast to the other South American small states, however and despite the 
negative effects of the dictatorship on its socio-political structure, Uruguay’s political 
stability can be considered as relatively high. It has maintained a political culture of 
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respect for the national and international institutions, for international law, and has 
prioritised the professionalisation of its state administration.  
 
During the six presidential terms since 1985, Uruguay has had five presidents in the 
six periods of presidency, all of which ran to the standard five years in the following 
sequence: Julio M. Sanguinetti, 1985-2000, 1995-2000; Luis Alberto Lacalle, 1990-
2005; Jorge Batlle Ibáñez, 2000-2005; Tabaré Váquez, 2005-2010, and José Mujica, 
2010-present. 
 
It is noteworthy that the last two presidential periods have further transformed the 
political landscape into a predominant party system. During the presidency of Jorge 
Batlle, the leftist party Frente Amplio (FA, Broad Front) created at the beginning of 
the 1970s and strengthened by the return to democracy, overthrew traditional 
parties, the Colorado and Nacional parties which had been losing support since the 
1990s. 
 
Moreover, the regional financial crisis, the decrease of the Uruguayan exports and a 
short stagnation in the integration process within the MERCOSUR, and the 
subsequent social unrest, presented a challenge for the Colorado government of 
Jorge Batlle when its co-legislator, the National party, withdrew political support. 
 
Consequently, the bi-party politics of Uruguay came to an end in 2004 when the 
socialist Tavaré Vázquez and its party Broad Front were elected to power. This 
historic domestic political change also had impacted on Uruguayan views about 
South American integration. The approach of the new government supported more 
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active Uruguayan involvement in the region, confirming the country’s region-
engaging character. 
 
Uruguay has become a region-engaging small state due to its involvement in the 
creation and maintenance of the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) and 
its membership in the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) from the year of 
its foundation are examples of the region-engaging character of Uruguay. Such 
traditional commercial ties have been linked to the shared history with its neighbours 
and the family-links of Uruguayan society with the neighbouring national societies. 
 
As the host of the General Secretariats of both ALADI and MERCOSUR, Uruguay 
has traditionally played a region-engaging role in South America. Ever since the 
creation of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) 
in February 1948, its engagement in the creation of mechanisms for  economic 
integration was recognised through the appointment of Montevideo as host of the 
General Secretariat of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC), created 
in 1962. 
 
The ALALC, (transformed into the ALADI in 1980), has included ten of the states of 
South America. Only Guyana and Surinam have never been included; instead, 
further Latin American states such as Mexico have been members since the 
organisation’s foundation. 
 
Furthermore, Uruguay shows consistent participation in the process of construction 
of the South American region. From its beginnings as the Initiative for Integration of 
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Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) 2000, Uruguayan presidents and 
representatives of the Uruguayan diplomatic service have integrated these 
negotiations within this project, and included special groups for the coordination and 
cooperation. 
 
Despite the withdrawal of popular support to President Batlle at the end of 2004, 
Uruguay was involved in the creation of the South American Community of Nations 
(CSN) in December 2004, and since 2005 has participated in the transformation of 
the CSN into UNASUR in 2008 and in its institutional consolidation in 2011. 
 
The final parliamentary debates in November 2010, whereby Uruguay decided to 
support the consolidation of the South American region through the confirmation of 
the UNASUR treaty, confirmed the traditional region-engaging character of Uruguay. 
 
Acts of Parliament contain the arguments expressed by Foreign Minister Luis 
Almagro at the Commission for International Affairs of the Chamber of 
Representatives on 4 November 2010. As he expressed, 
 
‘We understand that Uruguay has to be an active agent in the South American 
integration process… …This area of integration that UNASUR aims to construct 
includes certain areas which are still being discussed in meetings regarding cultural, 
social, economic matters and related to social, education, energy, infrastructure and 
environmental policies. According to the treaty, the idea is to generate an 
environment for dialogue and the exchange of information with the aim of attaining 
social inclusion and civil participation, and strengthening democracy and reducing 
asymmetry’ (Uruguay: Comisión de Asuntos Internacionales de la Cámara de 
Representantes, 2010: 3). 
 
This argument is based on various common principles which connect the political 
position of Uruguay and the aims of UNASUR, as expressed in its Article 3 of the 
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foundational treaty, 2008. Particularly, in its governmental plan for the years 
following 2004, the left-oriented political party Broad Front (Frente Amplio) highlights 
a reinsertion of Uruguay into regional integration processes. 
 
This view of Uruguay’s regional role has been corroborated by political figures from 
both the present and the previous Uruguayan governments in interviews for this 
study, such as Diputado Martínez-Huelmo, member of the Commission for 
International Affairs of the Chamber of Representatives (Diputados). 
 
Yet interviewees from the political opposition view this integration process with 
scepticism regarding its appropriateness for a small economy. The opposition had a 
very different view of UNASUR. Senators Sergio Abreu and Ope Pasquet, in a 
personal interview in May 2012, suggested UNASUR was a plan by Brazil to 
consolidate its hegemony in South America. 
 
The scepticism of some traditional politicians is congruent with the argument against 
UNASUR expressed by Diputado Vázquez from the Colorado party who voted 
against the ratification of the treaty on 25 November 2010. This parliamentary debate 
demonstrates dissatisfaction with the previous processes of integration, and the 
political opposition’s doubts about UNASUR, by suggesting that ‘this is the ninth or 
tenth attempt at integration. All, including MERCOSUR, have slowly languished’ 
(Uruguay: Cámara de Representantes, 2010a: 122). 
 
All the same, the UNASUR treaty gained the Uruguayan parliament’s approval 
during these debates. Uruguayan commitment to the South American project has 
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illustrated two aspects of the country’s politics, both national and regional. Both 
blend with socialist ideology of recent governments. 
 
Regional policy embraces the common South American understanding that to 
collectively overcome both new challenges and old ones, a new mechanism to 
achieve regional integration was required, quite different from previous attempts 
which supported mainly regional economic integration. So, international cooperation 
for the solution of common socio-political issues and diplomatic impasses, among 
others, was envisaged and proposed within UNASUR.   
 
The other embodies the endeavour of the newly elected leftist government to 
consolidate itself as the new political leadership in Uruguay, at the same time as 
making a positive contribution to the new era of South American regional politics. 
 
Regarding regional politics, two phenomena need to be elucidated, which pre-date 
the signature of the UNASUR treaty. One is the influence of the United States of 
America and Brazil on the whole South American region and within this particularly 
on Uruguay. 
 
The other is the Uruguayan region-engaging character within the Latin American 
context and its late discontentment with the economic mechanisms of integration. 
Both factors have contributed to the invigoration of the interrelationship between 
South American states in the decades before the foundation of UNASUR. 
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In the first place, when contrasting secondary literature with documents of the 
Uruguayan Foreign Office from 2000-2004, it became clear that the interrelationship 
of the South American states had deepened since the beginning of the 1990s. 
 
Despite the fact that South American small states, particularly Uruguay and 
Paraguay were oscillating between the influences of Brazil and the USA, the decisive 
Brazilian idea of creating a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) began to 
overthrow the US ‘Enterprise Initiative for the Americas’ at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. 
 
This US project was introduced by President George W. Bush senior in June 1990 
followed by the creation of the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) in 1992, 
and the expressed intention to extend it to the whole continent (Hurrell, 1995a; 
Carranza, 2000; Phillips, 2005; Vieira, 2008); whereas the idea of a SAFTA was 
introduced to South American presidents by Brazil in 2000 as the Initiative for 
Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA). 
 
On the one hand, the USA had persevered in establishing its hegemony in the 
continent. It based this on the ‘Monroe Doctrine’ of the 1820s, and on its 
endorsement of the idea of ‘Pan-Americanism’ at the dawn of the twentieth century. 
It reinforced this in the 1940s by technically, economically and logistically updating 
the idea and supporting the creation of adjacent new institutions. 
 
The Inter-American Defence Board was created in 1942. The Inter-American Treaty 
of Reciprocal Assistance was signed in 1947 and the re-foundation of Pan-American 
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Union as the Organisation of American States (OAS) was established in 1948. 
These consolidated the supremacy of the USA in the continent and put Uruguay as 
well as most other Latin American states under its direct influence. 
 
However, this US influence tended to decline in the region. This was due to the 
failure of the project ‘Alliance for Progress’, an aid programme for Latin America 
which provided financial support as a developmental aid for poor states in order to 
fight the expansion of Communism in the region in the 1960s (Taffet, 2007).  
 
Moreover, direct and indirect US military interventions in small states, as well as US 
support to some bloody military dictatorships during the 1970s and 1980s, further 
damaged the image of the USA in the region (Poggio, 2012). In Uruguay, open US 
support for the 1973-1985 dictatorship aggravated the political divide. The impact of 
this was felt on the democratic institutions and society as a whole. Its ultimate result 
was the reconstruction of the Uruguayan identity, as discussed in the next section. 
 
In contrast to the US vision for South America, Brazil has historically been a discrete 
political regional actor, until, that is, the late 1970s when the Amazon Cooperation 
Treaty Organisation (OTCA) was created. The limited role played by Brazil in the 
creation of a cohesive region in South America was then replaced by a calculated 
Brazilian geopolitical plan for its role in the region and in world politics in the twenty-
first century. 
 
This empowered Brazil to open itself towards the region from that time, and it was 
further strengthened when Brazil and Argentina included Uruguay and Paraguay to 
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make a first step towards building a peaceful region through the creation of 
MERCOSUR in 1991. This was followed by the Brazilian idea of expanding it further 
as a SAFTA into the whole South American region (Carranza, 2000). 
 
Through the creation of MERCOSUR and the OTCA, Brazil had succeeded in 
gathering all South American small states under its influence by the beginning of the 
1990s, and had the advantage of not being mistrusted amongst Latin American 
states to the same extent as the USA. It also shares its borders, a variety of political 
values, history and further identitarian features with  most of the small states which 
enabled small states to demand more action of Brazil in certain shared issues such 
as coordination to control the destruction of the Amazon area.  
 
This increasing involvement of South American small states around Brazil and 
Argentina was further stimulated in reaction to the US proposal in 1994 of expanding 
NAFTA to the whole hemisphere as a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 
 
This attempt to open all American states’ borders to the market not only 
demonstrated the US position of trying to re-establish herself as the leader of an 
emerging continental economic regime (Phillips, 2005; Hurrell, 1995a), but it also 
gathered together all South American states around the negotiation tables for a long 
period of time. 
 
Analysis of Uruguayan Foreign Office documents from 2000 to 2004 shows that 
Uruguay showed a clear interest in supporting the FTAA project at the beginning of 
the century during the government of President Jorge Batlle. The negotiations were 
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conducted within the various thematic Commissions of the FTAA project, and both 
Uruguay and other small states obtained particular assistance due to the 
considerable asymmetries of the economies across the continent.  
 
Consequently, Uruguay and the other South American states constantly interacted 
with each other in order to construct common interests to negotiate with the USA. 
The interaction was conducted either bilaterally, or multilaterally within the framework 
of sub-regional organisations such as MERCOSUR, or as members of the special 
groups of states with small economies. 
 
The extent of the negotiations increased following the Summit of the American 
States in Quebec in April 2001, as the opening of national markets was expected to 
take place by the end of 2005. As a result, various small states began to openly 
express their position and their concerns about the possible effects of the FTAA on 
their national markets and on their own societies. 
 
The fifteenth meeting of the Negotiation Commission for Commerce of the FTAA in 
Puerto España, Trinidad and Tobago, in October 2003 provided evidence that 
Uruguay had started questioning the real benefits of the FTAA. Here, Uruguay 
demanded clear anti-dumping policies to eliminate subsidies on exportable products, 
particularly on agricultural goods, a worry which was shared with most of the South 
American states, but particularly with Brazil as one of the main producers of 
agricultural commodities in South America. 
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Uruguay also demanded of the FTAA that it ‘neither restrain nor impose’, a demand 
that for a small state with a weak economy was only attainable in accordance with 
the closest fellow states. 
 
Despite prompt support from some South American states for the establishment of 
Free Trade Agreements (FTA) with the USA on a bilateral basis (such as Chile in 
2003), these negotiations with the other states of South America stagnated following 
the meetings in October 2004. In particular, Venezuela officially voiced its 
reservations about continuing the negotiations due to various diplomatic impasses 
with the USA. 
 
Moreover, the idea of expanding this initiative to the whole continent found a variety 
of barriers and the opposition of organised anti-American civil groups, 
environmentalists, new left-oriented governments, and academics. Such politically 
engaged groups interpreted this initiative as another US strategy to dominate the 
continent by introducing a hemispheric economic regime with neoliberal rules. 
 
For many critical political writers, such measures were debilitating the role of the 
national states and further empowering private transnational business (Godio, 2004; 
Buono, 2006; Múnera, 2006; Ruiz, 2006). In Uruguay, such economic and political 
measures taken by the government of the traditional parties were policies directly 
confronted by the Uruguayan socialist Broad Front party. 
 
However, President Batlle’s support for the FTAA endured until the end of his 
mandate. One of his arguments for support for this US project was that during the 
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2000 to 2003 Uruguayan crisis, the ‘only country that gave us a hand was the USA’ 
(Presidente Batlle, 2012). 
 
An opposing argument from left-oriented politicians and writers points out President 
Batlle’s personal friendship with US American president, George W. Bush junior. 
This interchange of personal interest favoured US interests despite the collision 
between the FTAA’s aims and the expectations of the great majority of Uruguayan 
society. 
 
Furthermore, academics and critical political activists suggested that free trade 
between asymmetrical economies was impoverishing the weaker economies. The 
population was dissatisfied with the inability of traditional Uruguayan political forces, 
the Colorado and Nacional parties, to resolve the social problems created by the 
neo-liberal policies supported by the USA (Díaz, 2005; Rodríguez, 2005; Múnera, 
2006). 
 
A report from CEPAL (2005) regarding the challenges of South American integration 
highlights a causal relationship between the neo-liberal policies introduced in the 
Latin American region and the rise of unemployment, increasing poverty and health 
deprivation, and a considerably increasing gap between rich and poor from 1998 to 
2003, which also impacted on Uruguay (CEPAL, 2005). 
 
Consequently, support for the FTAA declined in Uruguay, as it did in most states of 
the region in 2005, since many South American states, including Uruguay, adopted 
leftist governments, which were directly opposed to the establishment of the FTAA. 
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At the same time, such socio-economic developments triggered a wave of 
dissatisfaction with the existing mechanisms of regional integration, as these also 
showed limited capability to contribute to the solution of political, social and 
economic crisis in their member states. 
 
While Uruguayan support for the FTAA started declining by the end of President 
Batlle’s government of 2000-2005, the Brazilian idea of a SAFTA was pushed into 
the foreground through the introduction of the IIRSA as the initial step towards the 
construction of a South American region. 
 
The IIRSA was introduced in September 2000 as a prelude to the creation of a free-
trade zone in the region. Although South American states fell into a deep financial 
and foreign debt crisis at the end of the 1990s, Uruguay did not withdraw its support 
for this project. UNASUR documentation shows that Uruguay was involved in 
numerous negotiations and presidential meetings since the initiation of IIRSA in 
2000, until 2012, when UNASUR imposed sanctions on Paraguay. 
 
Within the context of the conflict of interest between these influential continental 
forces, for Uruguay and most South American small states the pendulum finally 
began to swing following the fifth Summit of the Americas in Mar del Plata, 
Argentina, in November 2005. 
 
This made it clear that many South American states were not prepared to further 
engage in the negotiations. The FTAA project was condemned to failure following 
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thirteen years of negotiation, over fifteen meetings of the Negotiation Committee for 
Commerce, eight ministerial meetings and five summits of the leaders of the 
American states. 
 
Nevertheless, these FTAA negotiation meetings further drove the South American 
states to interact and communicate with each other in order to identify common 
economic issues and construct a collective interest. Moreover, the failure of the 
FTAA project signalled both the decline of the USA’s overpowering influence in the 
region and the rise of Brazilian influence in South America. 
 
At the same time, Uruguayan scepticism about the effectiveness and 
appropriateness of an economically and commercially integrated South American 
region appears to have been increasing. 
 
This last argument is related to the second phenomenon that preceded the 
consolidation of UNASUR through the support of Uruguay, during the first year of the 
government of President José Mujica. This factor involves the increasing 
dissatisfaction of Uruguay with the suitability of the existing mechanisms of regional 
integration, the ALADI and the MERCOSUR, and their impact on the socio-economic 
development of Uruguayan society. 
 
On the one hand, international economic cooperation within ALADI illustrated two 
major weaknesses concerning regional integration in Latin America that captured the 
political discourse of the Uruguayan political elite. These weaknesses are related to 
the following two factors: the apathy shown by regional economic mechanisms of 
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integration towards questions of democracy and human rights, and the scanty loyalty 
of their members to commonly agreed regulations. 
 
For a start, most of the coup d’états, military dictatorships and related torture of 
thousands of South American civilians who mainly belonged to left-oriented political 
organisations were perpetrated while the ALALC/ALADI was officially in being 
(Slack, 1996; McSherry, 1999, 2002; Paredes, 2004). 
 
Secondly, the ALALC/ALADI did little to counter the atrocities of the military 
dictatorships. Instead, the ALALC was transformed into ALADI while thousands of 
South American civilians were being tortured by these dictatorships (McSherry, 
1999, 2002). Thirdly, democracy was not a requisite for the functioning of the 
ALALC/ALADI. Hence, the new left-oriented governments of South American states, 
and particularly of Uruguay, could hardly trust ALALC/ALADI again as a regional 
instrument to construct and maintain national and regional democracy and peace. 
 
Moreover, the argument that the failure of regional integration is due to the low 
commitment of its members to the rules of the ALADI and other instruments of Latin 
American economic integration (Vieira, 2008; Dabène, 2009) has been corroborated 
by analysis of the documents regarding the debates for the ratification of UNASUR in 
2010. 
 
The breach of Article 44 of the ALADI Treaty regarding commercial agreements with 
third parties, and the extension of these policies to small states favoured by the 
clause regarding benefits for less developed economies were matters of great 
192 
 
concern to Uruguayan policy-makers over the old mechanism of economic 
integration. 
 
This clause was violated by Mexico in 1994 when the NAFTA came into force, 
followed by Chile in 2003 when it established a FTA with the USA. In addition to this, 
the ALADI did not have the power to gather together its member states in a common 
front to resolve the debt and financial crisis of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s. 
For these reasons, since 2005 the new Uruguayan government built by the Broad 
Front has spoken of changing the old type of regional integration. 
 
On the other hand, this perspective of altering the type of regional integration, can 
also be understood as a reaction to the stagnation of the current economic regional 
integration, and to its low success rate for resolving MERCOSUR member states’ 
disputes since the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s.  
 
Moreover, the focus of small states on exports to one or two major markets affected 
friendly relationships between the South American states in various ways, and small 
states’ dependency was reinforced (Hey, 1995, 1995a; Correa, 2010). For instance, 
Uruguay became economically dependent on trade with Brazil and Argentina within 
the newly created MERCOSUR. As a result, the Brazilian financial crisis strongly 
impacted on the Uruguayan economy at the beginning of this century, causing a 
variety of commercial disputes with both these neighbours. 
 
Disputes with Argentina were further exacerbated as the government led by 
President Batlle in 2002 approved the construction of pulp mills on the shores of the 
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river Uruguay, on the border with Argentina. The environmental effects of these 
plants were the cause of a long dispute with Argentina as the Argentinian 
neighbourhoods opposed the installation of the pulp mills because of the pollution. 
Moreover, the MERCOSUR Decree 3646 setting a tax of 150% on the exports of 
tobacco to Uruguay triggered controversy with Brazil, which further affected the 
unpleasant relationship in 2003 caused by the Brazilian financial crisis and the cut to 
Uruguayan imports. 
 
Despite this, Uruguay continued being a supporter of the Brazilian-proposed idea to 
construct the SAFTA since its introduction as the IIRSA project. The analysis of 
documents regarding IIRSA confirms that as a result of President Batlle’s 
participation in the first meeting of Heads of the South American states in Brasilia in 
2000, and the input of the Presidency Pro-Tempore of MERCOSUR directed by the 
Uruguayan Ambassador, Guillermo Valles, in 2003, Uruguay supported the idea of 
establishing a free market in the South American region. 
 
The first clear attempt was made when representatives from the CAN and 
MERCOSUR aimed to achieve an agreement for the establishment of a South 
American free market, conducting a series of negotiations in Montevideo from 
August to December 2003. Finally, this plan was incorporated in the Foundational 
Document of the Community of South American Nations (CSN) in 2004 as a long 
term aim. 
 
However, in the following years when the leftist Tavaré Vázquez came to lead 
Uruguay in 2005, this uneven path of economic integration did not improve despite 
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the creation of a joint High Commission with Argentina, within the framework of 
MERCOSUR, in the attempt to solve their controversies. Instead, a variety of new 
disputes appeared and brought the bilateral dialogue to a standstill by the end of 
2009. Documents regarding the debates about the ratification of UNASUR suggest 
that at the beginning of 2010, Uruguay had at least 18 unresolved bilateral issues 
with Argentina. 
 
Furthermore, a case regarding the dispute about the environmental pollution of the 
Uruguayan pulp mills that could not be solved within MERCOSUR has been at the 
International Court of Justice at The Hague waiting for a judgement since 2006. 
 
Arising from this, the left-oriented governments of the region began to search for a 
new kind of cooperation forum, and out of this grew the idea of transforming the CSN 
into the UNASUR. The signature of the UNASUR treaty in May 2008, and the 
confirmation of Uruguay in November 2010 as this ninth state, enabled UNASUR to 
consolidate itself and to be registered at the United Nations Organisation as a 
regional international organisation with binding powers on 11 March 2011. 
 
To summarise, this sketch of the historical background has shown three relevant 
trends of the Uruguayan and regional political developments. First, Uruguay has 
traditionally been a region-engaging small state. Second, more communication and 
interaction of Uruguay with the other South American states has been triggered 
through the various continental, regional, and sub-regional integration projects during 
recent decades. 
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Third, the studied economic integration mechanisms have shown to be insufficient in 
achieving a peaceful resolution of the economic and social crisis of Uruguay and the 
region, and for settling the controversies between states of the region. It was this 
combination of factors which impelled Uruguay to search for a new form to cooperate 
with other states and to conceive a political cooperation which has been defined here 
as communitarian cooperation. 
 
4.2. Overlapping Factors between Uruguayan Identity and the Idea of a 
South American Identity. 
 
This section focuses on two further significant factors that have influenced Uruguay 
in its decision to support the consolidation of UNASUR. These factors are first, the 
arrival of a leftist or socialist party -Broad Front- to the political leadership of the 
country; secondly, the positioning of elements of a collective identity as a pillar for 
the establishment of a new form of cooperation in the interests of South American 
integration. 
 
Regarding the first factor, the Broad Front has been leading the country since 2005, 
when it came to power for the first time since its creation in 1971. This change of 
preference by the Uruguayan electorate ended the 174 year hegemony of the bi-
party politics of the Colorado and Nacional parties. 
 
The history of the formation of the Broad Front and its political platform show that it 
comprises a variety of political groups that range from radical communist to centre-
right oriented dissidents from the traditional conservative Colorado party. Hence, the 
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Broad Front party represents a diversity of political views that could in time challenge 
its structures and long term objectives. 
 
The enactment of the government by the Broad Front since 2005 has embodied two 
aims: to consolidate itself as a third efficient leading party in the country and to 
maintain a positive international image of a traditionally stable and a region-engaging 
small state. 
 
Nationally, the Broad Front party started by increasing public investment in health 
and education, creating more jobs, guaranteeing employment stability to those public 
servants working under unstable work contracts in previous years, and increasing 
salaries. Some of these experiences were shared and extended regionally as will be 
clarified in the following section on the creation of the South American Council for 
Health (CSS). 
 
Regionally, the Broad Front party attempted to further insert Uruguay into the region 
as an active political agent, enhancing its traditional role as a region-engaging small 
state, but looking for a new kind of integration that sees cooperation as mutual action 
between partner states and includes the socio-economic development of the majority 
of the people. In this way, the challenge it faced was how to position and expand 
such ideas in the international political context. 
 
The creation of the CSN in 2004 introduced a political framework to support activities 
conducted within IIRSA. From 2005 onwards the original Brazilian idea of 
establishing a free market zone in South America underwent a process of 
197 
 
transformation into a more general concept of South American integration. This was 
the new regional political environment in which Broad Front had to position its 
principles about regional integration. 
 
This has been a common phenomenon among South American states. Some 
studies see it as a result of the national electorate’s changed political preferences 
across the region since the turn of the century (Sanahuja, 2010, Fernández, 2011); 
but Gardini and Lambert (2011) prefer to characterise it as a cyclical phenomena, in 
the course of which consistency with established foreign policy is not guaranteed. 
 
Evidently, most South American conservative political parties that had strong ties 
with the main economic sectors were the dominant political organisations in the 
1980s and 1990s, but lost their electorate’s support in the twenty-first century.  
 
Hence, the newly created parties or modern left-oriented parties were governing 
South America by 2010, and came to power with an agenda that aims to change the 
neo-liberal practices introduced by their predecessors into more socially-oriented 
policies. The election of the socialist Tabaré Vázquez to the presidency of Uruguay 
in 2004 is one such transformation in the preferences of the South American 
electorate. 
 
In short, the Uruguayan involvement in shaping the communitarian cooperation and 
the founding of UNASUR is the outcome of five crucial historical years. These years 
saw a shift in ideas, from the initial economic cooperation based on building a South 
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America Free Trade Area (SAFTA), to a communitarian cooperation based on the 
socially-oriented UNASUR. 
 
A first relevant step was made with the installation of the Special Commission of 
High Representatives of the South American States on 5 December 2005 in 
Montevideo. The other strategic impetus towards UNASUR’s consolidation came 
through the official government publication of Uruguay’s ratification of the UNASUR 
treaty on 15 December 2010. 
 
As mentioned above, Uruguay was represented throughout the creation of UNASUR 
by high state representatives, including the Head of State, despite the changes in 
domestic politics. Declarations by Foreign Minister Reinaldo Gargano, from the 
government of Tabaré Vázquez, in 2005, show that Uruguay’s economic, social and 
political regional engagement, to which they adhere, was intended to support 
integration as a further step towards the integration of the whole of Latin America. 
 
This statement made no clarification about the kind of cooperation or integration that 
Uruguay was aiming to adhere to. However, an analysis of the reports and minutes 
of the parliamentary debates of the Special Commissions from CSN in 2005 to 2007 
show that Uruguayan involvement varies. It ranges from being the host country for 
the initial meetings, to leading such meetings in conjunction with Venezuela. 
 
These meetings covered the treatment of asymmetries in the region, identification of 
the challenges and benefits of a future new South American integration, and the 
drawing-up of the UNASUR treaty. 
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During these meetings, Uruguay’s concern about a more socially-oriented integration 
for South America, as declared by the Broad Front party, found agreement among 
most South American states. The documents of the High Commission and the 
reports of the ALADI, CAN, MERCOSUR and Inter-American Development Bank, 
concerning the challenges and benefits of integration, advised the heads of South 
American states to prioritise structural and social problems across the region. 
 
These suggestions were related to a new kind of cooperation for improving the 
population of South America’s living standards. The principles put forward included 
solidarity and equality as the basis for the assurance of every state’s cooperation. 
 
Hence, the existing consensus clause, implemented since 2000 in IIRSA projects, 
was reinforced as a guarantee of equality between South American states. These 
principles can be considered as fundamental to the development of a new form of 
cooperation known here as communitarian cooperation. 
 
Small states’ achievements in their construction of UNASUR can be related to the 
direct involvement of Uruguay since 2005 in the formation of a new regional 
organisation for international cooperation. 
 
President Tabaré Vázquez’s attendance at the presidential meeting of Cochabamba, 
Bolivia in 2006 should not be regarded simply as a symbolic expression of support 
by the president for this project. It also symbolises the support for a common 
understanding of the reasons for incorporating social elements in the treaty, and for 
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measures to reduce poverty and economic asymmetries within both the national and 
regional context. 
 
The ideal of regional integration reflects the political position of the Broad Front 
expressed already in the party guidelines from 1990, and reinforced through the 
governmental guidelines from 2003 and 2008. It is true to say that this regional 
agreement is in general harmony with the left-oriented Broad Front’s policy of 
pursuing new forms of integration. 
 
However, the creation of this new international organisation triggered other concerns 
that Uruguay shared with other South American small states. These concerns are 
particularly the financial capability of small states to maintain permanent posts both 
for government departments involved in the new integration structures and in the old 
ones as well. 
 
Most of the members of the political elite interviewed for this study corroborated 
these concerns. Their arguments are related particularly to the small budget of a 
small state and the replication of official roles in different international organisations 
and institutions. The duplication of roles, as suggested by Diputado Martínez 
Huelmo, may ‘thwart cooperation and will cost more to the state’ (Martínez Huelmo, 
2012). 
 
Moreover, regional organisations such as ALADI and MERCOSUR have not only 
been centres of expertise. They have also been expressions of identity. It is 
recognised that these have been important forums where the majority of South 
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American states have been able to interact and to identify both their shortcomings 
and potential. 
 
This view was acknowledged by members of the political elite such as the 
Uruguayan president, Tabaré Vázquez, and the Venezuelan president, Hugo 
Chávez, who in an open letter suggested the incorporation of such experiences into 
the new integration project. Such thoughts were reproduced in the final document 
prepared by the Strategic Commission formed to reflect on the new form of 
integration for South America. In this document it was pointed out that Uruguay 
supports these initiatives and that, 
 
‘The construction of a new type of integration should not only be based on 
commercial relations, especially when everybody knows that the region tolerates 
diverse international regimes such as MERCOSUR, CAN, CARICOM, and Chile. 
South American countries should also seek a wider coordination of their economies 
and their production. This would take the form of focusing on commercial union and 
on new ways of cooperating socially, politically and culturally. The ultimate aim would 
be to construct a balanced integration and an agenda of social integration…’ (IIRSA, 
2006a). 
 
In the meetings of governmental delegates and high representatives in 2007 and 
2008, many of these ideas were also discussed and incorporated in the final 
document of the treaty of UNASUR. 
 
On the one hand, the treaty included a high number of vague concepts that look to 
find consensus and approval by all parties (Sanahuja, 2010). On the other, it reflects 
the complexity of a diverse continent, asymmetrical in the areas of economics, 
politics and social relations. Notwithstanding this, the signing of the UNASUR treaty 
in Brasilia in May 2008 by all South American states demonstrates that all parties 
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were willing to initiate a new kind of cooperation as a means towards South 
American integration. 
 
This consensus between Uruguay and the other states of the region reflects 
continuity in Uruguay’s maintenance of stable regional politics during the presidency 
of Tavaré Vázquez. It can also be interpreted as the mechanism used by Broad 
Front to position itself as a cautious political organisation in an unknown area of 
international relations in order to maintain its electorate’s support and consolidate 
itself as the new leading party in Uruguay. 
 
At the same time, this tactical political move of the Broad Front kept open the 
possibility of supporting the establishment of a new political era in South America, 
which was dominated by left-oriented political organisations by 2010. Argentina, 
Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela, and, since 2008, Paraguay 
were by then led by left-oriented governments. Consequently, a more politically and 
socially oriented form of South American integration obtained more support. 
 
This rather cautious move in regional politics of the first presidential mandate of the 
Broad Front has been carefully matched by the newly elected government for the 
party’s second period of leadership. The newly elected president, José Mujica 
Cardona, an ex-member of the Marxist guerrilla group the Tupamaros, inaugurated 
the second governmental period in March 2010, following a long trajectory of political 
activism which forced him to serve 14 years prison during the dictatorship in the 
1970s and 1980s. 
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His government decided to modify the country’s foreign policy, which until then had 
been a traditional Uruguayan approach of rigidity and bureaucratic diplomacy. 
Instead, he introduced the policy which prioritised ‘dialogue’ and the ‘convergence’ of 
interests with the neighbouring states, initially applied with Argentina and then 
steadily implemented across the region. With President Mujica, it became clear that 
Uruguay expected to support UNASUR as a new path to integration in which 
communitarian cooperation could take place. 
 
UNASUR offers the possibility of political dialogue and the convergence of interests 
on the basis of a shared history, shared identity and similar socio-political 
challenges, whereby every member state can contribute with its capabilities and 
experiences to complement each other. 
 
Luis Almagro, the Uruguayan Foreign Minister under the government of Mujica 
explained this to the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the Chamber of Senators and 
Representatives during the sessions regarding UNASUR in May and November 
2010, and confirmed this in a personal interview in April 2012 highlighting that, 
 
 ‘…every one of us [countries] has something to contribute to the integration….and 
we need to decide in which area we can contribute most…..Uruguay in health for 
example…’ (Almagro, 2012). 
 
However, the involvement of every state in the interests of a fully legitimated action 
demanded the parliamentary ratification of the treaty by its members and the process 
coincided with the national elections. 
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President Vázquez requested parliamentarian approval of the treaty in November 
2008, and the Chamber of Senators approved it in April 2009 when there was 
scepticism in Uruguay about Argentinian self-interest in nominating ex-president 
Néstor Kirchner as the General Secretary of UNASUR due to the fact that Uruguay 
and Argentina could not solve their commercial and diplomatic impasses during his 
presidential period in Argentina. 
 
Consequently, this Uruguayan scepticism regarding the neutrality and 
appropriateness of UNASUR, and the prospect of an unfriendly General Secretary, 
triggered the Uruguayan political position of ‘no election means no rejection’, ‘no voto 
no veto’, in order to overcome domestic political pressure and opposition. In 
Uruguayan political circles this meant that Uruguay could contribute to the 
consolidation of UNASUR taking a neutral role in Kirchner’s nomination. 
 
However, the ratification of the UNASUR treaty in November 2010 was not achieved 
solely as the result of a new foreign policy of the new President José Mujica. It was 
also in the interests of Uruguayan national strategy to legally position its concerns 
and views about South American integration into the regional political context. 
 
Popular acceptance of President Mujica’s ideas reinforced the pattern of regional 
politics started by President Vázquez, but Mujica made changes in the foreign office 
from a proud conservative nationalist office, still highly influential during the mandate 
of his predecessor, to a foreign office more open to political dialogue. 
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President Mujica was elected on 29 November 2009, positioned on the first of 
March, and dialogue with Argentina was re-established in May and June 2010. On 
one hand, the reestablishment of dialogue with Argentina favoured the Argentinian 
aspirations underlying the nomination of ex-president Néstor Kirchner as the new 
UNASUR General Secretary. On the other, his nomination with the required 
agreement of Uruguay enabled Uruguay and Argentina to resume political dialogue 
and facilitated the resolution of their diplomatic impasses. 
 
The rapprochement of Uruguay and Argentina at the beginning of Mujica’s mandates 
benefited not only the two countries concerned, but also the whole region. Not only 
was political dialogue restored, but trade across the Uruguayan-Argentinian borders 
was freed up, which was beneficial for the Uruguayan economy. As an adjunct, 
Uruguay’s tacit agreement enabled Argentina to position ex-president Néstor 
Kirchner as the first General Secretary of UNASUR on 4 May 2010. Thirdly, the 
nomination of the first General Secretary confirmed the establishment of UNASUR 
and further  strengthened its consolidation. 
 
This Uruguayan decision to ‘go along with the consensus in order that South 
America should have a chance to insert itself as a unit on the international scene’, as 
President Mujica expressed it during the presidential meeting of UNASUR in May 
2010, illustrates the region-engaging role of Uruguay in the building of South 
America as a region. It also demonstrates that a change in the approach to regional 
cooperation was able to facilitate the resolution of international conflicts, strengthen 
the development of a ‘we-ness’ and contribute to the consolidation of a South 
American identity. 
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Moreover, the idea of this new approach to regional cooperation impacted on most 
parts of the Uruguayan political elite to such an extent that even some opposition 
members of the parliament began to develop a positive view of UNASUR. For 
instance, Senator Da Rosa of the opposing Nacional party speaking in the Chamber 
of Senators on 30 November 2010 stated that they would support the confirmation of 
the treaty, giving as his reasons that, 
 
‘This process…aims for integration of the South American countries and establishes 
certain objectives… Among these objectives, we find the promotion of political 
dialogue…, support for social policies, the coordination of areas of education 
regarding the commonalities of the states, …protection of democracy, promotion of 
social inclusion…the intention to reduce asymmetries between the member states, 
all these areas we consider important areas for Uruguay…’ (Uruguay: Cámara de 
Senadores, 2010: 52). 
 
Finally, the ratification of Uruguay as the ninth instrument for the legal validation and 
international recognition of UNASUR enabled the leftist Broad Front to portray itself 
to its electorate as an established party of the country. At the same time, it projected 
Uruguay as a crucial regional political actor conscious of its historical tradition as a 
region-engaging state. 
 
Another important factor contributing to the building of UNASUR is the reliance on 
common elements of national identities as sources of a collective regional identity. 
This analysis has revealed the identitarian factors linking Uruguay’s concepts of its 
national identity with the wider concepts of South American identity which UNASUR 
first proposed and then expanded. 
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These factors can be categorised as established shared norms, shared identification 
features, and shared values and beliefs as shown in figure 6. All these can be 
considered as identitarian factors that underpin the construction of a collective 
identity (Wendt, 1994, 1999). Hence, all Uruguayan norms, identitarian features, 
values and beliefs shared with the other South American states and given 
established status within the UNASUR are sources for the wider South American 
identity. 
 
 A set of norms, identitarian features, values and historical events are interrelated 
between Uruguay and the norms, values and beliefs underpinning the creation of 
UNASUR. These factors linking Uruguay and the other South American states 
constitute joining elements between the Uruguayan state and the umbrella 
framework of the South American region conveyed in UNASUR.  
 
Firstly, various formally institutionalised and informal Uruguayan norms enable the 
state to support regional integration as shown in figure 6. One of these main 
institutionalised norms is embedded in the Uruguayan political constitution. A 
subsection of Article 6 of this states that, 
 
‘…the Republic will assume the social and economic integration of the Latin 
American states, particularly within the area of common defence of its products and 
natural resources. Equally, it will foster the efficient complementation of its public 
services’ (Uruguay: Poder Legislativo, 2004: n/p). 
 
This argument was highlighted by Uruguayan supporters of the consolidation of 
UNASUR and could not be rejected by those who opposed them, since  the 
constitution itself reflects the region-engaging character of Uruguay. 
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Uruguayan presidential declarations are also legally binding. Presidential Declaration 
N- 18,708 (15 December 2010) binds Uruguay to respect the regulations of 
UNASUR, since in ratifying the UNASUR treaty the president expresses the will of 
the whole Uruguayan people. 
 
Figure 6. Institutional regulations of Uruguay and UNASUR that legitimise political Action 
 
A less mandatory source of 
Uruguayan regional political 
action, but still highly 
relevant due to the party’s 
position regarding regional 
integration of the 
government in power 
during UNASUR’s period of 
construction is found in 
various documents of 
Broad Front. These 
comprise the foundation 
documents from 1971-
1984, the Action Plan of 1990, and the Governmental Guidelines for 2005-2009 and 
2010-2015 which declare explicit support for Latin American integration. 
 
As show in figure 6, Uruguayan protocols are enshrined in the regional regulation 
covered by UNASUR’s own protocols. These are binding on Uruguay as long as the 
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process of drawing up the protocols has been achieved by consensus. Article 12  of 
UNASUR’s Constitutive Treaty embeds the expectations regarding national and 
regional protocols. It therefore obliges Uruguay to abide by these regional 
regulations. This is explicitly stated: 
 
‘…the regulations that originated in UNASUR’s institutions are binding on all member 
states as long as these had been incorporated into the juridical system of every state 
in accordance with their internal procedures...’ (UNASUR, 2008). 
 
That is to say that the Treaty of UNASUR, the Decisions and Declarations of the 
Heads of the South American states and the Regulations and Resolutions of the 
Councils of UNASUR form abiding norms for Uruguay as well as for the further 
signatory states of the South American region. 
 
On the one hand, the linkage between these institutional national and regional norms 
enables Uruguay to legally position itself in a further role, as leader of the integration 
process when it obtains the Presidency Pro Tempore of UNASUR. This will enable it 
to further influence the construction and consolidation of UNASUR. This was one of 
the main arguments in the debates from April to November 2010 regarding the 
ratification of Uruguayan membership in UNASUR. 
 
On the other hand, the national and regional connection through these norms limits 
Uruguay, since it must abide by them and behave accordingly. In that way, Uruguay 
is trapped in the small state’s dilemma over whether to choose influence or 
autonomy, as Goetschel (1998) characterises small states in integration processes. 
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It is true to say that the historical development of the Broad Front party represents 
the historical change in Uruguayan political culture and identity. Regarding this, two 
historical factors have impacted on the identity of Uruguay and the whole region 
shaping Uruguay’s identity even more, so that it fits better into the whole South 
American context. 
 
One of these is the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (ALALC) 
in 1962, in which the Uruguayan discourse was based on the integrationist virtues of 
the free market, whose benefit was seen as its ability to unify the region and 
collectively confront the economic overpowering influences from outside it (Ministerio 
de Hacienda, 1962). 
 
The other is the transformation of the Uruguayan political culture and the shared 
identification features that have historically linked Uruguay to the Ibero-American 
states, as shown in figure 7. 
 
These features of a shared collective identity were directly highlighted by the re-
establishment of dialogue with Argentina. Here the Uruguayan political elite stresses 
that ‘yes we are brothers with Argentina, yet we have many conflicts’. However, 
conflicts are part of cooperation and it is to be expected that conflicts (in the sense of 
diplomatic or commercial impasses) arise in a process of cooperation (Groom, 
1990). 
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Figure 7. Identitarian features shared between Uruguay and other states in the region 
As shown in figure 7, there 
are relevant Uruguayan 
shared identification 
features embedded in the 
identitarian elements of the 
South American identity. 
These serve as principles 
on which dialogue can be 
re-started, conflict resolved 
and the region 
strengthened. 
 
The list presented here of 
identification features of both the Uruguayan and the South American identity is not 
exhaustive. Instead, these only represent the features captured in the process of this 
analysis. Most relevant for this investigation are those identification features that 
bond Uruguay to South America and South America to Uruguay, which are 
documented above as linkages between national and regional identity. 
 
In addition to the historical transformation Uruguay shares with most of the South 
American countries, there are further identification features that connect Uruguay to 
the region. They are derived from a long, shared historical development in the 
region. These include: speaking the Spanish language, being ex-European colonies, 
belonging to a Latin American idea, possessing a variety of ethnic backgrounds, 
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being a society built from a blending of immigrants with local ethnical influences, and 
more recently through the existence of a South American ideal and through 
membership of UNASUR. 
 
Figure 8. Values and beliefs shared by Uruguay with the region 
 
These are the basis of the 
political discourse, and 
therefore they are not less 
important. These are 
fundamental features that 
reverberate in the public 
speeches of politicians, at 
academic congresses, and 
in the discussions of 
students of the region. It is 
within such meetings that 
the idea of South American 
identity has begun to be 
propagated, arguing a need for a new kind of cooperation and new form of 
integration within the UNASUR. 
 
Finally, these arguments are also rooted in the values Uruguay shares with the other 
South American states and such values illustrated in figure 8 are entwined with the 
historical development of the whole continent. 
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As shown in figure 8, these Uruguayan values can be found ingrained in the 
UNASUR treaty and in the arguments supporting the outcomes of the meetings of 
the Heads of State and governments, as well as in Uruguayan debates about their 
membership in UNASUR. 
 
On the one hand, these political values and principles (such as the protection of 
democracy, respect for sovereignty and non-intervention, respect for human rights 
and states’ equality) have been upheld by Uruguayan governments, past and 
present, and are embedded in  UNASUR as figure 8 illustrates. 
 
On the other hand, the transformation of both Uruguayan society and of the people 
of the South American region have been driven by the collective efforts to re-
establish, strengthen and maintain shared social values (such as solidarity, respect 
for differing political thinking, tolerance of diversity, and freedom of speech, among 
others).  
 
These values of freedom, zone of peace and respect for diversity have taken on 
great relevance in twenty-first century Uruguay, and indeed, in the whole of South 
America, since the reintegration of the leftist party Broad Front (with its various 
branches composed also of the leftist group stemming from the ex-guerrilla group 
MLN-Tupamaro) has gradually impacted on Uruguay’s political culture. Following 
demands for a review of cases of torture and human rights violations under the 
dictatorship, the question, ‘What kind of people are we?’ has arisen. The result has 
been a challenge to the values and principles that was used to underpin Uruguayan 
identity in the previous century. 
 
U
N
A
S
U
R 
URUGUAY 
214 
 
The impact of the leftist political leadership on such social Uruguayan issues, and 
the response of the government to the increasing demand for justice, are also factors 
that affect the identity of a state. The creation, during the presidency of Jorge Batlle, 
of a commission to investigate the cases of torture and forced disappearance is an 
example of social issues that can change the national identity of a country. 
 
However, the demands for a collective and coordinated investigation across 
countries such as Argentina, Chile and Paraguay show that the shared negative 
history of a region needs to be dealt with as members of a whole. 
 
This process of civil reconciliation of the members of the Uruguayan society, and the 
adaptation to a left-oriented government are characteristics of the Uruguayan state 
that are also shared with most of the South American states in the twenty-first 
century, and have further blended Uruguay in the region. Most of such Uruguayan 
shared political principles and identitarian elements (that can be summarised as 
shared norms, culture and values) are deeply embedded in the fundamentals 
underpinning the creation of UNASUR as shown in figure 8. 
 
4.3. The Prospect of Communitarian Cooperation and the Creation of the 
first Councils of UNASUR 
 
In common with other small member states of UNASUR, Uruguay can find enough 
space to engage, despite their weak material power, in the process of instituting, 
developing and executing regional projects. The large scope for cooperation offered 
by the UNASUR framework makes this possible, as the UNASUR treaty is so broad 
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that every area of the state and civil society can be selected as an area of 
cooperation. 
 
The integration mechanisms that have enabled South American states to cooperate 
for decades have created a friendly environment. This allows political actors to 
interact with each other and identify centres of communitarian cooperation within an 
‘ambience of cordiality and comradeship’ as suggested by the Uruguayan Diputado 
Martínez Huelmo, and corroborated by the Ecuadorian Foreign Minister in personal 
interviews in May 2012 and June 2013, respectively. Here, the elements of a shared 
identity such as shared history, culture, language and values also facilitate 
communication and interaction. 
 
Archival records also show that Uruguay has participated consistently. It contributed 
to the process within the IIRSA, as a member of CSN and as founder of UNASUR as 
mentioned in the historical background of this study. These engagements show the 
country’s willingness to strengthen the South American region through 
communitarian cooperation. 
 
However, it is beyond the reach of this study to look at all the cases of Uruguayan 
communitarian cooperation within the context of UNASUR. Therefore, a closer look 
at two particular cases can help to elucidate how it has employed communitarian 
cooperation in order to link its national policies with those of other states across the 
South American region. 
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The first case looks at Uruguay’s involvement in the creation and regulation of the 
South American Council for Health (CSS). The second case draws on the formation 
of the South American Council for Defence (CSD) to illustrate Uruguayan 
involvement in the South American integration process. 
 
Regarding the first case, this study has distinguished an ever growing Uruguayan 
endeavour to define policies that allow national states to cooperate across their 
borders. Here, Uruguayan experiences acquired within MERCOSUR, particularly in 
conjunction with Brazil, have become the basis for their engagement in the whole 
region. 
 
The Uruguayan involvement in this particular area is rooted in two particularities of 
this small state. One is the historical region-engaging character of Uruguay. The 
other stems from the political ideology of its leftist government, which has envisaged 
a social policy that can extend to the whole region. 
 
The governmental plan of the Broad Front for 2005-2009 contains indications of two 
relevant aims of the Uruguayan government. One is the public investment in national 
health services as a formula to re-formulate the social policies of the nation. The 
other shows its support for regional integration, particularly Latin American 
integration, as long as it benefits the majority. This means that both state and region 
should promote universal access to social security and health services, for instance. 
 
Already, under the conservative government of President Jorge Batlle in 2002, 
Uruguay and Brazil initiated joint health projects in shared populated border areas. 
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These were for monitoring the outbreak of epidemics and for immunisation, and 
there were also environmental and other health programmes coordinated by a 
Binational Commission for Health. 
 
In this way, Uruguay accumulated experience in the area of health within 
MERCOSUR. This and a socialist-oriented policy for the country and the region were 
further strengthened with the inauguration of the government led by Tavaré 
Vázquez. 
 
Once in power, the new Uruguayan government passed governmental Decree N.17, 
930 of 19 December 2005, giving approval for the creation of 5,170 jobs. This aimed 
to provide the population with a better health service and give  assurance to  this 
service’s administrative and professional workforce. 
 
From 2004 to 2007, state investment in public health increased by 56 % related to 
the previous government, and according to the approved political agenda of the V 
Congress of the Broad Front 2008, the government aimed to continue with the 
transformation of the public health service in order to make it more accessible to the 
whole population. 
 
This Uruguayan experience became a solid basis from which to expand the initiative 
across the region, as President Vázquez showed in his speech to his regional 
colleagues. This speech was made at the Montevideo meeting on 26 to 28 June 
2006, which was called in order to promote policies for racial equality in Latin 
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America. Here, the promotion of free access to the public health service was one of 
the fundamental objectives. 
 
This perspective was supported by the Special Commissions for negotiation of South 
American integration, and the analysis of its future, in which Uruguay played a 
leading role as mentioned above. This highlighted the connections between poverty, 
poor health and underdevelopment in the region, and suggested the creation of a 
South American network of public health. 
 
This project aimed to coordinate cooperation in vaccination programmes, collective 
production or acquisition of basic vaccines and other medicines, and to support the 
coordination of further shared developmental projects. In this way, regional 
integration became a mechanism for collective action to find new forms of 
cooperation to help states overcome such challenges. 
 
Health policy was one of the first areas of cooperation incorporated in UNASUR’s 
plans. Three months after the signature of the UNASUR treaty, the Council of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs proposed, at their August 2008 meeting in Chile, the 
creation of a Council for Social Policy. It was envisioned that this would include 
education, social development, health and culture. But instead of creating an 
institution with such a wide range of responsibilities, the states decided on the 
creation of sectorial councils which would separately coordinate the policies in their 
specific areas directed by the sectorial ministers of every member state. 
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Soon afterwards, the creation of the South American Council for Health was created 
by the Heads of States of UNASUR during their meeting in Costa de Suaípe, Brazil 
on 16 December 2008.     
 
Regulation J of Article 3 of the 2008 UNASUR treaty was invoked as the founding 
argument for the creation of the South American Council for Health (CSS). The 
regulation states that UNASUR should promote ‘universal access to social security 
and health services’ as one of its specific objectives. In this way the creation of the 
CSS was foreshadowed by this specific objective. Its aim is to assemble the 
experiences already gained in the field of health within the existing regional 
organisations such as MERCOSUR, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organisation 
(OTCA), the Andean Health Organisation (ORAS), and others, and coordinate their 
undertakings under the umbrella of UNASUR. 
 
The first meetings of the CSS in Santiago, Chile in 2009 were centred on the 
definition of its attributions and the formation of collective technical work groups such 
as the Group for Epidemiological Mapping which later delivered the common 
Declaration of the CSS of 8 August 2009 in Quito to fortify this process. The 
Uruguayan governmental position regarding the supremacy of public health over 
commercial and economic private interests prevailed in these working meetings. 
 
The declaration from Quito illustrates the decision of the South American states to 
cooperate within their environment. This can be considered as communitarian 
cooperation, as it is not based on a competing market-oriented approach, but on 
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solidarity and a complementary effort for developing common social policies for the 
region. 
 
The election of José Mujica to the Presidency in 2009 gave popular confirmation to 
the Broad Front for a new presidential period. In this way the positions and 
ideological vision of the socialist government’s stance on regional and national 
politics were validated. 
 
At the national level, the newly elected government brought a challenging legislation 
project up for discussion intending to regulate the consumption of cannabis on the 
basis of public health. This might also impact on drug consumption regulations 
across the region. This was a conceivable aim, as many new institutions for 
cooperation and shared development and the implementation of common projects, 
as well as investigations and the harmonisation of national policies, have been 
created within UNASUR since 2010. This has been due to the fact that most of the 
South American states are now governed by governments with similar ideological 
tendencies. 
 
Most of these projects have also been articulated in one central institution, created 
about 16 months after the initiation of CSS, whose Coordinating Committee 
presented the Five-year Plan 2010-2015 on 28 April 2010. Here, the harmonisation 
and recognition of standards, medical procedures and protocols are some of the 
most relevant proposed strategic guidelines. 
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On the one hand, this project presents the vision of consolidating South America as 
an integrated area that contributes providing health services for all (UNASUR, 
2010j). A first step to achieving this aim was taken by setting out policies that 
enabled the standardisation of common specialised terminology, and protocols that 
help to improve communication within the region. On the other, it shows the 
predisposition of all South American states to fulfil a regional project in the area of 
social development and health that links the national interest to the regional common 
interest. 
 
This Five-year Plan sets out the UNASUR vision of consolidating South America as 
an integrated space that could contribute to the health services for all. This is based 
upon the premise that solidarity, human rights, equality and citizen participation are 
basic principles of CSS. 
 
And in order to achieve such aims, the project to create a Network of Schools for 
Public Health (RESP-UNASUR) was also presented to the Council of Presidents on 
30 November 2010, and approved through Resolution 6/2011 of the CSS of 14 April 
2011 in Montevideo. Most of these goals are enshrined in the principles grounding 
the politics of recent Uruguayan governments and can therefore be seen as part of 
the Uruguayan ideas of regional integration. 
 
In addition, support was given by Uruguay for the creation of the South American 
Institute for Government in Health. This project, initiated in 2010 in Cuenca, Ecuador, 
aims to promote the exchange of experience and knowledge, and to invent new 
policies for governments in the field of health. This new path of cooperation shows a 
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national and regional harmonisation of policies in a way that differs from previous 
approaches to regional integration. In this new approach the small state is a constant 
actor in regional politics. 
 
In conclusion, the preparedness of Uruguay and all other South American states to 
support regional cooperation in the area of health demonstrated three points. First,  it 
illustrated a new mode of cooperation which would benefit the community as a 
whole. Secondly, the region-engaging character of Uruguay manifested itself in the 
voluntary consent it gave to these projects. Thirdly, this Uruguayan consent can be 
linked to the political views of the left-oriented government, views which are identical 
with the aims of the CSS. 
 
This study has also illuminated the way in which, during the creation of the South 
America Defence Council (CSD), a regional environment of mistrust between the 
South American states has been transformed. Confidence and trust have been built 
between UNASUR’s member states, as a preliminary to establishing regional peace 
as suggested in the UNASUR treaty. Uruguay as a member of UNASUR has directly 
participated in this process. 
 
Two aspects of trust building have been identified in this context. One consists of the 
re-establishment and consolidation of trust between the states across the region in 
order to consolidate South America as a region of peace. The other is observable in 
the way that popular trust in the nation-states’ democratic institutions has been 
consolidated. 
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Regarding the first aspect, this investigation has distinguished some patterns of 
behaviour in Uruguay showing a latent and consistent support for the establishment 
of a South American zone of peace throughout the last decade. Despite the various 
diplomatic impasses between states of the region, there has been a constant appeal 
of the Heads of Government of South America to the national states to construct a 
region of peace. This idea has been unanimously declared as an aim of the South 
American integration process since the introduction of the IIRSA in 2000. 
 
Uruguay portrays an example of how a small state can construct and maintain 
international peace and friendship with its neighbour states throughout the centuries. 
Its last international conflict dates back to the 1860s-1870s, when Uruguay took part 
in the Great War as a part of the Triple Alliance jointly with Brazil and Argentina 
against Paraguay. 
 
Following this conflict Uruguay has managed to establish a policy of respect for 
sovereignty, for the principles of non-intervention and self-determination of the 
people, and for international law, as the leading strategy of its foreign policy. This 
has allowed Uruguay to avoid any behaviour that could affect the historical rivalry of 
its big brothers, Argentina and Brazil. 
 
Although cooperation within ALADI and MERCOSUR was mainly restricted to the 
commercial area, a new era of friendship and cooperation between the big and small 
states of the Southern Cone (the southern geographical area of South America) 
started in the 1980s and was strengthened when all member states of MERCOSUR, 
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plus Chile and Bolivia gathered in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, in December 2004 to sign 
an agreement to cooperate in the field of security (Gutiérrez, 2008). 
 
Uruguay has also managed to maintain a friendly relationship with its neighbouring 
partner states and avoid major confrontations with extra-regional international 
agents. This sensitive issue for the security of Uruguay as a small state has been 
handled by Uruguay in a consistent way by condemning any extra-regional threat to 
the region. 
 
This behaviour of the Uruguayans is congruent with Argentina’s aim to gain support 
and include all neighbours in condemning the hostile acts of the United Kingdom 
regarding the Falkland Islands. The collective voice expressed in the common 
declarations on the security of the South American states since the introduction of 
IIRSA shows Uruguayan support for the formation and strengthening of the region as 
well as the ‘we-feeling’ of a consolidated region. 
 
Moreover, Uruguay’s support for Argentina’s demands not only has a strategic 
implication due to the Uruguayan geostrategic position, but also stems from their 
shared history and culture, and their common interest in maintaining international 
trust. 
 
At the same time, this idea of including all states in a common space of regional 
cooperation was strengthened by the common need to tackle remaining issues from 
the times of social divide, excessive nationalism and dictatorships. The approval in 
Chile in June 2008 of the Brazilian initiative concerning the agreement to cooperate 
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in the field of security laid a solid foundation for the construction of an institution that 
includes all South American states. 
 
As a member of MERCOSUR, Uruguay took part in forming the basis of this new 
South American dialogue. Furthermore, although Brazil’s initial ambition was to 
restrict this project to commercial arrangements in the field of military industry, and 
joint short military exercises (Saint-Pierré, 2008), the CSD took a rather political 
approach which found support from Uruguay in the joint Declaration of the Heads of 
State and Government of South America in December 2008. This enabled the 
creation and consolidation of the CSD in the following years. 
 
The general objectives of the CSD reflect the vision supported by Uruguay 
throughout the process of the creation of UNASUR. The statute of creation of the 
CSD reflects most of Uruguay’s traditional endeavours regarding Latin American 
integration. 
 
In creating the CSD, the South American states have voluntarily decided to:   
 
‘a) consolidate South America as a zone of peace, based on the democratic stability 
and integral development of our people, as a contribution to world peace, b) 
construct a South American identity in the area of defence that takes into account 
sub-regional and national differences, and contributes to the strengthening of the 
Latin American and Caribbean unity, and c) generate consensus for the  
strengthening of regional cooperation in the field of defence’ (IIRSA, 2008a). 
 
Uruguay’s shared history and shared borders with both bigger neighbours Brazil and 
Argentina has not only obliged it to develop the ability to coexist in an environment of 
relative peace, but also to cooperate internationally as part of the South American 
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contingent of forces for maintaining international peace. A clear example of this is 
the Uruguayan contribution to the UN peace keeping forces, by sending a national 
contingent to the UN peace keeping task force in conflict zones. 
 
In October 2008, Uruguay maintained a contingent of 2,533 personnel in sixteen 
peace operations within the framework of the UN (Uruguay: Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores, 2008: N.75/08). A great number of them formed the South American 
contingent to the UN Mission to maintain stability in Haiti in 2008, which later 
became the contingent of UNASUR for the reconstruction of Port-au-Prince, Haiti 
following the earthquake from January 2010. 
 
This experience and its traditional approach to international norms gave Uruguay a 
place as a serious partner in the field of security. Moreover, its official declaration of 
respect for international law, and for peaceful resolution of the conflict between 
Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela following the conflict of March 2008 reflects the 
Uruguayan vision of the establishment of a mechanism to build and maintain trust as 
the basis of regional peace. 
 
This position is linked to the traditional characteristics of Uruguay, which has 
historically supported the defence of international regulations and the maintenance 
of peace nationally and regionally. The establishment of the CSD has not only been 
considered as a mechanism for establishing international peace within regional 
political circles, but also as a mechanism for the modernisation of the military and the 
Defence Ministries. 
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This tendency is related to the views of the Uruguayan Defence Minister, Dr José 
Bayardi, who participated in, and signed the declaration for, the creation of the CSD 
and at the same time initiated a process of transformation of the Ministry of Defence 
and the role of the military in Uruguay, starting in 2006. 
 
This drive to transform the role of the armies as well as the structure of the Defence 
Ministries is related to a final factor regarding peace. This factor stems from the 
search for a method that helps states to maintain democracy, political stability and 
national peace. Like most South American states between the 1960s and the 1990s, 
Uruguay, as mentioned above, suffered a dictatorship which had no respect for 
democratic institutions or human rights. 
 
Moreover, the need for a mechanism to support democratic principles and political 
stability became clearer as the threat to democracy continued to be an issue in 
South America. Venezuela’s attempted coup d’état in 2002, the various coups d’état 
in Ecuador until 2005, and the attempts to overthrow the Bolivian president, Morales, 
in 2008 lurked in the background during the negotiation of the DSC. 
 
In this way, the establishment of regional peace was directly linked to the 
establishment of national peace. At the same time the CSD became an instrument of 
cooperation over transforming national military institutions in order to resolve 
remaining border issues between the members of UNASUR, as well as for 
constructing a collective response to extra-regional threats. 
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The existence of US American military bases in Ecuador until 2009, and in the 
following years in Colombia, were political events repudiated by the Uruguayan 
leadership. Similar perceptions were voiced by Uruguay regarding the presence of 
British military forces in the South Atlantic, specifically on the Falkland Islands. 
 
President Vázquez depicted the importance of cooperation in the area of security for 
the South American neighbouring states as well as for the whole region with the 
following statement, 
 
‘I believe that in order to arrive at the land of peace, that land of democratic health, of 
sovereignty which fights against a variety of pathologies, no doubt we have to 
struggle fiercely to eliminate the pathologies that we are suffering from…. …In order 
to establish a region of peace, Uruguay also supports the resolution of controversies 
through peaceful means, by analysis, discussion and respect… …Therefore, 
Uruguay has openly rejected from the beginning, and still rejects, the installation of a 
foreign British military base on the Argentinian Islas  Malvinas (Falkland Islands)…’ 
(Presidente Vázquez, 2009).  
 
The pathologies referred to by President Vázquez can be related to the role of the 
military in Uruguayan society. Although Uruguay has traditionally showed a clear 
tendency to support and respect international norms and the democratic national 
institutions, the history of dictatorships and political instability experienced by 
Uruguay, and indeed, by all South America, can still be seen as a distinctly 
threatening phenomenon to democracy and political stability in the twenty-first 
century. 
 
Particularly, the political stability and the maintenance of democratic institutions of 
small states were seriously threatened in small South American states such as 
Bolivia in December 2008, Ecuador in September 2010 and Paraguay in July 2012. 
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The experience of an ideologically driven campaign by the military, in conjunction 
with conservative right wing groups, against socialist- and communist-oriented 
political activists during the dictatorships has remained a challenge for national and 
regional peace as most of the South American states are now led by left-oriented 
governments. 
 
The reforms made to the ministries of defence in 2010, which placed them under the 
leadership of civilians took place not only in Uruguay, but across the region. This 
points towards the gradual reconciliation between the different social groups in 
Uruguayan society. However, the new waves of political destabilisation and 
disrespect for democratic institutions particularly in small states represents a new 
challenge for Uruguay, as a small state governed by a leftist government. 
 
The declaration of the Uruguayan Foreign Minister, Almagro, in the Chamber of 
Senators in July 2012 provides evidence of these worries, particularly when he 
highlights his position of imposing sanctions on Paraguay within MERCOSUR and 
UNASUR, as a response to the irregular removal from office of the Paraguayan 
president, Fernando Lugo, by his parliament. This is referred to by Almagro as a new 
way of destabilisation in the South American countries, stemming from a different 
ideology. He suggests that, 
 
 ‘…in relation to the coups d'état in the region, the ideological implication that I found 
serious is that it seems that only left-oriented governments are affected by these 
ruptures of the institutions…’ (Almagro, 2012a). 
 
Notwithstanding this, the recent signing of a mutual statute for cooperation in the 
common protection of democratic values and political stability in the region, and its 
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ratification by most of the member states of UNASUR including Uruguay, 
demonstrates that the process of constructing a region of peace has followed its 
positive route. Moreover, the solidification of trust through the creation of institutions 
and common projects within the CSD has allowed small states to come closer to the 
bigger partner states. 
 
Finally, although the data has not revealed a major input from Uruguay in this area of 
cooperation, its participation in the negotiation meetings, as well as in the sectorial 
meetings of the Ministries of Defence, and in the special working groups and joint 
projects, show the willingness of Uruguay to support the construction of South 
America as a region of peace, and definitely re-establish its traditional character as a 
nation of peace. 
 
4.4. Conclusion 
 
On the basis of the outcomes generated by this investigation, it can be concluded 
that Uruguay is a traditional region-engaging small state, and its support for the 
creation of UNASUR has, in the first place, been based on its traditional character. 
Secondly, the identitarian elements that link Uruguay to the region are also important 
elements in its motivation. This motivation is related to a third particular factor –that 
of the left-oriented ideology of the government in power in the last two governmental 
periods. 
 
The study also shows recent Uruguayan governments’ affinity with the aims 
conveyed by the treaty of UNASUR and their ideas of a new mode of cooperation. 
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This idea of a new form of cooperation is related to the aspirations of the majority of 
South American governments and the need to transform both the national and the 
regional political structures that have dominated in previous centuries. This national 
objective is linked to the intention to definitely signal the rupture with the 
overpowering aspiration of the USA to maintaining its influence in South America. 
 
Moreover, this chapter provides evidence of the stages preceding, during and after 
the signing of the UNASUR treaty, whereby Uruguay has participated in and 
contributed to its consolidation. What is more, this process of transformation 
demands a theoretical explanation which has not been referred to in this chapter, but 
the findings presented here smooth the path for a more vibrant theoretically-related 
discussion in the following one. 
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Chapter 5: Are Ecuador and Uruguay Region-engaging Small 
States in UNASUR? Discussion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The empirical within-case analysis or process-tracing applied to the study of Ecuador 
and Uruguay in the previous chapters made it possible to obtain some salient 
insights into the most relevant reasons for the support given by these two small 
states for the construction and consolidation of UNASUR. This chapter further 
examines these outcomes in order to locate similarities and differences between 
Ecuador and Uruguay. On the basis of these outcomes discerned from the gathered 
evidence collated in appendix 4, and summarised in figures 9, 10, 11, 12, this 
chapter also aims to draw more accurate conclusions regarding the motivations of 
small states to construct the South American region. 
 
The chapter is divided into four themes which reflect the main arguments of Ecuador 
and Uruguay, as small states, for their support for the construction of UNASUR. The 
first part refers to the national political situation of Ecuador and Uruguay and their 
external relations prior to the signature of the UNASUR treaty.  
 
The second part draws on the disenchantment of the small states with economically 
driven integration and their support of a political alternative for cooperation on the 
basis of the left-wing ideology of the governments in power, during the process of 
signing and ratifying the UNASUR treaty. The third section focuses on the identity 
factors within the two states studied, and considers these in relation to the idea of a 
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South American identity and its consolidation, and the consequent influence on the 
behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay. 
 
The fourth section highlights the importance of the role of states within the 
framework of UNASUR. To further illuminate the motivations of small states to 
support this integration process, I also consider the importance of the role of 
President Pro Tempore and the significance of acting in the role of ‘member’, using 
as an example membership the South American Defence Council. 
 
5.2 National Political Situation of Small States and Interaction between 
States 
 
The study of the parts played by Ecuador and Uruguay in the creation of UNASUR 
can be linked to various factors contained in the historical process of the formation of 
a region, and the role played in it by these small states, in a manner that can support 
a social constructivist approach to the study of small states. 
 
One factor concerns the structural transformation of a system that has been driven 
by the agents -the states- through their governments and diplomats. The 
development of the IIRSA and the CSN as mechanisms for the spread of the idea of 
a South American identity, into UNASUR shows the process of ‘we-feeling’ 
construction. 
 
During this process, the interaction and interdependence of both, Ecuador and 
Uruguay with the other South American states and extra-regional forces, such as the 
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USA, have progressively enhanced the process of negotiation, right up to the 
signature of the UNASUR treaty which further shaped the idea of a collective South 
American identity. Wendt (1999; 343) describes this process of interaction and 
producing interdependence between states as one of the ‘master variables’ in the 
formation of a collective identity. 
Figure 9. Factors influencing the decision-making of small states in the process of creation and 
strengthening of UNASUR 
Themes 
 
National politics   Regional and extra-regional 
interdependence 
Case study   
ECUADOR  Demands for social inclusion & 
unrest (H) 
 Political stability (L) 
 Respect for democratic 
institutions (L) 
 Ability to construct a foreign 
policy and long term planning 
(L) 
 Issues related to national 
security (H) 
 
 USA (H) 
 Colombia (M) 
 Peru (L) 
URUGUAY  Demands for social inclusion & 
unrest (M) 
 Political stability (H) 
 Respect for democratic 
institutions (H) 
 Ability to construct a foreign 
policy and long term planning 
(M) 
 Issues related to national 
security (L) 
 
 
 USA (L) 
 Brazil (H) 
 Argentina (M) 
Interpreted Levels = (H)=High (M)=Medium  (L)=Low 
 
In the cases of the two small states studied here, the dynamics of the interaction and 
the agency conveyed by the action of Ecuador and Uruguay are related to the 
interior political situation of the small state. Figure 9 simplifies and illustrates the 
most relevant factors of national politics in both cases. 
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These factors are listed in the middle column of figure 9. The illustration of similar 
political phenomena in the case studies facilitated the interpretation of both 
similarities and differences, as well as showing the most likely influences of such 
phenomena on the supportive behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay during the 
consolidation of UNASUR. 
 
The right-hand column of figure 9 elucidates the analysis of each case study in 
relation to the main regional and extra-regional actors in the context of a bilateral 
relationship, and helps to interpret the possible influences of international actors on 
the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay in the process of region construction. 
 
At the same time, it facilitates an understanding about the different situations of the 
two small states in the South American region in order to draw clearer conclusions 
regarding their behaviour in the construction of UNASUR.  
 
As shown in this illustration, there are not only extra-national factors and agents 
influencing the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay but also domestic factors. Indeed, 
the understanding of the interior political events of these small states has been a 
basic requirement for comprehending their behaviour in the international context. 
Here, factors related to the ability to construct and put in place a foreign policy, 
factors affecting national security, democracy and the ability to deal with social 
unrest have been considered as factors of comparison.  
As shown in figure 9, a strong consolidated democracy such as Uruguay’s is more 
likely to have a high level of political stability and respect for democratic institutions 
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despite the possibility of having high demands for social inclusion at any particular 
time. Here, the governmental period of President Jorge Batlle has been highlighted 
as a crisis point of the challenge of social unrest in Uruguay. 
 
As in the case of Ecuador until 2007, high demands for social inclusion resulted in 
violent civil unrest. Hence, changes in the dynamics of the state are also driven by 
the electorate which choose new political representatives in accordance with their 
new political preferences. These preferences can also influence foreign policy and 
the behaviour of the state, as shown in the case of Ecuador. This will be further 
clarified in the following sections. 
 
In the case of Uruguay the demands for social inclusion have been interpreted as 
exerting a medium level of influence in changing international politics for the region. 
The changes in the style of national policy were driven by the preference changes of 
the electorate, causing a historical transition from traditional two party politics to a 
left-wing oriented government, and a three party system in 2005. 
 
Consequently, the planning and defining of Uruguay’s foreign policy has also 
impacted on the country’s behaviour in regional politics under recent left-wing 
governments as already noted by Rodríguez (2005) and Fernández (2011). 
 
However, Uruguay’s high level of political stability and the professionalism of the 
public administration enabled the country to maintain the basics of a firm traditional 
foreign policy until the installation of the government led by President Mujica. With 
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his arrival to the presidency, there has been a relaxation of Uruguayan diplomacy’s 
of the traditional views, and political dialogue with Argentina has been revitalised.  
 
A different panorama became evident in the study of Ecuador. Ecuador displays a 
high level of social unrest as a consequence of a high level of social demands for 
more social inclusion, social justice and the political recognition of excluded ethnic 
groups. In the case of Ecuador, this high level of unrest has also resulted in a low 
level of political stability, which is related to a low level of respect for democratic 
institutions. 
 
The low level of political stability, constant change of government and low 
professionalisation of the public administration resulted in reactive foreign policies as 
the case of Ecuador shows in its international projection and exterior representation 
until the beginning of 2007. Planning for a consistent political position and foreign 
policy was limited until the end of the government of President Palacio, as noted 
both by Jaramillo (2008) and Bonilla (2008). For this reason the social demands for 
change seem to have also influenced how political relations with other states in the 
region should be conducted. 
 
The domestic political dynamics of Ecuador also provide evidence that a small state 
cannot be vulnerable only to exterior influences. The case of Ecuador shows that the 
vulnerability of a state begins within its own national formal and informal structure, 
and with political stability, as lacking political continuity and stability affect long term 
planning and the design of a foreign policy. 
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In the case of Ecuador, the suggestion that the vulnerability of the state is lower 
when small states are members of a community (Goetschel, 1998, Hey, 2003; and 
Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010) can also be applied to the vulnerability to its own internal 
political dynamics. UNASUR has been viewed by Ecuador as an appropriate 
international environment within which political instability can be reduced. 
 
The mediation and resolution of the violent social unrest which had political 
implications for the unity of Bolivia in 2008, the prompt reaction to and 
denouncement of the attempted coup d’état in Ecuador in 2010 and the sanctions 
imposed on Paraguay in 2012 for the disruption of democratically elected leaders are 
some of the examples of the benefits of being a member of a regional international 
community. These political phenomena can also be linked to the issues affecting the 
national security of small states, which in the case of Ecuador and Uruguay is further 
clarified below. 
 
The study of the historical background of Ecuador and Uruguay has also facilitated 
the understanding of the transformation of a ‘subjective interdependence’ or 
reproduction of individual identity, into an ‘objective interdependence’ or construction 
of the ‘we-feeling’ (Wendt, 1999: 343-345). 
 
The ‘subjective interdependence’ as result of an asymmetrical relationship such as 
the one between Ecuador and the USA does not necessarily lead to the formation of 
a collective identity. Notwithstanding this, it can be said that the elements 
underpinning the formation of an objective interdependence or we-feeling remain in 
their premature stage, as, though social relationships can enable social actors to 
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identify common affinities and the elements of a common identity between them, it 
appears not to promote the formation of a collective identity. 
 
In the case of Ecuador and the USA, this asymmetrical relationship has led to a split 
between them. As suggested by Bonilla (2008), the asymmetrical relationship 
between the two in the areas of economy and international security had as a result 
an economic dependency of Ecuador on the USA, whereby Ecuador had no choice 
but to cooperate, instead of cooperating voluntarily. 
 
Moreover, the relationship between small states within the framework of UNASUR 
also needs to be taken into account, since in a competitive system, small states may 
coordinate in order to position their interests as suggested by Katzenstein (1985) 
and Thorhallsson (2000). In a non-competitive system such as UNASUR, in which 
communitarian cooperation is promoted, small states do not require such strategic 
alliances between them. 
 
In the cases of Ecuador and Uruguay, there has not only been an evident increase of 
the interaction between them, but also with the majority of other Latin American 
states. Again, this increase of interaction was motivated through their participation in 
negotiation meetings for the FTAA project, within their own sub-regional international 
organisations and within the IIRSA and CSN.  
 
However, figure 9 only illustrates the interrelationship of Ecuador with the USA, Peru 
and Colombia, and Uruguay with USA, Brazil and Argentina, since such relationships 
reflect the main interaction of these states before the creation of UNASUR. 
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Nevertheless, the objective interdependence between these two small states and the 
rest of the South American states has increased since 2000. The participation of 
these small states within the framework of IIRSA and CSN has been consistent and 
enabled the formal recognition of the clause of consensus as proposed by the states 
from the beginning of the meetings of the South American heads of state in Brasilia 
2000. 
 
On the one hand, the earlier medium and low level of importance, in terms of 
regional integration, the Ecuadorian relationship with Colombia and Peru 
respectively, began to climb following the peace agreement with Peru in 1998. This 
was despite the fact that these three states could not find a common objective for 
negotiations with the USA over the FTAA project, either as members of the CAN or 
as close neighbours who shared cultural ties. 
 
This shows the presence of individualist identities still cooperating as egoistic units, 
or within an environment of ‘subjective interdependence’, prior to the internalisation 
of the idea of a collective identity by the actors, as explained by Wendt (1999). This 
can also confirm the non-existence of a security community in the Andean region 
until the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
 
On the other hand, Uruguay maintained a close economic relationship with its 
neighbours Brazil and Argentina, which resulted in a relationship of dependency with 
Brazil. In contrast, the Uruguayan relationship with the USA was maintained at a 
minimum level, despite the personal relationship of President Batlle with George W. 
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Bush. As we can see, at the beginning of the twenty-first century cooperation took 
place in an individualistic, self-centred style, within the framework of economic 
cooperation, but without nurturing a nascent collective identity. 
 
The behaviour of Uruguay and Argentina particularly began to change during the 
time that the idea of a South American identity was being widely accepted among 
the population, and gaining in strength. This point is corroborated by the arrival of 
President José Mujica to power which resulted in the activation of communitarian 
cooperation between these states. Uruguayan support for the perspective of a strong 
South American identity was reinvigorated by its support of ex-president Kirchner in 
his candidature as UNASUR’s General Secretary and by ratifying the signature of 
the UNASUR treaty. 
 
Finally, the action and interaction of Ecuador and Uruguay with the other South 
American states, as well as with extra-regional actors, culminated in the signature of 
the UNASUR treaty in 2008. This shows that the wide social dissemination of the 
new regional identity presented by Brazil in 2000, supported by Venezuela, Uruguay 
and Argentina also found the support of Ecuador during the years of transformation 
of the CSN into UNASUR, and during UNASUR’s consolidation.  
 
The signature of the treaty by all twelve member states can also be considered as 
the inaugural ceremony of trust between the actors, and this is one of the 
fundamentals for the emergence of a security community, as explained by Adler and 
Barnett (1998). This can also be related to the first acts of learning and internalising 
a collective identity as noted by Wendt (1999). 
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5.3 Political Cooperation as a Result of the Failure of Economic Integration 
     
The original Brazilian idea of a South American Free Trade Area (SAFTA) was not 
frozen or completely rejected, as the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) 
project had been by most of the Latin American small states following the Summit of 
the Americas in Mar del Plata, in 2005. The introduction of IIRSA was based on the 
idea of SAFTA, and the CSN was the basis for the construction of UNASUR. 
 
This ideal of economic cooperation driven by the regional free market has remained 
embedded in the idea of a South American integrated economic space, and it is 
reflected in the present intention of converging the CAN and MERCOSUR, and in the 
experiences of Chile, Guyana and Surinam during the processes of integration. 
 
However, the UNASUR has given priority to political cooperation in the form of 
communitarian cooperation. Here, integration forms one of the main pillars of the 
discourse regarding South American identity, along with solidarity, social justice, the 
fight against poverty, the protection of democracy and support for the political 
stability of every member state. 
 
Consequently, the initial engine of integration, South American economic 
cooperation, has been relegated to the position of a long term objective. This is the 
difference between the old kind of regionalism and the new kind of South American 
regionalism, that is to say, a new idea of integration driven by the framework of 
UNASUR. 
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Figure 10. Economic integration and ideology as influencing factors on the decision-making 
process for the creation and strengthening of UNASUR 
Themes 
 
Economic mechanisms of 
integration 
Ideology of the governments 
Case study   
ECUADOR  Satisfaction with the CAN 
(L) 
 
 Satisfaction with the FTAA 
project (L) 
 Impact of national leader (L 
<2007; H>2007) 
 Impact of governing party 
(L<2007; H>2007) 
 Impact of regional 
tendency (L<2007; 
M>2007) 
URUGUAY  Satisfaction with 
MERCOSUR (L) 
 
 Satisfaction with the FTAA 
project (L) 
 Impact of national leader 
(M<2010; H>2010) 
 Impact of governing party 
(L<2005; H>2005) 
 Impact of regional 
tendency (M) 
Interpreted levels = (H)=High  (M)=Medium  (L)=Low  (<)=before  (>)=after 
 
In this process, the support given by small states to a change of focus on the type of 
cooperation was originally associated with the low satisfaction of Ecuador and 
Uruguay with the economic mechanism of cooperation and integration, as pictured in 
figure 10.  
 
At the same time, this figure shows a split in the impact of the ideology of the 
national leadership and the governing political force regarding the decision to 
support the consolidation of UNASUR in both study cases. 
 
In the diagram, the low levels of satisfaction with previous mechanisms of 
integration, combined with the impact of the ideology of the governing party 
correspond with the insights already gained regarding the competition of asymmetric 
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economies in South America. It seems that left-oriented leaderships in government 
are more reluctant to adhere to a mechanisms of economic integration that supports 
a free regional market as the engine of integration. The idea of a South American 
free market is therefore most unlikely to have the  support of left-wing governments 
of the South American small states. 
 
On the other side of the coin, the prioritisation of political cooperation in the form of 
communitarian cooperation within UNASUR’s framework has obtained support from 
small states’ leaders and corresponding governing parties. Therefore, the profile and 
influence of ideology in the case of Ecuadorian leaders before 2007 appears as low 
level regarding the construction of UNASUR and high level after 2007. 
 
This can also be linked to various other factors including political instability and the 
influence of extra-regional forces, since external forces, be these materially or 
ideationally (identitarian) driven, may not be interested in the establishment of a 
political unit for communitarian cooperation. Such influences affect more politically 
unstable small states as shown in the relationship of Ecuador with the USA. 
 
The case of Uruguay also shows a split into types of leadership of the governing 
parties corresponding with level of state’s influence upon the contribution towards 
the construction of UNASUR. The arrival of President Tavaré Vázquez reinforced the 
idea of a South American union and the election of President José Mujica to power 
seems to have further influenced the increase of support for the consolidation of 
UNASUR. This particularity of the Uruguayan case can be also linked to three further 
factors. 
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Firstly, the low influence of the governing party before 2005 is related to the political 
decline of the traditional political parties of Uruguay, as well as the poor results of 
integration during the last period of the Colorado party. Secondly, the influence of a 
public service that has traditionally maintained a certain continuity of foreign policy 
could not be changed or replaced immediately. Such influence seems to have lasted 
for some years into the first government of the Broad Front party. 
 
As illustrated in the middle column of figure 10, the interpretations of the satisfaction 
of Ecuador and Uruguay with the economic mechanism of integration clearly show 
peoples’ low satisfaction at the prospects of the economic integration processes 
continuing. Regarding the disenchantment of Ecuador with the CAN, it has been 
referred to as having a low level of satisfaction. 
 
Ecuador’s view of CAN as an inefficient and ‘obsolete’ organisation is mainly related 
to two main phenomena. One is the poor ability to build a collective identity that 
contributes to the solution of conflicts such as the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border 
disputes, and the resulting poor commitment to economic agreements, and a low 
level of cooperation as noted by Vieira (2008).  
 
The other factor producing a low level of Ecuadorian satisfaction with CAN, is the 
poor impact of economic cooperation within CAN on social development. However, 
more factors appear just as important in relation to the inefficiency of CAN. These 
factors are the weakness of the democratic institutions and low political stability 
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which disrupts small states’ cooperation across borders. The Ecuadorian case from 
1980 to 2007 is an example. 
 
In contrast to this South American case, Western European small states rely on the 
strength of the democratic institutions in order to cooperate as corporate actors in 
some economic sectors, in order to counter the challenges of the world market, as 
hypothesised by Katzenstein (1985), -and tested by Thorhallsson (2000). European 
small states have also developed smart state strategies (Grøn & Rogaczewka, 2013) 
to pursue their interests within a framework of competition, which due to their nature 
of economic and technological development can be viewed as healthy competition. 
 
However, the economic framework of competition cannot be equally applied in the 
South American context due to economic asymmetries between countries. On the 
one hand, the larger states such as Argentina, Brazil and Colombia have a high level 
of technological and economic competitiveness. On the other hand, small states 
such as Bolivia, Ecuador and Paraguay have a low level of competitive economic 
capacity. 
 
In that case, an economic framework for integration such as those employed in 
Europe, which Latin America attempted to replicate in the twentieth century, can lead 
to a subjective interdependence, instead of an objective interdependence, within 
which losses and gains are considered as ‘ours’ instead of his/hers or theirs, as 
noted by Wendt (1999). 
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The FTAA project for instance was rejected by both Ecuador and Uruguay on the 
basis of both the size of the economy and of the differing political ideology of the 
parts. These two examples demonstrate a failure in the attempts to employ 
economic mechanisms of cooperation as means of integration. 
 
On the one hand, this continental project involved countries with world leading 
economies such as the USA, Brazil and Mexico which may have similar conditions in 
certain areas of their economies to a healthy competition. On the other hand, 
countries with an underdeveloped economy, such as Bolivia, Ecuador, and Paraguay 
to whom assistance was given during the negotiation process, are more vulnerable 
to such asymmetrical relationships, and a free trade market as means of integration 
could further damage their weak economies. 
 
The fact that assistance was given to small states such as Ecuador and Bolivia for 
the negotiation process of the FTAA shows that such asymmetrical relationships 
were not sustainable. This kind of relationship led to a dependent relationship and to 
what Wendt (1999) calls ‘subjective interdependence’ (p. 344-345).  Hence, it can be 
seen that this kind of cooperation may not lead to integration. 
 
Rather than this type of cooperation rooted in economics, it seems that,  in the 
process of construction of UNASUR, it was other elements that prevailed –trust 
building, and the recognition of common goals, such as fighting poverty, or 
constructing a physical infrastructure that more closely links the societies of the 
continent– and were factors which enabled the formation of an objective 
interdependence, and a feeling of we-ness. 
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This Ecuadorian experience within CAN and the experience of further small states 
such as Uruguay within the other economic mechanisms of integration such as the 
ALADI questioned the appropriateness of commercial cooperation accompanied by a 
low level of political intervention. These events also exemplify another reason for the 
failure of the FTAA and for the support given to UNASUR. 
  
Consequently, the transformation of the SAFTA into UNASUR on the basis of 
communitarian cooperation can be conceived as a response to the failure of 
previous projects of integration, and as an alternative offered by the left-oriented 
governments with the aim of finding alternatives that correspond with the South 
American situation, with contemporary international circumstances and with the 
demands of the South American societies. 
 
These phenomena can also be evidenced by comparing Ecuadorian with Uruguayan 
behaviour during the process of creating UNASUR. As figure 10 shows, the 
satisfaction of both states regarding free trade mechanisms of integration is low. And 
this outcome was obtained despite the considerable effort made by Uruguay, as a 
traditional region-engaging state, to support previous attempts to keep ALADI afloat 
and to comply with the regulations of MERCOSUR. 
 
Until 2010, Uruguay showed a low level of trust in the ability of MERCOSUR to 
resolve the high number of disputes with Argentina, despite the fact that Uruguay 
has traditionally been an international trader state. Most of its trade was conducted 
with extra-regional states until the beginning of the Latin American economic 
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integration process in the 1960s, and its international trade has traditionally been 
influenced by other states’ policies (Díaz, 2003). 
 
However, Uruguay’s small state characteristics and its membership of the 
MERCOSUR since the 1990s both challenged the capacity of Uruguay to overcome 
the relative economic and institutional disadvantages in relation to its main regional 
trade partners, Brazil and Argentina, which ended in a subjective interdependence 
and hindered the formation of a strong collective identity in the South American 
cone. 
 
For these reasons, the perspective of establishing a new international regional 
institution that compensates for this relative disadvantage appears to have also 
influenced the Uruguayan decision to support the consolidation of UNASUR as a 
mechanism for resolving discords between member states by means of political 
dialogue. 
 
This study has also sought to understand the particularities of individual cases. One 
such particularity is related to the ratification process of the membership of 
UNASUR. Ecuador did not question the issues of bureaucracy and public 
administration in the newly created international organisation and institutions of 
UNASUR as Uruguay did. 
 
Uruguay’s concerns were not necessarily concerned with the type of cooperation 
within it. Its concerns were and still are related to the danger of repeating the old 
mechanisms of integration, for two reasons, namely the fears that this could 
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jeopardise the aims of UNASUR, and secondly, that the requirement of increasing 
the number of civil servants will put more financial strain on the small state. 
 
Here, the smallness of the domestic political administration was evidently an issue 
for the Uruguayans. This case shows one typical characteristic of many small states 
within a highly institutionalised international environment, and the small size of a 
state can become a challenging factor for small states in international relations. 
 
These Uruguayan apprehensions are a common challenge shared by small states in 
regional and world politics, as evidenced by the study of 19 small states within the 
European Union (Panke, 2010). The South American small states also display this 
deficit as mentioned above in relation to the negotiation about the FTAA project, as 
well as in relation to the support given by Brazil to Surinam during the 
accomplishment of its role as President Pro Tempore of UNASUR. 
 
Nevertheless, this study has tried to explain that both Ecuador and Uruguay view 
UNASUR as a new regional instrument whose foreign policy could be significant, 
especially in an international environment where international corporations and 
economically stronger extra-regional agents continue to constrain the abilities of 
small states to satisfy the demands of their population when discharging their duties. 
 
Although there are voices that view the consensual clause of the UNASUR as a 
weakness of this kind of integration (Bizzozero, 2008, 2010), UNASUR’s position as 
a new international player and as a regional representative of South American 
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identity and interests could help small states to position some of their national 
interests across and beyond the region. 
 
For small states, this suggested weakness of UNASUR is instead an important 
source of motivation for their engagement in it, since the veto or consensus clause 
equips small states with similar tools to approve or disapprove regional policies and 
practical common projects. 
 
What is more, the various failed attempts made by Uruguay and Argentina to resolve 
their economic and diplomatic disputes in the coordination of, and cooperation in, the 
environmental policies influenced Uruguay to view UNASUR as an alternative to the 
resolution of their diplomatic impasses. This Uruguayan position can be particularly 
noted in the process of, and debates for, the ratification of the UNASUR treaty. 
  
The rise of left-wing governments is another relevant factor influencing the support 
given by Uruguay and Ecuador to the construction of UNASUR as a politically driven 
international regional organisation, and at the same time a rejection of the FTAA. As 
figure 10 illustrates, in both case studies, there has been a tendency towards 
supporting the idea of a South American identity when left-oriented governments 
arrive to power. 
 
This process is related to the periods of government and the ideological change in 
the electorate in both case studies. Originally, the Ecuadorian leadership and 
governing party had a low impact on the motivation for supporting the creation of 
UNASUR before 2007. That motivation increased after the arrival of the socialist-
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oriented government of President Rafael Correa and his political movement, Alianza 
Pais to power. This tendency was maintained until recently. 
 
Here, Ecuadorian behaviour slightly differs from the behaviour of Uruguay, as 
Uruguay maintained a more stable attitude of moderation, or medium impact on the 
support of the idea of South American integration from 2005 to 2010. This 
Uruguayan behaviour may be explained by a more stable and professionalised 
Uruguayan public administration and civil service. 
 
The arrival of President José Mujica, who belongs to the same socialist political 
alliance as his predecessor, the Broad Front, but has traditionally held strong left-
oriented political views, injected more support for South American integration from 
the beginning of 2010. Hence, Uruguayan support for the consolidation of the region 
has further increased since that time. 
 
The foreign policy, particularly the vision of regional integration of these small states 
through economic and free trade, has lost its force during the process of 
consolidating UNASUR. Instead, the idea of political collective action as 
communitarian cooperation for the resolution of shared socio-political issues became 
the engine of UNASUR. Here, a ‘cognitive community’ made up of the members of 
political elites belonging to the governments, and a political discourse concerning a 
common fate is noticeable in most fields of the construction process. 
 
Although the left-wing party governing Uruguay since 2005 did not necessarily 
modify traditional Uruguayan foreign policy until the arrival of President Mujica to 
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power, the leading Uruguayan party reinforced the idea of Latin American integration 
on the basis of a more politically driven process as a requirement to retain the 
support of the electorate. 
 
This Uruguayan behaviour is related, in the first place, to the breakdown of 
negotiations with the USA concerning the FTAA on a multilateral, and later on a 
bilateral, basis. This behaviour of the Uruguayan leadership after 2005 shows the 
intention of the party to comply with the proposal aired during the election campaign 
to display itself as a trustworthy new political party. Secondly, the direct intervention 
of President Vázquez in the negotiations and the hosting of the Special Commission 
demonstrate both the consistency of a political campaign, and the realisation of 
ideas into policies. 
 
Thirdly, the presence of delegates, representatives and special envoys of Uruguay in 
the different negotiation groups and commissions embody the representation of the 
ideas of Uruguay, and their reinforcement of an ideological change from 2005. This 
linked Uruguay to the other national governments which were largely formed by left-
oriented parties. Hence, they constituted a ‘cognitive community’ as defined by Adler 
(2005).  
 
Moreover, the signature of the treaty by President Vázquez and its ratification by the 
Uruguayan parliament positioned Uruguay as a crucial political actor for the region, 
as this was the ninth (out of twelve members) instrument required for the legal 
validation and international recognition of UNASUR. 
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This political move of the new Uruguayan government led by President Mujica also 
obtained support from some opposing parliamentarians of the National Party, and 
enabled Uruguay to play a relevant regional role in the new integration process. 
Uruguayan ratification of the treaty allowed this regional organisation to reach an 
international status and to project itself as the leading instrument of South American 
integration. 
 
Hence, the actions of the national leaders of Uruguay and the ideology represented 
by the governing parties was in accord with the socialist-oriented tendency of the 
region during the period of signature and ratification of UNASUR, demonstrating both 
a high level of discussion and the influence exerted by the Uruguayan parliament in 
regional politics. 
 
In contrast, the Ecuadorian legislative traditionally played a weaker role in the 
international politics of the state. The figure of the president and the tradition of a 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs gathered together the major influences on international 
relations. 
 
Moreover, in Ecuador the constant violation of constitutional rules by both the 
executive and the legislative powers of the state reduced the legitimacy of the 
national parliament’s demand to participate in the design of foreign policies, until the 
introduction of the new Constitution of 2008 and the renovation of the political elite. 
As a consequence, there was a period prior to 2007 when the presidential figure and 
the legislative powers exerted only a low level of influence on regional politics. 
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However, since 2007, there has been a high level of influence of the presidential 
figure and governing party on regional policies. This phenomenon is related to the 
arrival of the present governing political party and its maintenance in power. This 
government and the corresponding political movement, Alianza Pais, adhere to a 
left-oriented ideology. They also joined the socialist-wave of South America, and the 
wave of regional integration on the basis of a political rather than of an economic 
perspective. Hence, the new Ecuadorian political elite became a part of the 
integrationist cognitive community. 
 
On the one hand, these factors influencing the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay 
differ slightly from one another in the degree of continuity and stability of political 
ideology and in its implementation in their national and regional policies. On the 
other hand, the ideological tendency of a left-oriented regional politics began to 
merge from 2007. Both states prioritised socio-political policies instead of an 
economic or commercial related integration. 
 
In the case of Ecuador, the reassertion of national sovereignty that involves the 
reassertion of South American belonging, the promotion of active multilateralism, the 
diversification of Ecuadorian exports and the support of the South–South 
cooperation, the promotion of environmental projects, the provision of protection to 
the Ecuadorian population living abroad by defending their rights, free mobility of the 
people and universal citizenship, and the support for Latin American integration all 
defined the Ecuadorian agenda for foreign affairs under the government of Alianza 
Pais, as already highlighted by Zepeda (2011). 
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From this point, a new era of Ecuadorian international relations began with the arrival 
of Alianza Pais and Rafael Correa to the government who are inclined to consider 
UNASUR to be an appropriate regional integration process for the achievement of 
the Ecuadorian objectives regionally and internationally. 
 
Before coming to the last reflection of this analysis, it can be said that the influence 
of the left-wing wave in South America on the creation of UNASUR (Sanahuja, 2010) 
can be noted, in the case of Ecuador, mainly in the last stages of UNASUR’s 
creation process. In contrast, Uruguay demonstrated a higher level of activity prior to 
the signature of the UNASUR treaty in 2008 by supporting the Venezuelan left-
oriented view, and transforming the focus of UNASUR into a socio-politically oriented 
institution. 
 
Finally, the actions of these small states can also be characterised as reactions to 
tacit issues affecting the national-states in that period of regional financial crisis. 
From this point of view, their support for the consolidation of UNASUR reflects also a 
pragmatic move to coordinate policies for tackling regional issues that could not be 
resolved without collective action under previous diverging ideological perspectives. 
The affinity of the left governments of Ecuador and Uruguay with most of the socialist 
governments of the region appears to have facilitated common action, as in the case 
of signing common political statements. 
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5.4 Elements of Identity as Explanatory Factors for Ecuador’s and Uruguay’s 
Participation in the Creation and Consolidation of UNASUR 
 
The idea of South American integration in infrastructure and communication, as 
stated in the protocols of the first meetings of the heads of state, is based on the 
argument of constructing a South American identity. This argument has been 
reinforced throughout a process of international expansion of this idea which has 
been supported by a consistent incorporation of new elements into a set of norms, 
identitarian features, values and beliefs. This set of norms, identitarian features, 
values and beliefs links the identities of the South American states with one another 
and enables them to be viewed as constituent parts of the regional identity. 
 
This suggests that South America was not a homogeneous region at the beginning 
of the twenty-first century, despite the recognition of a set of norms, identitarian 
features, values and beliefs that has historically been shared by most of the South 
American states. The fact that the twelve South American heads of state and 
governments of South America met in Brasilia in 2000 for the first time in history 
shows the beginning of trust building as a basic principle for the fusion of shared 
identities into a collective regional one. 
 
Moreover, the period of regional division, and enmity between neighbouring states 
ended only two years before the meeting of Brasilia in 1998 when Ecuador and Peru 
signed the Itamaraty Peace Treaty. These international political events demonstrate 
the lack of trust between the South American states right up to the end of the 
twentieth century, despite them sharing various elements of a collective identity. 
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Yet it is these shared characteristics that, according to Wendt (1999), drive like-
minded states to find elements of identity that can help to construct a collective 
identity. This statement corresponds with the political situation of South America in 
2000, where all South American states had democratically elected governments 
which enabled them to identify a variety of identitarian features that became part of 
the political argument for their interest in creating and consolidating a region. 
 
Hence, the signature of the UNASUR treaty and its ratification by all member states 
have helped to expand the idea of a South American identity which has been 
promoted by the member states in various political, cultural and academic events. 
 
Civil and academic events such as the first Students’ Congress for Integration, which 
took place in Uruguay in April 2012, and the South American Cinema Festival 
supported by UNASUR confirmed the existence of an instituted idea of such South 
American identity and strengthened the construction of the ‘we-ness’ as a basis for 
the collective South American identity. 
 
The construction of the we-ness, or objective interdependence, appears as a 
process whereby small states have used their identitarian features, norms, values 
and beliefs to weigh up the appropriateness of international actions. In the cases 
studied here, figure 11 summarises the main identity factors underpinning the idea of 
a South American region and a new kind of cooperation. 
 
Both small states, Ecuador and Uruguay have national constitutional norms binding 
them to the process of integration. At the same time, the main regional norms given 
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institutional form in the UNASUR treaty became another mandatory norm. These 
actions are fundamental characteristics of region-engaging states as suggested in 
chapter two. 
  
Figure 11. Identity as a factor influencing the decision-making process during the creation and 
consolidation of UNASUR 
 
 
The diagrams also show a set of identitarian features, values and beliefs that are 
summarised within an intersection point that connects Ecuador and Uruguay to 
UNASUR as a whole. Relevant features of identity are the shared history of being an 
ex-European colony, having a shared cultural background and similar language. 
Important values that are institutionalised as well as conceived as principles of the 
South American regional unity include the respect for sovereignty and the principle of 
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non-intervention, tolerance towards liberal thinking and democratic principles, the 
principles of solidarity and social justice, and the sense of belonging to the Latin and 
South American idea of unity. These factors have been the pillars of the formation of 
trust and objective interdependence in recent years within the framework of 
UNASUR. 
 
As figure 11 illustrates, the cases studied here show various elements of the 
Ecuadorian and Uruguayan identity linked to the the identitarian elements of the 
region conveyed in the UNASUR treaty. This embodiment of the elements of all 
twelve national identities within UNASUR has helped to consolidate the South 
American international community. 
 
This international community shows the three conditions highlighted by Adler and 
Barnett (1998: 31). Firstly, the ‘shared identity, values and meanings’ are embodied 
in the set of norms, identitarian features, values and beliefs as demonstrated in the 
previous chapters and depicted in figure 11. All these factors demonstrate a high 
level of influence to the support given by Ecuador and Uruguay for the construction 
and consolidation of UNASUR. 
 
Secondly, the ‘many-sided and direct relations’ (ibid) as suggested by Adler and 
Barnett (1998) took place, in the case of UNASUR, through the various meetings of 
presidents, ministers, councils, working groups, and academic and social projects 
developed through the civil society belonging to the member states, including 
Uruguay and Ecuador. Thirdly, ‘some degree of long-term’ (ibid) objectives are 
contained in the aims proposed by UNASUR and approved by the states, such as 
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the consolidation of South America as a zone of peace which has been supported by 
both cases studied here. 
 
Those shared elements of identity have had a high level of influence in the behaviour 
of both case studies as demonstrated in the previous chapters and in figure 11. Both 
Ecuador and Uruguay have constitutional norms that legitimate the actions of 
governments in favour of the process of creating and consolidating UNASUR. This 
support for South American integration is consistent with the ratification of the 
UNASUR treaty by both small states, despite their different approaches in the 
decision-making process. 
 
However, each state has its own particular features. These two states also show 
their own identitarian characteristics, related to their particular behaviour in 
international relations. While Uruguay demonstrates bargaining strategies and a 
well-debated process for the ratification of UNASUR, to the extent that small states 
can be characterised as smart small states (Grøn and Rogaczewka, 2013), Ecuador 
appears to have been driven by ideational elements such as a shared identity, 
shared ideology and spontaneous initiative. 
   
Some of the further elements of such shared identity which have been noted as 
influencing the behaviour of Ecuador are the features of collective identity formally 
embodied in the UNASUR treaty. These comprise: shared historical background, 
shared culture and languages spoken, and the symbiosis of a shared ethnic and 
immigrant background as the result of being ex-European colonies. 
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Regarding the links of small states to the whole region, Ecuador portrays itself as 
reflecting the whole of South America on a reduced scale, as it contains one of the 
world’s most diverse communities in a geographically small territory. A group of 
diverse provinces, nationalities, ethnicities, cultures and languages are embedded in 
the Ecuadorian national-state. The idea that Ecuador is the prototype of South 
American diversity has been constantly promoted by the Ecuadorian authorities in 
recent years. 
 
This idea reflects the idea of a holistic South American region, in the sense that the 
South American region also contains a diversity of national-states with their distinct 
cultural and linguistic identities, different political systems, and localised social, 
political and economic issues -which despite the diversity have shared a historical 
background and a shared ideal. 
 
Hence, there are various links between the South American national-states that 
explain the support of Uruguay and Ecuador to the construction and consolidation of 
the South American region as shown in figure 11. All three categorised identitarian 
elements exert a high level of influence on the decision-making of both small states 
as mentioned above. 
 
In the case of Ecuador, the process of political re-foundation of the state coincided 
with the institutionalisation of UNASUR and the creation of various councils and 
further institutions. This has facilitated the incorporation of related norms at the 
domestic level and at the regional level. As a result, Ecuador has developed an 
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agenda for its foreign policy which includes the revival of regional integration as a 
strategy of its international politics. 
 
As shown in the other case study, Uruguay has aimed to maintain its traditional 
region-engaging character by drawing on identitarian features that it has historically 
shared with Argentina and Brazil, as well as with the other Latin American states. 
The shared language, culture and history, among others, are highlighted by the 
arguments for the support given to UNASUR. Particularly these three elements are 
links that connect Uruguay to Ecuador and underpin the communitarian view of 
political cooperation in the region. 
  
The set of South American values and beliefs also connect both states with the 
whole region as shown in figure 11. Both Ecuador and Uruguay demonstrate they 
have been highly influenced by shared values such as the protection of liberal 
democratic institutions, respect for human rights, social justice, and solidarity among 
others. As suggested by Wendt (1999), this self-consciousness and the 
intersubjective understanding of the existence of a culture and values shared 
between political actors within an international political environment are the basis for 
the formation of a collective identity which can be noted in the case of Uruguay and 
Ecuador during their involvement in the process of the consolidation of UNASUR. 
 
Although the identification and self-assurance provided by shared elements of a 
collective or regional identity rarely evolve in a short period of time, the historical 
background of Ecuador and Uruguay in connection to most South American states is 
an example of the presence of such development. 
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To define what political action is in the interest of individual nations requires, as 
suggested by Finnemore (1996), a process of weighing up and comparing identities, 
one with another. In this case, the process would include from 2000, when the idea 
of IIRSA was introduced by Brazil, up to 2011 when the major challenges to 
UNASUR’s consolidation were finally overcome and the UNASUR treaty came into 
force. 
 
Finally, I will turn to the identification of extra-regional identities or agents that can 
also influence the behaviour of small states. These can also influence the way in 
which the states involved in various regional projects enact their roles (Nabers, 2011; 
Harnisch et al., 2011). In this analysis there are various cases of the influence of 
identities, but only a few are highlighted.  
 
One case is that of the constant and consistent portrayal of Great Britain as the 
‘other’ in declarations complaining of its imperial behaviour in the South Atlantic, and 
the geopolitical issues raised by its claim concerning the Falkland Islands. These 
declarations made in the name of UNASUR bear the stamp of approval of all the 
South American states, and illustrate how a depiction of the ‘other’ counter-posed to 
the ‘us’, can act as a signal to influence the behaviour of states and the role played 
by them (Harnisch et al., 2011). 
 
Another case is based on the idea that the USA with its military and economic 
imposing presence in South America could also culturally influence the behaviour of 
not only small states in the area but also other states.  The rejection of the FTAA 
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project, and the protest of both Ecuador and Uruguay against the installations of US 
military bases in Colombia can both be understood as a reinforcement of the idea of 
the ‘other’ as an identity which does not belong to the region. 
 
Again an identity conflict within the member states may arise when they play various 
roles as members of various regional integration processes, as suggested by 
Harnisch et al. (2011), Breuning (2011), and Nabers (2011). In the case of 
UNASUR’s members this possible identity conflict and its influence on their role as 
members or leaders has been resolved during the process of construction of 
UNASUR by drawing on past experience as a means of self-awareness of the 
existence of a South American region. 
 
The inclusion of CAN and MERCOSUR within UNASUR as important sources of the 
South American identity reduces the possibility of such identity conflict. At the same 
time, the long-term project of merging CAN and MERCOSUR can enable small 
states to maintain their individual identities as well. 
 
For example, Ecuador’s membership of CAN, and Uruguay’s membership of 
MERCOSUR are sources of experience which can be put to good use in the 
framework of UNASUR. This suggests that small states may be able to adapt to, 
adopt and adapt a regional building project driven by identitarian factors. 
 
In addition, this constant interaction of states shows the other condition for the 
formation of a community, namely the many-sided and direct relations between 
states (Adler & Barnett, 1998). This interaction enables states to identify common 
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issues, collectively develop projects and resolve shared issues. Indeed, the shared 
identity promoted within UNASUR facilitates the solution of controversies, as already 
shown in the case of Argentina and Uruguay, and in the case including Colombia, 
Ecuador and Venezuela. 
In contrast to small states within the European Union which required further efforts 
regarding language and communication for negotiation, these South American small 
states share a culture and language, with most of UNASUR’s members. This further 
facilitates the flow of communication in the planning and conduct of common 
projects. 
 
In the case of Uruguay, the experiences and culture shared with Argentina and Brazil 
have facilitated the harmonisation of the norms of the national Uruguayan health 
system with the systems of other members of UNASUR. In the case of Ecuador, the 
use of the Spanish language in the majority of meetings and negotiation tables have 
facilitated the participation of Ecuador as well as the relative successful performance 
as President Pro Tempore. 
 
To summarise, the examples I have given (the way in which the principles of equality 
is practiced and roles are played) signal that the South American states have 
persued mechanisms that enable them to go through a process of trust-building by 
adopting political dialogue as the means for resolving disputes between states. From 
the Wendtean explanatory perspective, these phenomena can be characterised as 
the fourth master variable that explains the construction of a collective identity, 
namely, self-restraint (Wendt, 1999: 357) which will be further clarified in the 
following section. 
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5.5 The Role Enactment, Influence and Cooperation of Ecuador and 
Uruguay within UNASUR 
 
The study of Ecuador and Uruguay has shown that beyond the theoretical 
explanations, the analysis of each states’ domestic phenomena also enables an 
understanding of the behaviour of small states in international relations. The fact that 
each member of UNASUR is entitled to the role of President Pro Tempore for a 
period of one year, and so is also responsible for coordinating the council’s 
meetings, setting the agenda and representing the region in international forums, 
enables small states to play a prominent role in the region, as well as worldwide. 
 
Yet each state differs in its approach, and its ability to fulfil such demands. Moreover, 
each state has developed a particular kind of identity which is linked to regional as 
well as to extra-regional identities, as mentioned above. So the behaviour, the role 
enactment and the preference of the kind of policies and projects to be prioritised 
might be influenced by such links (Harnisch et al., 2011). 
 
In the cases of Ecuador and Uruguay, links to the regional identity are high, as 
denoted in the previous section. However, a possible change of behaviour and 
consequently of role cannot be predicted as the tendency to support or reject a 
certain kind of integration appears to be related to the kind of government in power in 
a similar way to the fluctuation of foreign policy in the other Latin American states, as 
suggested by Gardini and Lambert (2010). 
 
In the case of both Ecuador and Uruguay, the support given to the construction and 
consolidation of UNASUR is not only related to the ideology of the president and 
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party in government, but also shows a great affinity with the regional political 
tendencies, as shown in figure 11. 
 
Moreover, the traditional region-engaging character of Uruguay, and its historical 
stable domestic and foreign policy offer a reduced space for role change. In contrast 
to Uruguay, the Ecuadorian historical background can frustrate any prediction of a 
role change owing to its unsettled politics and weak institutions as highlighted above. 
 
However, the high level of identitarian ties which Ecuador has with the region has 
had considerable influence on its behaviour, to the extent that the old relationship 
with the USA has suffered and support for the South American regional integration 
process has increased. 
 
Furthermore, the framework for cooperation within UNASUR offers many 
opportunities to small states, such as the role of President Pro Tempore. For many 
scholars of small states studies, the fact of being a small state and being a member 
of a regional international organisation already has value added in its favour 
(Goetschel, 1998; Hey, 2003; Wivel, 2010). 
 
All the same, the membership does not guarantee that all small states will be able to 
coordinate, cooperate, influence and play the role of member and President Pro 
Tempore as expected by the other member states. But, the principle of 
complementarity and communitarian cooperation enables fellow states to support 
each other in fulfilling this role. 
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This kind of cooperation embodies the principle of communitarianism within  
UNASUR, as the existing asymmetries between states do not enable competition. 
Their asymmetries stimulate them to complement each other in order to define the 
common interest, agree on policies for all and find resolutions for collective issues. 
This kind of cooperation shows that the exercise of self-restraint as a condition for 
the construction of the collective identity. 
 
These principles also enable weaker small states to coordinate common policies and 
projects without being concerned they will be overpowered by the responsibility of 
coordinating the projects and policies of UNASUR, as support of fellow member 
states can be requested in order to tackle issues affecting the international 
community. 
 
The historical context within which UNASUR was created has also facilitated the 
construction of a unique regional international organisation that equips small states 
with the same constitutional roles as the larger states. 
 
Historical factors at play here are firstly that this is a democratic region governed by 
a democratically elected government despite the differences in their approach to 
governance. Secondly, all the small states have actively participated in the design of 
the type of integration. The construction of the South American region has also 
obtained wider support from Ecuador than the FTAA project since 2006. As might be 
expected, there was also a new affinity within the new Ecuadorian political elite with 
the South American project. This civil support given to the new Ecuadorian political 
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elite has also enhanced the performance of Ecuador as a signatory, member and 
President Pro Tempore of UNASUR. 
 
The region-engaging character of Ecuador was also reinforced by the maintenance 
of the principle of equal rights in the decision-making process of the policies and 
projects within UNASUR. Moreover, articles 7, 12, 13, and 14 of the UNASUR treaty 
further guaranteed Ecuador the opportunity to lead the South American region from 
2009 to 2010. 
 
These norms enable a small state to share responsibility with every state despite 
their respective material sizes. This kind of cooperation represents a new way of 
building trust. 
 
The challenge for small states in this context lies in their ability to coordinate, 
cooperate, identify and propose policies and projects that contain common issues in 
order that the trust deposited in each member state can mature and develop into a 
(security) cohesive community. 
 
The attempted coup d’état in Ecuador, in September 2010 and the institutional crisis 
in Paraguay, in June 2012, showed that the challenge to the small states in 
UNASUR is not the power differences between the fellow member states. The 
challenge for the small states is the weakness of their democratic institutions, which 
can also endanger the political stability of the whole region. This is due to the fact 
that half of the member states of UNASUR are small states. 
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In its six years of existence, UNASUR has had six Presidents Pro Tempore. Four 
small states have led the region, namely Ecuador from 2009 to 2010, Guyana from 
2010 to 2011, Paraguay from 2011 to 2012, and Surinam 2013 to the present. 
However, in the cases of Ecuador and Paraguay not only the democracy of the state 
was endangered, but also the international institutions of the whole region. 
 
It can be seen that the implications of the post of President Pro Tempore are that it 
enables a small state to play the role of leader of the region within UNASUR, and 
this role also offers small states the possibility of placing their issues on the agenda 
of projects and discussions. 
 
Figure 12. Coordination, cooperation and role enactment within UNASUR 
Themes 
 
Role of President Pro Tempore   Member of UNASUR 
Case study   
ECUADOR  
 President Pro Tempore (H) 
 
 
 Member of the CSD 
(H) 
URUGUAY  
 President Pro Tempore (-) 
 
 
 Member of the CSD 
(M) 
Interpreted levels = (H)=High (M)=Medium  (L)=Low  (-)=Not assumed yet 
 
Figure 12 shows two possibilities in the region-engaging role of a small state: as 
President Pro Tempore and as a member of UNASUR. Ecuador as illustrated in 
figure 12 has already enacted the role of President Pro Tempore of UNASUR and as 
a member also shows a high input into the construction of the region. Hence, it can 
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be said that the role of President Pro Tempore enables small states to have a higher 
prominence in the construction and consolidation of the region. 
  
Ecuador demonstrated a higher involvement in the issues of the region during its 
period as president of UNASUR despite the internal challenges such as the 
attempted coup d’état in 2010 and the diplomatic impasses with Colombia and the 
USA. Moreover, the role of President Pro Tempore enabled Ecuador to coordinate 
and lead the South American aid to Haiti in the name of UNASUR following the 
earthquake that destroyed the main physical structure of Port-au-Prince in January 
2010. 
 
The role of President Pro Tempore  played by Ecuador has also shown that 
UNASUR as a community supports small states when they have to confront 
domestic and exterior challenges. The immediate reaction to and condemnation of 
the attempted coup d’état in Ecuador show that UNASUR as a regional actor was 
able to counter such events. The reaction of UNASUR during and after the coup 
d’état attempt on 30 September 2010 brought Ecuador back to conclude its mandate 
as President Pro Tempore of UNASUR as well as to strengthen the democratic 
institutions in Ecuador. 
 
Comparing the Ecuadorian role to the Uruguayan one, it can be seen that Uruguay 
shows a medium level of engagement in the areas of cooperation within UNASUR 
following the signature of the UNASUR treaty. However, this disparity can be related 
to the fact that Uruguay has not yet played the role of President  Pro Tempore, and 
its role is restricted to the quality of member state. 
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Nevertheless, Uruguay’s support given to the consolidation of UNASUR by ratifying 
the treaty is based on the actions of traditional region-engaging small states, and it 
can also be related to the discourse of collective identity expanded throughout the 
process of constructing UNASUR. These arguments support the general proposition 
that membership in international regional organisations can be particularly beneficial 
for small states. 
 
However, as noted by Goetschel (1998), membership can also restrict the autonomy 
of the small state, forcing them to develop strategies to put forward their own most 
relevant issues as the priority of the region. Ecuador’s prioritised campaign for the 
ratification of the UNASUR treaty enabled it to obtain more support and reciprocity 
during its diplomatic impasse with Colombia. It would seem from this that small 
states need to focus on strategic areas of national and regional common interest in 
order to find direct support and expand their influence within the region, as well as 
beyond it. 
 
Furthermore, as shown in the case of Ecuador, the reforms of the structure of the 
national state can also enable a small state to harmonise the national with the 
regional norms and interests in order to expand its areas of influence. This kind of 
strategy has been combined with hosting the headquarters of international 
organisations in the territory of the small state. 
 
The installation of the permanent General Secretariat in Quito embodies a significant 
strategy of Ecuador, for the state as well as for the region. Firstly, it positions the 
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symbolical value of the newly created union in a country that was dominated by an 
extra-regional force until 2009, when the US army withdrew. Secondly, hosting the 
General Secretariat of UNASUR can impact on the national as well as on the 
international perception of Ecuador as an international actor. Thirdly, the presence of 
the headquarters of UNASUR, which includes larger states such as Brazil and 
Argentina, represents not only the increase in Ecuador’s geopolitical value, but it 
also motivates an urban regeneration of the area where the headquarters is placed. 
 
Finally, the presence of the General Secretariat in Quito facilitates direct contact and 
involvement of the Ecuadorian people with one of the main institutions that 
represents the whole South American region, enabling them to be direct constructors 
of the South American identity. President Correa’s speech during the celebration of 
the beginning of the construction of the headquarters in 2011 refers to this as a 
signal that ‘reflects the emblematic longing for union and integration of our countries’ 
(Presidente Correa, 2011). 
 
In this context, some of UNASUR’s particular objectives, such as consolidating the 
region as a zone of peace and supporting the consolidation of democratic 
institutions, have been perceived by Ecuadorian political actors as factors that are 
also of special interest for Ecuador due to its recent history of insecurity and 
instability. 
  
In contrast, the case of Uruguay shows a lower performance than Ecuador. This 
strengthens the proposition that the nature of the international system’s structure can 
strengthen or constrain the region-engaging character of a small state. Uruguay, as 
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one of the states that has not obtained the role of President Pro Tempore, has not 
had the same opportunity as Ecuador in this process. Hence, its actions are limited 
to the role of UNASUR member as shown in figure 12. 
 
Nevertheless, the region-engaging character of Uruguay and its role enactment as a 
member of UNASUR has been clarified by looking at its participation and input into 
the projects, regulations, norms and declarations that Uruguay has agreed to 
develop to fulfil UNASUR’s objectives. 
 
According to Article 13 of the Constitutive Treaty of UNASUR 2008, all the union’s  
regulations, the creation of new institutions and the execution of communitarian 
projects require discussion, coordination, and, under the consensus clause, the 
agreement of all parties. It is within this process of presenting, discussing and 
coordinating initiatives that the common collective interest is defined. 
 
During the process of the creation and consolidation of UNASUR, Uruguayan 
behaviour has neither been driven by the force of an international system in which 
Uruguay, as a small state, was a prisoner (as was the case in its membership of 
MERCOSUR) (Fernández, 2012), nor was Uruguay merely opportunistic in its 
participation, as some would suggest. The fact that the foundation of UNASUR was 
revised and adapted within the Commission of High Representatives of all South 
American states, in which Uruguay was a major actor, shows the region-engaging 
role of Uruguay as an active UNASUR member. 
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In another way UNASUR presents further opportunities that can be utilised by the so 
called ‘smart small states’ (Grøn & Rogaczewka, 2013), which would create 
strategies to persuade their fellow member states to adhere to their initiative. This 
strategy is available to all member states of UNASUR. 
 
In the case of Uruguay, discussions about alternatives to amicably resolve the 
commercial conflicts with Argentina were opportunities employed by Uruguay, as 
UNASUR had already shown its potential for the pacific resolution of disputes in 
previous cases, such as the diplomatic impasse of Ecuador and Colombia in 2008 
and the internal destabilisation of the democratic system in Bolivia, also in 2008. 
 
Ecuador, for example, was not able to plan and apply a foreign policy before 2007 
due to its political instability, the lack of continuity of its governments, and the low 
professionalisation of its civil servants. As a result, it can be argued that smart small 
states may primarily be smart in their interior organisation in order to maintain a 
higher level of stability, continuity and professionalisation of the civil service in order 
to perform a smart international role. 
 
A further important insight as a result of this study is that an international regional 
organisation created on the basis of an equalitarian and communitarian cooperation 
can enable small states to contribute more to the strengthening of the international 
community. 
 
The role played by Ecuador and Uruguay in the Creation of the South American 
Defence Council (CSD) can support this argument. The Ecuadorian leading role in 
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the consolidation of the South American Defence Council and in the process of 
expanding international awareness of the idea of South America as a zone of peace 
while holding the Presidency Pro Tempore are examples of the contribution of a 
small state to the consolidation of the region. In this particular case, the idea of a 
South American identity in defence was utilised as one of their collective aims. 
 
Despite the possible constraints that present historical principles such as self-
determination and sovereignty, Ecuador and Uruguay appear to have flexibilised 
such traditional values and adapted themselves to the new idea of balancing 
autonomy and influence. 
 
Ecuador’s role as host of the General Secretariat of UNASUR has possibly opened 
up an opportunity to exert more influence. In contrast, Uruguay’s role as member 
state has maintained its traditional region-engaging character in the form of an 
honest agent in order to maintain its international profile. This profile can be further 
strengthened during the enactment of its role as President Pro Tempore in the period 
2014-2015. 
 
During this whole process, the transformation of the character of Ecuador from pro-
US American to pro-South American in the last seven years seems to have 
demonstrated that identity can be a main factor influencing the decision-making 
process of small states. This claim can be supported by the arguments presented by 
Uruguay about their own decision to confirm the UNASUR treaty. 
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This idea of a South American identity is manifest in all the councils created within 
UNASUR. In the cases studied here, the establishment of the CSD is a major 
mechanism which can help convert South America into a zone of peace on the basis 
of the idea of a South American identity. 
 
At the same time, this process seems to have supported the transformation of a 
region of little wars (Sánchez, 2011) into a region that aims to consolidate the idea of 
a zone of peace. As shown in chapter 3, Ecuador has been an arena of coup d’états, 
military conflicts and constant civil unrest. 
 
Hence, the will to change a culture of insecurity can also be considered as an 
influential factor on the behaviour of Ecuador in the construction of a more cohesive 
South American region through UNASUR on the basis that UNASUR promotes a 
zone of peace, respect for democratic institutions and political stability. 
 
Ecuador used to lack these very elements, as shown in chapter 3. As examples of 
this permanent insecurity can be included the border conflicts with Peru, and the 
threat portrayed by the possibilities of the Colombian conflict with the FARC spilling 
over into Ecuadorian territory. 
 
However, the new friendly relationship between Ecuador and Peru, following the 
signature of the peace treaty of 1998, shows the fourth and most important master 
variable for the construction of collective identity, the practice of self-restraint, that is, 
the abandonment of violence as means of the settlement of conflict (Wendt, 1999). 
This same idea has been promoted and formally accepted within the CSD, which 
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aims to promote the zone of peace and the South American identity in defence. In 
this way, the perspective of constructing a ‘we-feeling’ has been promoted in various 
forms by the Ecuadorian state and strengthened through its engagement in the 
creation of the CSD. 
 
In contrast to the Ecuadorian case, Uruguay has had a low level of vulnerability in 
the area of security, despite its relative smallness and geopolitical position, in the 
period prior to the signature of the UNASUR treaty. This is related in the first place to 
its relatively stable relationship with its neighbours. Secondly, Uruguay does not 
appear to have been directly influenced by extra-regional forces, as in the case of 
Ecuador. At the same time, Uruguay’s membership in MERCOSUR, which was 
already considered as an emerging security community before the beginning of the 
twenty-first century (Hurrell, 1998), portrays Uruguay as less vulnerable to extra-
regional influences. 
 
Finally, the outcomes of the study of Ecuador and Uruguay have also helped to 
demonstrate why UNASUR cannot be considered as a security community in the 
terms considered by Adler and Barnett (1998). Firstly, Ecuador has about 11,000 
soldiers on the border with Colombia occupied in constant patrol, due to the contact 
with the Colombian militia. These are repelled by the Colombian military forcing the 
conflict to spill over the borders. This phenomenon of insecurity also affecting 
neighbouring states has increased in violence since the beginning of the century, the 
mistrust between Ecuador and Colombia reaching its highest level in March 2008, 
while Brazil was promoting the creation of the South American Defence Council as 
mentioned in the previous chapter. 
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This use of violence by Colombian forces in Ecuadorian territory in March 2008 is 
one of many events that show that the South American region does not demonstrate 
the basic conditions for considering the region as a security community, as one of 
such requirements is the absence of military forces at the borders of states, and the 
abandonment of violence for the settlement of conflicts (Adler & Barnett, 1998). 
 
All the same, there are at least three fundamental indications that the South 
American region can develop into a security community. First, the settlement of the 
historical border conflicts between Ecuador and Peru has developed into a 
successful project of peaceful transition from enmity into friendship, not only at the 
level of the states’ interrelationship but also between the two civil societies. The 
mutual civil projects on the Ecuadorian-Peruvian border concerning infrastructure, 
health and education can be considered as a success, following the signature of the 
Peace Treaty of Itamaraty in 1998. 
 
Secondly, the creation of UNASUR has enabled all South American states to start 
projects of cooperation at various levels of the state as well as between the civil 
societies. The creation of twelve councils and various adjacent institutions in the 
period up to 2012 also shows an intensive and rapid development into a 
homogenous international community. 
 
Thirdly, the creation of the South American Defence Council has enabled all South 
American states to hold dialogue and build trust, to make transparent their military 
assets and investments, and develop security projects between the military of all 
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states, cooperating at various levels of the field of security, and demonstrating 
willingness for the development of a zone of peace. 
 
With all the above in mind, this investigation has considered UNASUR not as a 
security community at present, but as an international community based on a 
principle of communitarian cooperation, and which in future can develop into a 
security community. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter initially highlighted the argument that Ecuador and Uruguay could be 
characterised as region-engaging small states. The support they gave to the 
construction and consolidation of UNASUR is not the only way in which they fulfil the 
description of the region-engaging small state. Both Ecuador and Uruguay have also 
contributed in shaping the organisational structure of UNASUR. 
 
In this context, Uruguay can also be considered as a smart small state, as a state 
that develops strategies to shape common policies and expand its own influence 
internationally. This characteristic is related firstly to the suggestion that politically 
stable small states are more able to influence international relations and project 
themselves regionally as well as globally. Uruguay has shown this characteristic by 
strategically supporting Venezuela in the efforts to change the original market- 
related integration, as envisaged by the Brazilian initiative, into a socio-politically 
oriented regional integration process based on communitarian cooperation. 
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Secondly, smart small states not only identify opportunities offered by the structure 
of the organisation but also develop strategies that would benefit the whole 
community. Uruguay’s timely approval of the UNASUR treaty enabled it to play the 
role of crucial actor (region-engaging actor)  in the consolidation of UNASUR and, at 
the same time, enabled the whole region to possess a legally binding international 
regional organisation that represents all twelve South American states.  
 
Ecuador also fits into the category of smart state, and therefore into the type of 
region-engaging small state, since it not only offered to host the General Secretariat 
of UNASUR, but also campaigned to obtain the ratification of the UNASUR treaty in 
order to consolidate the region. In relation to these actions, these cases confirmed 
the general proposition that regional international organisations can be sources of 
international influence for small states. 
 
In addition, this study has shown that the kind of structure administering international 
organisations also influences the behaviour of the small state. An inclusive 
institutionalised regional organisation gives an incentive to small states to participate 
in, and to contribute more effort to the consolidation of the region. In this way, 
Ecuador has played a more prominent role than Uruguay, as Ecuador has already 
held the role of President Pro Tempore. 
 
Two more important factors have also influenced both Ecuador and Uruguay in the 
process of consolidation of UNASUR. One is ideology; a left-oriented view of the 
national and regional policies has reinforced the region-engaging character of 
Uruguay, as many of its policies are included in the main objectives of UNASUR. 
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Ecuador joined this wave in 2007 when President Correa came to power and its 
position was strengthened following a constitutional change. This national political 
adjustment enabled the new Ecuadorian National Assembly to ratify the treaty of the 
UNASUR. 
 
The final factor is identity. The various elements of identity are embedded in the 
whole UNASUR project. The formation of a South American identity is not only a 
historical concept employed in political debate in both Ecuador and Uruguay. It also 
reflects the circumstances of these South American small states which have a 
historically shared culture, language, as well as values and beliefs with most of the 
other South American states. From this it follows that identity is a major factor that 
helps to explain the support given by Ecuador and Uruguay to the creation and 
consolidation of UNASUR. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This study has had two aims. One is conveyed generally by the heuristic question, 
why have Ecuador and Uruguay supported the creation and consolidation of 
UNASUR? The second is related to the underpinning theoretical guide for this study, 
namely, has identity influenced the decision-making process of these small states in 
the process of creating and strengthening UNASUR? 
 
The first section of this chapter summarises the result of the study and presents 
some answers to these questions obtained from this investigation. The second 
section evaluates the theoretical guide employed in this study as well as the 
methodology. The final section makes some suggestions for further investigations in 
the area of small state studies. 
  
6.2 Reasons for Ecuadorian and Uruguayan Engagement in UNASUR: More 
than Shared Elements of a Collective Identity? 
  
The study has helped to illustrate that Ecuador and Uruguay, as international political 
actors in the particular case and time-frame of creating and consolidating UNASUR 
from 2000 to 2012, can be considered as region-engaging small states. 
 
Both Ecuador and Uruguay have fulfilled the criteria for the character of small states 
as region-engaging agents as suggested in figure 1 from chapter 2. These  South 
American small states can be considered as region-engaging as they have 
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voluntarily cooperated with other South American states by signing and ratifying the 
UNASUR treaty, and have assumed the international role of general member. 
Ecuador has played the role of President Pro Tempore leading towards leadership 
and Uruguay is expecting to enact this role in the coming months. 
 
Both states can be said to have voluntarily participated in and organised collective 
projects within the framework of UNASUR, in order to construct and strengthen this 
regional international organisation and strengthen South American identity, despite 
the fact that what constitutes a voluntary action by a state can be the object of 
subjective interpretation. 
   
The use and the international expansion of the idea of a collective regional identity 
within the UNASUR framework has enabled Ecuador to link its regional politics to the 
domestic ones in order to overcome a period of increasing security threats to its 
national security, threats it expected to minimise by acting in conjunction with similar 
minded states. These issues include threats to political stability and democracy at a 
domestic level, and to the national sovereignty by international agents. 
 
Here, the idea of a collective identity, and the idea of a new international forum that 
prioritises political dialogue for the resolution of conflicts, both driven by the 
UNASUR project, seem to have impacted on governments. It could be said, 
therefore, that Ecuador changed its preference for a pro-US policy in favour of a 
South American-oriented integration policy. In this respect the study has  
demonstrated that elements of the self-identity of Ecuador and the identity of the 
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South American region, conceived as identitarian factors, have played a fundamental 
role. 
 
However, further reasons such as disenchantment with the old economic 
mechanisms of cooperation, the new perspectives offered by roles of President Pro 
Tempore of UNASUR and the new type of political communitarian cooperation have 
also influenced the change in political approach of Ecuador to the creation and 
consolidation of UNASUR. 
 
The region-engaging character of Uruguay is based also on traditional principles of 
international cooperation and construction of international norms, and for 
institutionalisation in international organisations which are the lever for political 
international engagement. Shared elements of identity are not the only major 
influential factor in the Uruguayan decision-making process in order to support the 
consolidation of UNASUR. Its traditional professionalisation of the administration of 
the state seems to have swayed Uruguay into making strategic decisions based on a 
clear bargaining strategy. 
 
Nevertheless, the links between identitarian elements in both case studies and the 
elements portraying the South American collective identity can be considered as 
strong factors that connect each to each other and to the whole region. Hence, 
identity has played a fundamental role in both cases in their support for the formation 
of UNASUR. 
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Another common factor between the cases is contained in the similar ideological 
tendency of the left-wing governments of both small states, and their prioritisation of 
social policies, and of common projects related to security and infrastructure instead 
of economic-commercially related integration. 
 
The realisation of the danger of worsening their socio-economic situation through 
using lightly regulated international free trade as a vehicle for regional integration 
has influenced both states in favour of the creation and consolidation of UNASUR. 
This is connected with the poor satisfaction of both small states with the economic 
mechanism of cooperation and integration in CAN, ALADI and MERCOSUR 
respectively. 
 
Small states’ economic cooperation on the basis of free trade and market 
competition with economically stronger states, can be either a risky, short-lived event 
that could lead to negative outcomes, or an egoistic, self-interested action by certain 
agents that aims for long term benefits, in which the South American small states, 
due to their comparatively underdeveloped and poor economies, are not able to 
compete. 
 
This study has also further elucidated the differences between these two small 
states. Political stability and the protection of democratic institutions are some of the 
factors of comparison. Ecuador, being more vulnerable to political instability, sees 
UNASUR as a lever for positioning its national objectives regionally and beyond, and 
at the same time for constructing a state of peace. Uruguay views the signing and 
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ratifying of the UNASUR treaty as a way of avoiding isolation and of obtaining the 
right to act in regional politics. 
 
Moreover, extra-regional forces have influenced both small states. Here, Ecuador 
showed more vulnerability to external factors due to its old ties to the USA, and to a 
variety of border conflicts with its neighbouring states. The role of leader of the 
region as President Pro Tempore of UNASUR offers small states the possibility to 
reduce such disparities. 
 
In summary, the role of President Pro Tempore is a further important factor which 
has influenced the behaviour of Ecuador and Uruguay during the consolidation of 
UNASUR. There are various reasons for this. First, such a role enables small states 
to take a lead in the region. It also allows them to request support from large or 
medium states, or, conversely to offer support to them; in both cases, this reinforces 
the principle of complementary. 
 
Secondly, the principle of equality through the consensus clause generates trust 
between large and small states. Third, these structural characteristics distinguish 
UNASUR’s practice from other methods of integration in the region, and make 
UNASUR unique in that it supports the equal participation of small states in the 
design and decision-making of regional politics. 
 
In this study Ecuador demonstrates a higher level of involvement in the political 
construction of the region compared with Uruguay, as Ecuadorian security issues 
regarding the presence of US military bases in the region, and the diplomatic rupture 
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with Colombia became a major concern to digest while being the President Pro 
Tempore of UNASUR and consolidating the institutionalisation of the South 
American Defence Council. 
 
For these reasons, Ecuador’s enactment of the role of President Pro Tempore 
enabled it to play a more prominent role in the process of consolidating the South 
American region, while Uruguay is soon to obtain this role and will have similar 
possibilities open as leader of the process for the period of a year. 
 
This suggests that the principles of equality through the rotating enactment of roles 
and functions within a regional international organisation enable small states to 
contribute more for the benefit of the whole as well as to expand their influence 
regionally and beyond. 
 
Finally, the introduction of the consensus clause in the decision-making process 
provides evidence of acceptance of the principle of equality and respect for the 
national sovereignty of all member states. It creates trust between the member 
states and empowers small states, as they have the potential to oppose policies and 
projects that could affect their national interest. Hence, a modification of the 
decision-making process that weakens the consensus clause would diminish the 
competence of small states to direct the destiny of UNASUR. 
6.3 Reflections on the Theoretical Approach and Methodology 
 
The theoretically related aim of this study was not to test a theory, but to employ 
theoretical elements as a guide to the understanding of the actions or inactions of 
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the subjects of the two case studies and their motivations in the process of region 
construction. 
 
The combination of three constructivist theoretical views: Wendt’s (1999) social 
constructivism, Adler and Barnett’s (1998), security communities, complemented 
with elements of the role theory in international relations of Harnisch et al. (2011) 
and Nabers (2011) facilitated the interpretation of the empirical data in congruence 
with the theoretical explanations at a general, medium and specific level. 
 
Furthermore, the combination of such elements enabled this study to maintain a 
coherent path of investigation, which is challenging to maintain when employing 
interpretative case study methodologies. The use of identity as the central focus of 
the investigation, with the flexibility of searching for further relevant factors that may 
have influenced the behaviour of the agents also allowed the development of a 
coherent set of ideas that facilitated an understanding of the region-engaging role of 
Ecuador and Uruguay. 
 
The employment of an interpretative approach enabled me also to follow an 
investigative historical path and interpret the data in close relation to theory and find 
the story-line of the political events across the process, which is more difficult when 
using competing methodologies in the study of international politics. So, theory-
related investigation not only guided the construction of the framework for this study, 
it also enabled a drawing of conclusions in connection with the theoretical precepts. 
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In the first place, the three main steps illustrated in the emerging constructivist 
framework facilitated the understanding of the historical political events antecedent 
to the creation of UNASUR. Secondly, the central focus on the links between 
national and regional identity enabled an understanding on the influence of agents to 
the structure, and vice versa, and also helped overcome the agent-structure dilemma 
of studying international relations. 
 
The third step was related to the enactment of international roles, namely member 
and leader, by Ecuador and Uruguay in UNASUR. For an understanding of this, the 
combination of the theoretical explanations contained in Adler and Barnett’s (1998) 
security communities with the theoretical explanations of role theory (Harnisch et al., 
2011; Nabers, 2011) facilitated a view of the role enactment and actions of Ecuador 
and Uruguay from a theoretical perspective which was intertwined with the main 
factor of explanation, namely identity. 
 
The effects of identity on role change were only indirectly considered in this study, 
and this owes itself to the fact that the focus of this study was not necessarily on role 
change as Harnisch et al. (2011) and Nabers’ (2011) work aim to show. However, 
the direction of their thoughts has been important to understand both the material  
and ideational influences of larger and stronger states on smaller ones. 
   
Regarding the case study methodology, there are further relevant aspects of the role 
played by Ecuador and Uruguay in UNASUR that are related to the application of a 
case study methodology. For instance, the categorisation of small states during the 
process of integration as region-engaging, region-constraining and region-adapting 
292 
 
has enabled this study to place Ecuador and Uruguay into the category of region-
engaging South American small states. 
 
The review of the literature has been a fundamental source from which to infer that 
small states could be classified in this way on the basis of their behaviour in a 
regional international organisation or integration project, despite the fact that 
international organisations as well as states possess their distinct histories, 
identities, issues, aims and motivations. 
 
The classification into types of small states has been relevant for this study to the 
extent that it has facilitated the selection of the case studies according to established 
selection methodologies, which also enabled comparison (Gerry, 2007, 2008; 
George and Bennett, 2005), despite the fact that this study did not necessarily follow 
a positivist approach. Nevertheless, there are important tools in the positivist as well 
as in the interpretative approach to knowledge, that can be used alternately and as 
complementary tools, such as case selection methodologies supporting positivism 
and the historical description supported by interpretivism. 
 
Despite this, mainly elements of the interpretative approach have been used in this 
study and they have enabled clearer inferences to be drawn from the single case 
analysis as well as from comparison. The complexity of a historical process appears 
to be less challenging to explain when using a theoretical explanation as a guide, 
and an in-depth study of each case supported by interpretative case studies 
facilitated the delving into the particulars of the historical process. 
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6.4 Final remarks 
 
The field of small state studies is experiencing its come-back period as  researchers 
began to consider that ‘size matters’ in international relations and ‘it is now time for a 
true dialogic relationship between big and small’ (Smith, 2005: iii). However, the 
distance small state studies will have to travel in order to catch up with the other 
main fields of IR is a long one, but the academic delay is what makes this prospect 
attractive, as most of the field has not yet been exploited. 
 
For instance, a comprehensive edition that collates and reproduces the history and 
development of this area of studies, and complements Ingebritsen’s et al. (2006) 
work is required. Indeed, there is a need for cumulative academic work that also 
develops a cohesive and consistent academic agenda. The material for the conduct 
of more investigative work already exists, as most of the states of the globe could be 
characterised as small states, and each decade more small states are created.  
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Appendix 1. Primary data and project’s information 
 
This appendix contains the list of interviewees and political speeches which have 
been organised according to case study, place and time of the recordings. 
 
Case study Ecuador 
 
Interviewees 
 
1. Ricardo Patiño, Ecuadorian Foreign Minister (2010-Present), Ecuadorian 
Consulate, London: 17 June 2013. 
2. Carlos Oswaldo Salgado Espinoza, General Legal Advisor of the General 
Secretariat of UNASUR. General Secretariat of UNASUR, Quito: 26 June 2012. 
3. Francisco Carrión, Ex-Foreign Minister (2005-2007), Flacso-Ecuador, Quito: 23 
February 2012. 
4. Jacques Ramírez,  Dean of the School of International Relations of the Instituto de 
Altos Estudios Nacionales (IAEN), Quito: 12 February 2012. 
5. Ecuadorian Consul in Uruguay (2012), Ecuadorian Consulate in Uruguay, 
Montevideo: 8 May 2012. 
 
Political Speeches 
 
1. President Lucio Gutiérrez, Palabras del Presidente de la República del Ecuador, 
Lucio Gutiérrez Burbúa, en la Reunión Extraordinaria del Consejo Presidencial 
Andino (Via teleconferencia). Quito/Cusco: 7 de diciembre de 2004. 
2.  President Alfredo Palacio, Discurso del Presidente Alfredo Palacio por el Día del 
Diplomático Ecuatoriano. Quito: 22 de mayo de 2006. 
3. President Rafael Correa, Intervención del Presidente de la República Rafael 
Correa en la Ceremonia del Acta Fundacional del Banco del Sur. Buenos Aires: 9 de 
diciembre del 2007. 
4. President Rafael Correa, Ceremonia de Traspaso de la Presidencia Pro Tempore 
de la UNASUR. Quito: 10 de agosto de 2009. 
5. President Rafael Correa, Sesión de Trabajo en Solidaridad con Hiatí – UNASUR, 
Quito: 9 de febrero de 2010 
6. President Rafael Correa, Discurso para la Cumbre de Parlamentos de UNASUR. 
Quito: 14 de junio de 2010. 
7. President Rafael Correa, IV Cumbre de Poderes Judiciales de Países UNASUR. 
Cuenca: 23 de junio de 2010. 
8. President Rafael Correa, Primera Piedra de la Sede Permanente UNASUR. Quito: 
11 de marzo de 2011. 
9. President Rafael Correa, VI Reunión del Consejo de Jefes y Jefas de Estado y de 
Gobierno de la UNASUR. Lima: 30 de noviembre de 2012. 
10. President Rafael Correa, Cumbre de Jefes de Estado de MERCOSUR y Estados 
Asociados. Brasilia: 7 de diciembre de 2012. 
11. Carlos Larrea, Main Officer of SENPLADES, La Visión y Misión del Ecuador 
Vista a la UNASUR como un nuevo Desafío en la Integración Suramericana. Quito: 
19 de junio de 2012. 
12. Daniel Kersffeld, Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (IAEN), UNASUR: 
Historia y Actualidad. Quito:  19 de junio de 2012. 
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13. Marcelo Bonilla, Instituto de Altos Estudios Nacionales (IAEN), Los Desafíos de 
la UNASUR. Quito: 20 de junio de 2012. 
14. Ricardo Patiño, Foreign Minister, Reunión con los Jefes de Misión de los 
Estados de América Latina y el Caribe. Quito: 17 de Febrero de 2010. 
15. Ricardo Patiño, Foreign Minister, Presentación de la Revista Línea Sur 2. Quito: 
17 de mayo de 2012. 
16. Fander Falconí, General Secretary of SENPLADES, La UNASUR y los Nuevos 
Desafíos de la Integración Suramericana. Quito: 18 de junio de 2012. 
17. Javier Ponce, Minster of Defence, Esquemas de Defensa y Seguridad en 
Suramérica. Quito:  20 de junio de 2012. 
18. Lorena Escudero, Main Officer of Gubernamental Commission for Integration, 
Coordinadora de Ecuador en la UNASUR, UNASUR y los Derechos Humanos: 
Construcción de una Ciudadanía Suramericana. Quito: 20 de junio de 2012. 
19. Pedro Páez, Coordinator of the Ecuadorian Policy for Economy, Sub-desarrollo, 
Crisis e Integración en Suramérica. Quito: 19 de junio de 2012.   
 
 
Case Study Uruguay 
 
 
Interviewees 
 
1. President Jorge Batlle, El rol de Uruguay en la UNASUR. Montevideo: 10 de 
mayo de 2012. 
2. Luis Almagro, Foreign Minister, El rol de Uruguay en la UNASUR. Montevideo: 30 
de abril de 2012. 
3. Varela, N. Sub-director of Politcal Affairs at the Foreign Ministry, El rol de Uruguay 
en la UNASUR. Montevideo: 10 de mayo de 2012. 
4. Ope Pasquet, Senator, El role de Uruguay en la UNASUR.  Montevideo: 4 de 
mayo de 2012. 
5. Sergio Abreu, Senator, El rol de Uruguay en la UNASUR. Montevideo: 07 de 
mayo de 2012. 
6. Rubén Martínez-Huelmo, National Representative, El rol de Uruguay en la 
UNASUR. Montevideo: 7 de mayo de 2012. 
 
Political Spechees 
 
1. President Tabaré Vázquez, Cumbre Extraordinaria de UNASUR. Bariloche-
Argentina: 28-29 de agosto de 2009. 
2. President José Mujica, Nominación deEx-Presidente Kirchner como Primer 
Secretario General de UNASUR. Los Cardales-Argentina: 04 de mayo de 2010. 
3. President José Mujica, Audición Radial del Presidente José Mujica en M24. 
Montevideo: 6 de diciembre de 2012. 
4. President José Mujica, Intervención del Presidente Mujica en la VI Reunión de 
Jefes y Jefas de Estado y de Gobierno de UNASUR. Lima: 29-30 de noviembre de 
2012. 
5. Víctor Rossi, Ministro de Transporte y Obras Públicas de Uruguay, Iniciativa para 
la Integración de la Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (IIRSA). Montevideo: 4-5 
de diciembre de 2007. 
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6. Víctor Rossi, Ministro de Transporte y Obras Públicas de Uruguay: Octava 
Reunión del Comité de Dirección Ejecutiva, Iniciativa para la Integración de la 
Infraestructura Regional Suramericana (IIRSA). Montevideo: 13-14 de diciembre de 
2006. 
7. Luis Almagro, Foreign Minister, Primera Cumbre Studiantil Universitaria por la 
UNASUR. Montevideo: 29 de abril de 2012. 
8. Luis Almagro, Foreign Minister, Comisión de Asuntos Internacionales: Parlamento 
de Uruguay, Tratado Cosntitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, 
UNASUR. Montevideo: 4 de noviembre de 2010. 
9. Luis Almagro, Foreign Minister,Comisión de Industria, Energía y Minería integrada 
con la de Asuntos Internacionales: Parlamento de Uruguay, La Relaciones 
Comerciales y la Dificultades Surgidas con Argentina.  Motevideo: 30 de marzo de 
2011. 
10. Luis Almagro, Foreign Minister, Comisión de Asuntos Internacionales: 
Parlamento de Uruguay, Los Lineamientos de la Política Exterior del País. 
Montevideo: 15 de abril del 2010. 
11. Luis Almagro, Foreign Minister, Comisión de Asuntos Internacionales: 
Parlamento de Uruguay, Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones 
Suramericanas (UNASUR). Montevideo: 13 de mayo de 2010. 
12. Luis Almagro, Foreign Minister,  Senado: Parlamento de Uruguay, Convocatoria 
al Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Embajador Luis Almagro: Comparecencia ante 
el Senado de la República. Montevideo: 26 de julio de 2012. 
13. Constanza Moreira, Senatorin, Primera Cumbre Estudiantil Universitaria por la 
UNASUR. Montevideo: 29 de abril de 2012. 
14. Embassador Flanagan, Comisión de Asuntos Internacionales, Tratado 
Constitutivo de la Unión de Naciones Suramericanas, UNASUR. Montevideo: 26 de 
mayo de 2010. 
15. Niko Schwarz, High Representative of Frente Amplio, Primera Cumbre 
Estudiantil Universitaria por la UNASUR. Montevideo: 28 de abril de 2012. 
16. Roberto Kreimerman, Minister of Industrie, Primera Cumbre Estudiantil 
Universitaria por la UNASUR. Montevideo: 29 de abril de 2012. 
 
Appendix 2. Data Collection Procedure and Development 
throughout the Investigation. 
 
Initially, this investigation intended to be based mainly on data collected through 
personal semi-structured interviews of members of the elite from the sectors of 
economy and politics from both Ecuador and Uruguay. I had a personal contact with 
a civil servant who at that time, 2010-2011, was working at the Ecuadorian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and therefore I thought I would be able to have access to a 
considerable number of interviewees, as I also contacted various Ecuadorian 
universities which have close relations with politicians in the Ecuadorian government. 
In the case of Uruguay, I was put into contact with an Uruguayan ex-PhD student 
who had studied in the UK and who had personal contact with people in the 
Uruguayan parliament and with ex-members of the Uruguayan government. 
 
Firstly, I contacted some of the Ecuadorian politicians by email to request a personal 
interview including the President of the Commission for Foreign Affairs of the 
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Ecuadorian National Assembly, the Ex-minister of Foreign Affairs who at that time 
was the Secretary of National Planning and the Sub-secretary for Foreign Affairs 
who was responsible for the area of integration. However, I did not obtain any 
positive responses until I started making telephone calls or visiting the offices 
following the advice of a sub-secretary who gave me an interview at the early stages 
of the fieldwork. During this process, I was offered and appointed the role of an 
Advisor to the Ecuadorian National Assembly for a few months. I had two reasons for 
accepting this appointment, one was the possibility to build up a network for 
obtaining interviewees and the other was the possibility to see the political dynamics 
of a country were I was born but had left 18 years previously. 
 
This appointment enabled me to have a clear insight into the actual politics and the 
tensions within political classes and the different members of the elite, from the field 
of economy, and newly created political groups such as the Alianza Pais which had 
been governing in Ecuador for the last four years. This also helped me to understand 
that it was extremely difficulty to obtain interviews and information from Ecuadorian 
politicians. Firstly, the level of mistrust and secrecy was extremely high due to the 
fact that Ecuador was going through a very sensitive stage of recovery after political 
instability following an attempted coup d’état still under investigation. Dozens of 
injured people and seven deaths was the consequence of this attempted coup d’état. 
Hundreds of members of the police and various politicians were on trial. Hence, 
politicians preferred not to offer interviews. 
 
At this time the National Assembly had a special military guard instead of the official 
National Police that is usually responsible, some of the members of the parliament 
were assigned special military guards, and the main institutions of the executive and 
legislative house had declared a period of special security measures. Hence, 
interviewing members of the political elite from the Ecuadorian government was 
extremely difficult despite the fact that my manager in the National Assembly 
belonged to the same political group that was governing the country. The interviews I 
obtained were more due to luck and persistence, and these were only possible later 
in the process of gathering other kinds of data, such as archived documents and 
political speeches. 
 
The decision to collect this extra data was also based on the realisation that the 
interviews were largely not possible until half way through the field trip, and that 
there was little secondary literature written about the role of small states, Ecuador 
and Uruguay, in the formation and consolidation of the UNASUR. Hence, it was 
necessary to collect primary data which could provide me with information about 
what was agreed, and also about the arguments given by politicians in the political 
debates as well as to the public in the corresponding public speeches. 
 
Moreover, some Ecuadorian politicians did not keep their word as many of them did 
not give me the interviews even after accepting my invitation. Nevertheless, the good 
relationship built with some civil servants and advisors from the government and 
academia directed me to the department of communication and media where most of 
the documents were in the process of being up-loaded due to a new legal mandate. 
Many documents were still in the digital archives of the institutions, but the majority 
were obtained from the websites mentioned in the second chapter of this study. 
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Similarly, the political speeches were downloaded from the website of the 
Ecuadorian presidency. 
 
Finally, during the fieldwork, only three of the Ecuadorian interviewees were still 
working for the government, including the Ecuadorian Foreign Minister, who a year 
later agreed to an interview in the Ecuadorian Consulate in England. The other 
interviewees were ex-civil servants from the government, for example the Chief 
Executive Advisor of UNASUR. Many of the contacted politicians had left their roles 
during my field-work and various politicians who I had contacted offered me 
interviews but turned them down at the last minute. 
 
This was different in the case of Uruguay and the politicians contacted there. Most of 
the politicians who I contacted through the Uruguayan student, and also through a 
contact of a colleague from my appointment at the Ecuadorian National Assembly, 
were able to give me an interview. They showed considerable interest in my 
research, with some of them asking for the list of questions to be sent in advance, 
and most of them giving me more time than requested for the interview. Moreover, 
they directed me to the websites were they archive their original documents of the 
debates in both chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. It was also 
clear that members of the Uruguayan political elite showed a sense of organisation, 
more political professionalism and experience than was evident with the Ecuadorian 
political elite.  
 
Despite these differences between the members of the political elite of the two 
states, similar main questions were asked to both groups of interviewees. The 
following table shows the central guiding questions asked to the interviewees. These 
guiding questions were complemented with short and often spontaneous questions 
which arose according to the development of the interview. 
 
Number of 
central 
questions 
Time in 
minutes 
Topic and Questions Reference to Interview 
Analysis  
 5-10 Presentación personal. 
Introducción, Síntesis y 
Propósito de la 
Investigación  
This should be general and 
according to the interviewee. 
The level of language and 
purpose of the investigation 
are directed to the main 
elements of what the 
interviewer wants to find out.  
1 2-5 Preguntar al 
entrevistada/o si tiene 
preguntas/comentarios 
¿Tiene alguna pregunta? 
The reasons for this are that 
the interviewee might not be 
sure about the purpose of the 
interview or might have other 
questions that might be 
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relevant for this investigation.   
2 5-10 La integración, 
regionalización y la 
UNASUR. 
 ¿Cuál es su concepción y 
cuáles son los avances más 
importantes? 
 
 
 
Relevant aspects of this topics 
are the concepts, its 
understanding, views and 
definitions by the interviewee   
3 5-10 La función de estados 
pequeños en la 
regionalización/ El rol de 
Ecuador/Uruguay en la 
UNASUR 
¿Ecuador & Uruguay, que 
rol tienen estos estados en 
la formación de la 
UNASUR? 
¿Es la UNASUR un 
proyecto realmente 
colectivo o se reflejan 
intereses superiores de 
algunos estados? 
The political, economic and 
other strategies used by small 
states (Ecuador & Uruguay) in 
the shaping of a regional 
international organisation are 
very important.   
4 5-10 El rol de UNASUR y la 
influencia de los estados 
grandes en las políticas 
del Ecuador/Uruguay 
(diseño de políticas 
colectivas) 
1. ¿Hay percepciones 
de algunas  
intenciones 
hegemónicas de 
The influence of regional 
international organisations on 
the elaboration and design of 
political plans, and its 
applications and political 
decisions of small states are 
relevant for the analysis 
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los estados de 
grandes poderes, 
tanto de las 
potencias militares 
y económicas 
globales 
tradicionales, 
como las 
emergentes? 
2.  Los estados 
grandes tienden a 
imponerse/influen
ciar  el diseño de 
estas 
organizaciones: 
¿Se siente esa 
influencia en la 
UNASUR y cómo 
se manejan? 
3. Las organizaciones 
regionales 
internacionales 
tienen políticas 
colectivas para 
desarrollarse y 
consolidarse: 
¿Cómo influyen 
éstas a las políticas 
del 
Ecuador/Uruguay? 
5 5-10 ALBA, CAN 
(Ecuador)/MERCOSUR 
(Uruguay) versus UNASUR 
¿Por qué ha decido 
The choice of opportunities 
and the search for alternative 
strategies used by small states 
in a process that has different 
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Ecuador/Uruguay crear la 
UNASUR y en vez de 
consolidarse en las 
diferentes formas de 
integración en sus 
organizaciones 
subregionales: CAN / 
MERCOSUR? 
¿Es ALBA una alternativa a 
la UNASUR o una 
amenaza/competencia?   
tendencies. The form and 
reasons for looking for and 
choosing preferences by small 
states (Ecuador & Uruguay) is 
very important.      
6 5-10 Los actores políticos; 
Instituciones de estados 
pequeños y estrategias. 
(Elementos 
constitucionales..CRE Art. 
416. #11; 423) 
Desde diferentes puntos 
los estados tienen políticas 
entre ellas políticas de 
integración: 
 
¿Desde su institución 
como se trabaja/ ha 
trabajado en el proceso de 
integración?  
 
 
¿Cuál es la percepción 
personal sobre este 
proyecto, es beneficioso o 
no para el 
Ecuador/Uruguay, y por 
qué? 
 
 
   
Institutions of the state and 
politicians as actors have the 
power to influence and direct 
politics and the 
plans/strategies of a state. It is 
important to find out the ways 
they act and how and why 
they prioritise strategies to 
confront political tendencies, 
decisions and 
strategies/interests of greater 
states.  
7 5-10 
minutos 
Conclusiones sobre el 
tema.  
¿De todo  lo discutido, 
cuáles cree que son los 
elementos más relevantes 
para el Ecuador? 
The interviewee (members of 
the elite) could see/find out 
that an interview could help 
investigators and them too by 
highlighting the most 
important/relevant elements 
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¿Ha habido algo que ha 
aprendido/gustado/no 
gustado de la entrevista? 
of the discussion. 
This will also help to improve 
the quality of the interview 
regarding content, strategies, 
flow, and interview 
techniques. It is important to 
let the interviewee evaluate 
the interview and perhaps ask 
for suggestions. 
8 2 Percepciones y evaluación 
de la entrevista 
¿Tiene alguna/otra 
pregunta?  
In the case that the 
interviewee remembers any 
aspect/elements regarding 
this topic at the last minute.  
Appendix 3. Development of codes and themes during the 
data analysis process 
 
The following tables outline both case study data coding procedures and the 
emergence of such codes and themes which appear to contain information relevant 
for answering the research question. This forms the basis for data classification and 
interpretation. 
 
 
a.  Mix-match method of Structural and Descriptive and pattern Coding 
Methodology (Spanish and English translations): Case study Ecuador 
 
Coding 
Methods/ 
Themes 
Questions asked 
to the data in 
each factor 
Structural Coding Descriptive or Topic Coding 
  Directed nodes Directed nodes 
1. Similar 
ideology 
of 
governm
ents 
How has the 
political ideology 
of the Ecuadorian 
government of 
Rafael Correa 
impacted on 
Ecuadorian 
regional politics? 
Amigos = friends, 
confianza = trust, politicas 
sociales = social policies, 
politicas integracionistas = 
integration policies, 
diálogo amigable = 
Friendly dialogue,  
gobierno socialista = 
socialist government,  
reducción de la pobreza = 
reduction of poverty,  
asistencia social = social 
help to people, derechos 
Equidad = equality, izquierdista 
= leftist, socialista = socialist, 
progresista = progressist, 
desarrollista = 
developmentalist, ecologista = 
ecologists, modernista = 
modernist, integracionista = 
integrationist, estado social = 
social state, estado incluyente 
= inclusive state 
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humanos = human rights, 
justicia social = social 
justice. 
2. 
Elements 
of 
collective 
or 
regional 
identity 
What is it that 
forms the South 
American and 
Ecuadorian 
identity? What is 
it that links them 
together? 
Historia compartida = 
shared history, cultura 
compartida = shared 
culture, espacio 
compartido = shared 
space,  región 
suramericana = South 
American region, 
diversidad = diversity, 
pluralismo = pluralism, 
pueblos hermanos = 
freternal countries, 
identidad surameircana = 
South American identity, 
plurinacionalidad = many 
ethnic national groups, 
Miembro de UNASUR = 
member of UNASUR 
Latinoamericano = Latin 
American, ciudadano 
sudamericano/a = South 
American citizen, ciudadania 
sudamericana = South 
American citizenship,  
ciudadano ecuatoriano/a = 
Ecuadorian citizen, 
plurinacional = multi-national, 
multicultural = multicultural; 
culturas ancestrales = 
ancestral cultures, país 
amazónico = Amazonian 
country, país andino = Andean, 
país democrático = democratic 
state  
3. 
Interest 
in 
national 
and 
regional 
peace 
How has Ecuador 
contributed to 
establish and 
protect regional 
peace?  
Amistad regional = 
regional friendship, 
Solucionar crisis = to solve 
crises, solución de 
problemas = to solve 
problems, mantener la paz 
= maintain peace, evitar 
conflicto = avoid conflict, 
construir  confianza = 
construct trust, territorio 
de paza = territory of 
peace, solución de 
conflictos = conflict 
resolution, soberanía 
nacional = national 
sovereignty, manejo de 
crisis = crisis management  
inseguridad = insecurity, 
terrorismo = terrorism,  crimen 
organizado = organized crime, 
CDS = SADC, conflicto militar = 
military conflict, seguridad 
nacional = national security, 
seguridad regional = regional 
security, estabilidad política = 
political stability,  paz regional 
= region of peace, solución 
pacífica = peaceful problem 
solving 
4. 
Interest 
in 
internatio
nal 
communi
tarian 
cooperati
on 
Why do states 
look for 
communitarian 
cooperation?  
How does 
Ecuador support 
communitarian 
cooperation? 
Coordinar proyectos 
conjuntos = joint projects, 
reducir la pobreza = to 
reduce poverty, coordinar 
proyectos de 
infraestructura física = to 
coordinate projects in 
physical infrastruture, 
políticas de educación = 
policies in education,  la 
protección de fronteras = 
the border protection, 
lucha contra la 
Bien común = common good, 
interés común = common 
interest,  interés colectivo = 
collective interest, acción 
colectiva = collective action, 
comunidad suramericana = 
South American community, 
unión suramericana = South 
American union, 
multilateralismo = 
multilateralism, cooperación = 
cooperation, interdependencia 
y autonomía = 
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delincuencia = fight against 
crime, cooperación 
energética = energetic 
cooperation,  proteger las 
recursos naturales = 
protect natural resources,  
la seguridad regional = 
regional security, inserción 
internacional = 
International influence 
interdependence and 
autonomy, Interconectividad = 
interconnectivity 
 
5. 
Influence 
of 
external 
forces 
What extra-
regional forces 
are influencial on 
Ecuadorian 
politics? 
What extra-
regional factors 
have impacted on 
the engagement 
of Ecuador in 
UNASUR? 
Principal mercado = 
fudamental market, fuente 
de tecnología = 
technological sources, 
supremacía diplomática = 
diplomatic supremacy, 
relación de dependencia = 
dependent relationship, 
posesión de bienes = 
possesion of goods, 
coorporaciones financieras 
= financial corporation, 
companías transancionales 
= transnational business, 
NGOs = NGOs, 
organizaciones 
internacionales = 
international organzations, 
estados hegemónicos = 
hegemonic states, estados 
grandes = bigger states.  
Amenaza = threat, deuda 
externa = foreign debt, 
dependencia económica = 
economic dependence, 
dependencia política = political 
dependence, presencia militar 
= military presence, fuerza 
militar extranjera = military 
foreign force, compromiso 
comercial = commercial 
compromise, compromiso 
militar = military compromise, 
compromiso político = political 
compromise, injerencia = 
interference. 
6. 
Disatisfac
tion with 
old 
regional 
integratio
n projects   
 
Why has Ecuador 
supported the 
creation of 
UNASUR instead 
of 
improving/deepe
ning the other 
regional 
organisations, 
such as ALADI or 
CAN?  
Empobrecimiento de la 
sociedad = 
impoverishment of the 
society, crecimiento de la 
desigualdad = rise of 
inequality, violación de las 
regulaciones = violation of 
the norms,  estancamiento 
del desarrollo = stagnation 
of the development, 
crecimiento de la deuda 
externa = increase of the 
foreign debt, aumento del 
desempleo = increase of 
unemployement, 
reducción del control del 
estado = deregulation of 
state’s control, pocos 
beneficios para la sociedad 
= low benefits for the 
OEA = OAS, CAN = CAN, 
MERCOSUR = MERCOSUR,  
proyecto ALCA = FTAA project,  
regionalismo abierto = open 
regionalism, competición 
abierta del mercado = open 
market competition, 
integración comercial = 
commercial integration, 
integración sub-regional = sub-
regional integration, 
integración Latinoamericana = 
Latin American integration, 
estruturas internacionales = 
international structures 
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societies, poca atención a 
los problemas de 
seguridad = poor attention 
to security issues, poca 
participación de la 
sociedad = low 
participation of the 
society. 
    
General 
questions 
posed to 
all the 
data 
based on 
the 
Research 
Topic and 
Research 
Question   
  
 
-Why has E/U supported 
the UNASUR? 
-Why has E/U not tried to 
strengthen the 
CAN/MERCOSUR instead 
of supporting the 
UNASUR?  
-Why is she/he speaking? 
- How has Ecuador 
supported the 
construction of UNASUR? 
-What is this a study about? 
-What is going on here? 
-What is the argument about?  
-What shows me this?  
-What is this?  
- How has Ecuador supported 
the construction of UNASUR? 
 
 
b. Mix-match method of Structural and Descriptive and pattern Coding 
Methodology (Spanish and English translations): Case study Uruguay 
 
Coding 
Methods/ 
Themes 
Questions 
asked to the 
data in each 
factor 
Descriptive/topic 
Coding 
Structural/interpretative 
Coding 
  Directed nodes Directed nodes 
1. Similar 
ideology of 
governments
: ideología 
similar de los 
gobiernos 
Why has the 
political 
ideology of the 
Uruguayan 
governments 
of Frente 
Amplio 
impacted on 
the Uruguayan 
regional 
politics? 
Equidad = equality, 
izquierdista = leftist, 
multilateralista 
=multilateralist, progresista 
= progressist, desarrollista = 
developmentalist, ecologista 
= ecologists, modernista = 
modernist, polítca 
integracionista = 
integrationist politics, 
estado social = social state, 
estado inlcuyente = inclusive 
state 
Amigos = friends, confianza = trust, 
politicas sociales = social policies,  
tolerancia = tolerance, diálogo 
amigable = Friendly dialogue,  
gobierno socialista = socialist 
government,  reducción de la 
pobreza = reduction of poverty,  
asistencia social = social help to 
people, derechos humanos = 
human rights, justicia social = social 
justice. 
2. Elements 
of collective 
or regional 
identity=ele
mentos de 
identidad 
colectiva 
 
What is it that 
links the South 
American and 
Uruguayan 
identity? Why 
does it 
influence to 
Uruguay to 
Latinoamericano = Latin 
American, ciudadano 
sudamericano/a = South 
American citizen, ciudadania 
sudamericana = South 
American citizenship,  
ciudadano/a uruguayo/a = 
Uruguyan citizen, raices 
similares = similar 
Historia compartida = shared 
history, cultura compartida = 
shared culture, espacio compartido 
= shared space,  región 
suramericana = South American 
region, diversidad = diversity, 
pluralismo = pluralism, pueblos 
hermanos = freternal countries, 
identidad surameircana = South 
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support the 
UNASUR? 
background, multicultural = 
multicultural; culturas 
imigrantes = migrant 
cultures, país rioplatence = 
country of the Plata, país 
sureño = Southern country, 
país democrático = 
democratic state  
American identity, 
plurinacionalidad = many ethnic 
national groups, Miembro de 
UNASUR = member of UNASUR 
3. Interest in 
national and 
regional 
peace=intere
ses en paz 
nacional y 
regional 
Which actions 
explain that 
Uruguay has 
contributed to 
establish and 
protect 
national and 
regional 
peace, and 
why? 
inseguridad = insecurity, 
terrorismo = terrorism,  
crimen organizado = 
organized crime, CDS = 
SADC, conflicto militar = 
military conflict, seguridad 
nacional = national security, 
seguridad regional = 
regional security, estabilidad 
política = political stability,  
paz regional = region of 
peace, solución pacífica = 
pacific problem solving 
Amistad regional = regional 
friendship, solucionar crisis = to 
solve crises, soulción de problemas 
= to solve problems, mantener la 
paz = maintain peace, evitar 
conflicto = avoid conflict, construir  
confianza = construct trust, 
territorio de paz = territory of 
peace, afianzamiento de paz = 
strengthening peace, soberanía 
nacional = national sovereignty, 
manejo de crisis = crisis 
management  
  
4. Interest in 
international 
communitari
an 
cooperation
=interes en 
coperación 
comunitaria 
 
   
Why do states 
look for 
communitaria
n cooperation? 
What actions 
show that 
Uruguay has 
supported 
communitaria
n 
cooperation? 
Bien común = common 
good, interés común = 
common interest,  interés 
colectivo = collective 
interest, acción colectiva = 
collective action, comunidad 
suramericana = South 
American community, unión 
suramericana = South 
American union, 
multilateralismo = 
multilateralism, cooperación 
= cooperation, 
interdependencia y 
autonomía = 
interdependence and 
autonomy, 
Interconectividad = 
interconnectivity. 
 
proyectos conjuntos = joint 
projects, reducir la pobreza = to 
reduce poverty, mejoramiento de 
infraestrutura física = improvement 
in physical infraestruture, políticas 
de educación = policies in 
educación, protección de fronteras 
= the border protection, lucha 
contra la delincuencia = fight 
against crime, cooperación 
energética = energetic cooperation,  
protección de recursos naturales = 
protect natural resources, inserción 
internacional = International 
insersion, comunidad política = 
political community. 
5. Influence 
of external 
forces=influe
ncias de 
fuerzas 
exteriores 
 
What extra-
regional forces 
have 
influenced the 
region-
engaging 
character of 
the Uruguayan 
politics, and 
why? 
Amenaza = threat, deuda 
externa = foreign debt, 
dependencia económica = 
economic dependence, 
dependencia política = 
political dependence, 
presencia militar = military 
presence, fuerza militar 
extranjera = military foreign 
force, compromiso 
comercial = commercial 
compromise, compromiso 
militar = military 
compromise, compromiso 
político = political 
Principal mercado = fudamental 
market, fuente de tecnología = 
technological sources, supremacía 
diplomática = diplomatic 
supremacy, relación de 
dependencia = dependent 
relationship, posesión de bienes = 
possesion of goods, coorporaciones 
financieras = financial corporation, 
companías transancionales = 
transnational business, NGOs = 
NGOs, Organizaciones 
internacionales = international 
organzations, Estados hegemónicos 
= Hegemonic states, estados 
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compromise, injerencia = 
interference. 
grandes = bigger states.  
6. 
Disatisfactio
n with old 
regional 
integration 
projects=disa
tisfacción 
con la 
integración 
regional 
vieja   
 
Why has 
Uruguay 
supported the 
creation of 
UNASUR 
instead of 
improving/dee
pening the 
other regional 
organisations, 
such as ALADI 
or 
MERCOSUR?  
OEA = OAS, CAN = CAN, 
MERCOSUR = MERCOSUR,  
proyecto ALCA = FTAA 
project,  regionalismo 
abierto = open regionalism, 
competición abierta del 
mercado = open market 
competition, integración 
comercial = commercial 
integration, integración sub-
regional = sub-regional 
integration, integración 
Latinoamericana = Latin 
American integration, 
estruturas internacionales = 
international structures 
Empobrecimiento = 
impoverishment, desigualdad = 
inequality, inconsistencia = 
inconsistency ,  estancamiento del 
desarrollo = stagnation of the 
development, endeudamiento 
extranjero = foreign debt, 
desempleo = unemployment, 
deregularización = deregulation, 
autodestrucción = self-destruction, 
disatisfacción = disatisfaction 
    
General 
questions 
posed to all 
the data 
based on the 
Research 
Topic and 
Research 
Question   
  
 
 
-What is this a study about? 
-What is going on here? 
-What is the argument 
about?  
-What shows me this? 
What does theory say 
about the support of small 
states for integration? 
 
-Why has E/U supported the 
UNASUR? 
-Why has E/U not tried to 
strengthen the CAN/MERCOSUR 
instead of supporting the 
UNASUR? 
What does theory say about the 
support of small states for 
integration? 
 
Appendix 4. Direct citations in Spanish and Portuguese and 
factors influencing the decision-making process 
 
This appendix contains two fundamental elements of evidence for this study. The 
first part contains the direct citations in Spanish and Portuguese that were translated 
into Englsih and inserted in the main text of this work. These direct citations are 
complemented with two pieces of information for clarification. The citations are firstly 
preceded by a page number which shows their place in this investigation. 
 
The other piece of information is situated after the citation and shows the document, 
interview or speech which can be found in its full version in the Nvivo project in 
appendix 1. The second part of this appendix contains a matrix with themes which 
have been the basis for the development of the comparative part of this study. 
 
a. Direct citations in Spanish and Portuguese which appear as English 
translations in the main body of this investigation 
  
Introduction 
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p. 2. ‘…afirman su determinación de cosntruir una identidad y ciudadanía 
suramericanas y desarrollar un espacio regional integrado en lo político, económico, 
social, cultural, energético y de infraestructura, para contribuir al fortalecimiento de 
la unidad de América Latina y el Caribe’ (UNASUR, 2008. Tratado Constitutivo de la 
Unión de Naciones Suramericanas: Preámbulo). 
 
Chapter 3. Case study Ecuador 
 
p. 116. ‘…9. Reconoce el derecho internacional como norma de conducta, y 
demanda la democratización de los organismos internacionales y la equitativa 
participación de los Estados al interior de estos. 10. Promueve la confromación de 
un orden global multipolar con la participación activa de bloques económicos y 
políticos regionales y el fortalecimiento de las relaciones horizontales para la 
construcción de un mundo justo, democrático, solidario, diverso e intercultural. 11. 
Impulsa prioritariamente la integración política, cultural y económica de la región 
andina, de América del Sur y de Lationamérica…’. (Constitución Política del 
Ecuador, 2008: Título VII, Artículo 416; numeral: 9-10-11).  
 
 
 
p. 116. ‘…la esperanza de un futuro, otro vivible desde lo humano, que es algo 
mucho más que solo una respuesta política a la crisis del capitalismo mundial. Que 
es lago mucho más que solo una respuesta política y cultural al imperialismo 
norteamericana’. (Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, Acta 040, página 111). 
 
p. 117. ‘… la unión de naciones del sur de América, se justifica por una vocación 
transcendente para unir y crear espacios de integración entre nuestros estados, 
entre nuestras culturas y lenguas, para unir pueblos en un destino universal que 
América del Sur es mucho más que una cultura, y nacionalidades y Estados, que es 
una unidad de destino en lo universal… …que ya integrada tendrá que cumplir 
misiones universales’.  (Asamblea Nacional del Ecuador, Acta 040, página 113). 
 
p. 139. ‘…Defiende la presencia soberana de Ecuador en América Latina y en el 
mundo, sin tutelajes externos, ni servidumbres a potencias y proyectos extranjeros, 
ajenos a la realidad y al bienestar de nuestro pueblo. Lucha por la integración, 
solidaridad y cooperaciónentre los pueblos de América Latina y su compromiso con 
la creación de alianzas Sur-Sur’. (Manifiesto Ideológico, Programa de acción y 
Régimen Orgánico Alianza País. 35 PAIS. Versión escrita, sin fecha de publicación, 
página 11).  
 
p. 139. ‘…la UNASUR genera otros espacios de integración que promueven los 
intereses latinoamericanos y cribeños. Es necesario fortalecer y dotarle de una 
institucionalidad, asi como la construcción de su sede en la mitad del mundo’. 
(Manifiesto Ideológico, Programa de acción y Régimen Orgánico Alianza País. 35 
PAIS. Versión escrita, sin fecha de publicación, página 48-49). 
 
p. 140. ‘… queda atrás esa región que era insultada, humillada, mancillada por 
cualquiera, desde prepotentes diplomáticos extranjeros, hasta burócratas 
internacionales que nos venían a pedir cuentas, a revisar nuestros datos, a decir 
que hacer o no hacer; hoy si pretende venr una misión del Fondo Monetario con 
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esas intenciones, al estar bajando del avión, con las mismas tendrá que regresarse, 
porque ningún país lo va a permitir’. (Presidente Rafael Correa, Primera Piedra de la 
Sede Permanente UNASUR. Mitad del Mundo, 11 de marzo de 2011). 
 
p. 140. ‘… Gestionar con Brasil la utilización de su sistema de vigilancia amazónica 
para control de actividades ilícitas en territorio ecuatoriano’. (Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores. Quito, 2007. Plan Nacional de Desarrollo 2007-2010. Política 
Exterior. Página 25). 
 
p. 140. ‘…Alianza PAIS busca el Socialismo del Buen Vivir. Se identifica en la 
consecución del bienestar común y la felicidad de cada uno, que no se logra 
mediante la acumulación de grandes riquezas, ni mediante una capacidad de 
consumo excesivo, sino a través de la maximización de los talentos y capacidades 
personales y colectivas…’ (Manifiesto Ideológico, Programa de acción y Régimen 
Orgánico Alianza País. 35 PAIS. Versión escrita, sin fecha de publicación, página 6). 
 
p. 141. ‘…La integración latinoamericana, la coperación y la solidaridad con las 
luchas de los oprimidos en todos los lugares del planeta es un objetivo estratégico 
de Alianza PAIS’. (Manifiesto Ideológico, Programa de acción y Régimen Orgánico 
Alianza País. 35 PAIS. Versión escrita, sin fecha de publicación, página 9). 
 
p. 142-143.‘…desarrollar un espacio sudamericano integrado en lo político, social, 
económico, ambiental y de infraestructura, que fortalezca la identidad propia de 
América del Sur y que contribuya, a partir de una perspectiva subregional y, en 
articulación con otras experiencias de integración regional , al fortalecimiento de 
América Latina y el Caribe y le otorgue una mayor gravitación y representación en 
los foros internacionales’. (IIRSA, 2004. III Cumbre Presidencial Sudamericana. 
Cusco 8 de diciembre d 2004. Declaración del Cusco sobre la Comunidad 
Sudamericana de Naciones). 
 
p. 143. ‘…i) la consolidación de una identidad suramericana a través del 
reconocimiento progresivo de derechos a los nacionales de un Estado Miembro 
residentes en cualquiera de los otros Estados  Miembros, con el fin de alcanzar una 
ciudadanía suramericana’. (UNASUR, 2008. Tratado Constitutivo de la Unión de 
Naciones Suramericanas. Artículo 3, literal i.) 
 
p. 144. ‘…el proceso de integración hemisférica, - área de libre comercio de las 
Américas (ALCA), supone un gran desafío por el impacto económico futuro que 
tendrá sobre nuestros países. El Ecuador confía en que este proceso cuando esté 
concluido traerá un vigoroso crecimiento económico…’ (IIRSA, 2000. Primera 
Reunión de Presidentes de América del Sur. Brasilia, Septiembre de 2000. 
Declaración de los Presidentes: Presidente de Ecuador). 
 
p. 145. ’10…es indispenpsable elaborar una propuesta y una estrategia para hacer 
frente al impacto del TLC, el ALCA y la profundización de la zona de libre comercio 
entre la CAN y el MERCOSUR…’ (Presidente Lucio Gutiérrez, 2004. Palabras del 
Presidente de la República del Ecuador e la Reunión Extraordinaria del Consejo 
Presidencial Andino. Quito/Cusco, 7 de diciembre de 2004). 
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p. 145. ‘”Para nosotros, la Patria es América”,   dijo Bolívar, y aquella sentencia, que 
parecía utópica, o siempre traicionada por la resignación o sumisión de los 
gobiernos del continente a los poderes omnímodos , se está haciendo realidad…’ 
(Presidente Rafael Correa, 2007. Intervención del Presidente de la República en la 
Ceremonia del Acta Fundacional del Banco del Sur, Buenos Aires). 
 
p. 146. ‘…Los actos normativos emanados de los órganos de UNASUR, serán 
obligatorios para los Estados miembros una vez que hayan sido incorporados en el 
ordenamiento jurídico de cada uno de ellos, de acuerdo a cada uno de sus 
procedimientos internos’ (Trado de UNASUR, 2008: Artículo 12).  
 
 
p. 147. ‘…4. Proteger y promover la diversidad cultural, el ejercicio de la 
interculturalidad, la conservación del patrimonio cultural y la memoria común para 
las indutrias culturales’. (Constitución del Ecuador, 2008. Título VIII. Capítulo 
Tercero, Artículo 423, Numeral 4). 
 
p. 152. ‘…que tome en cuenta su diversidad y, consecuentemente, abandone el 
“pensamiento único” prevaleciente en las últimas décadas; que no se limite 
solamente a objetivos en la mejora en los resultados macroeconómicos, sino que 
tenga como ejes prioritarios la equidad y la justicia social, la preservación del medio 
ambiente para las generaciones venideras, los avances técnicos-organizativos en 
las estructuras económicas, la eliminación gradual de la dependencia externa, la 
reducción de las asimetrías a lo interno de la regióny una inserción internacional que 
posibilite acortar la brecha que separa a las naciones pobres de las ricas.’ 
(Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio e Integración, 2011. Agenda 
Estratégica de Política Exterior 2011-2013. p. 105). 
 
p. 152-153. ‘Una nueva forma de convivencia ciudadana, en diversidad y armonía 
con la naturaleza, para alcanzar el buen vivir, el sumak kawsay.  Una sociedad que 
respeta, en todas sus dimensiones, la dignidad de las personas y las colectividades; 
un país democrático comprometido con la integración Latinoamericana –sueño de 
Bolívar y Alfaro-, la paz y solidaridad con todos los pueblos de la tierra’. 
(Constitución de la República del Ecuador, 2008. Preámbulo).  
 
p. 154. ‘…Que coincidencia, debo decirlo, los elementos que nosotros, que guiaron 
en definitiva, la cosntrucción de una Constitución libre en Ecuador, tiene mucho que 
ver con los elementos que sustancian los pueblos de América Latina, signatarios de 
este Tratado, los doce pueblos de más avanzada en nuestros países’ (Asamblea 
Nacional del Ecuador, Acta 040, página 115-116). 
 
p. 158. ‘…Nosostros hoy somos los actores de esos gobernos progresistas. 
Nosotros somos los artífices de este nuevo momento político y económico que no se 
somete al dogma ni a los organismos internacionales que prescriben la economía 
global. Nosotros hoy estamos marcando nuestra ruta regional y nacional…  …Pero 
la integración no solo es un cúmulo de proclamas y buenos deseos. ¡No! La 
integración del siglo XXI está marcado por la ruptura de los viejos modelos…  
…Ahorala integración tiene el propósito fundamental de fortalecer la 
insititucionalidad interna para fortalecer la institucionalidad externa’.  (Canciller 
Ricardo Patiño, 2012. Presentación de la Revista Línea Sur 2). 
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p. 160. ‘Ecuador tiene mucho que decir al respecto de este debate por su enorme 
constitución a una nueva epistemología del desarrollo, una concepción del buen vivir 
plasmada en nuestra constitución y en el plan nacional de desarrollo con la 
propuesta de una nueva propuesta financiera para América del Sur  y su 
consecuente política exterior que apuesta al multilateralismo y privilegia la 
integración latinoamericana y la diplomacia ciudadana para el desarrollo humano’ 
(Lorena Escudero, 2012. UNASUR y los derechos humanos. Cosntrucción de una 
Ciudadanía surmaeircana. Quito, 20 de junio de 2012). 
 
p. 160. ‘La constitución de 2008 se nutre de un dote social y de un espíritu 
integracionista y recupera para el estado funciones básicas en términos de 
soberanía y de interés nacional…’ (Carlos Larrea, 2012. Una Visión y Misión del 
Ecuador Vista a la UNASUR como un nuevo desafío en la Integración 
Suramericana. Quito 19  June 2012). 
 
p. 162. ‘4. La Paz y el ambiente de amistad y cooperación entre los doce países 
suramericanos son características que distinguen favorablemente a la región en el 
ámbito internacional. La superación definitiva de diferendos territoriales, según 
ejemplo del acuerdo de 1998 entre Ecuador y Perú, cosntituye una demostración 
reciente del espíritu que prevalece en América del Sur, que ha hecho y hará de esta 
parte del mundo un área de paz y cooperación...’ (IIRSA, 2008a. Comunicado de 
Brasilia). 
 
p. 167. ‘3. …la presencia de fuerzas militares extranjeras no puede, con sus medios 
y recursos vinculados a objetivos propios, amenazar la soberanía e integridad de 
cualquier nación suramericana y en consecuencia la paz y la seguridad en la región’ 
(UNASUR, 2009a. Reunión extraordinaria de Jefes y Jefas de Estado y de Gobierno 
de la UNASUR).  
 
 
Chapter 4. Case study Uruguay 
 
p. 180. ‘Nosotros entendemos que Uruguay tiene que ser un partícipe activo en el 
proceso de integración sudamericano… …Este espacio de integración que se 
pretende cosntruir a través de la UNASUR involucra determinados temas para los 
cuales hay y ha habido reuniones especializadas; nos referimos a cuetiones 
relativas a lo cultural, social y económico, y a las políticals sociales, de educación, 
energía, infraestructura y medio ambiente. Según se establece, el Tratado apunta a 
generar los espacios de diálogo, y el intercambio de información con el fin de lograr 
la inclusión social y la participación ciudadana, fortalecer la democracia y reducir las 
asimetrías’ (Acta de Sesión de la Comissión de Asuntos Internacionales, Sesión del 
día 4 de noviembre de 2010. Ministro Luis Almagro, página 3). 
 
181. ‘No voy a acampañar esta iniciativa porque este es el octavo o noveno intento 
integracionista; todos han ido langediciendo lentamente, inclusive el MERCOSUR…’ 
(Acta de 54 Sesión Extraordinaria de la Cámara de Representantes, Sesión del día 
25 de noviembre de 2010. Diputado Vázquez, página 122). 
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p.201. ‘La construcción de un nuevo modelo de integración no puede estar basada 
únicamente en las relaciones comerciales, sobre todo cuando es bien sabido que la 
región admite regímenes distintos: Mercosur, CAN, CARICOM y Chile. Con miras a 
la cosntrucción de una integración equilibrada y la cosnolidación de una Agenda de 
Integración Social y Productiva, los países de América del Sur, dando énfasis en la 
convergencia comercial, deben buscar una articulación económica y productiva más 
amplia, así como formas de cooperación política, social y cultural…’   (IIRSA, 2006a, 
Documento final de la Comisión Estratégica de Reflexión). 
 
p. 203. ‘…cada uno de nosotros tiene algo para aportar …por.. .. cada uno de los 
países lo tiene algo para aportar a la UNASUR. …. En temas de salud por 
ejemplo…. Atintabaquismo…’ (Entrevista personal con el Canciller Luis Almagro en 
Motevideo, Universidad de la República, 29 de abril de 2012). 
 
p. 205. ‘…Hemos deicido priorizar América del Sur para que esta pueda darse una 
representación continental que sin compromenter la soberanía de cada uno de los 
países le pueda decir al mundo aquí estamos, somos, luchamos por intereses que 
son en común’ (Discurso del Presidente Mujica, 2010. Elección del Primer 
Secreatrio de UNASUR). 
 
p. 206. ‘Este proceso… pretende la integración de los países sudamericanos y 
establece determinados objetivos que son claramente fijados en su Tratado 
Constitutivo, que es la cuestión central que debemos analizar. Dentro de estos 
objetivos está la promoción del diálogo político…, el impulso a las políticas sociales, 
el tratamiento de los temas de educación…, los asuntos relativos al medio ambiente, 
preservación de la democracia, la promoción de la inclusión social, el intento de 
reducir las asimetrías, los temas de energía e infraestructura, todos temas que 
cosnideramos importantes para el Uruguay…’ (Acta de 59 Sesión Extraordinaria de 
la Cámara del Senado, Sesión del día 30 de noviembre de 2010. Senador Da Rosa, 
página 52). 
 
p. 207. ‘Artículo 6°.- En los tratados internacionales que celebre la República 
propenderá la cláusula de que todos las diferencias que surjan entre las partes, 
serán decididas… La República procurará la integración social y económica de los 
estados Latinoamericanos, especialmente en lo que se refiere a la defensa común 
de sus productos y materias primas. Asimismo, propenderá la efectiva 
complementación de sus servicios públicos.’ (Constitución de la República del 
Uruguay, 2004. Artculo 6). 
 
p. 209. ‘…Los actos normativos emanados de los órganos de la UNASUR, serán 
obligatorios para los Estados Miembros una vez que hayan sido incorporados en el 
ordenamiento jurídico de cada uno de ellos, de acuerdo a sus respectivos 
procedimientos internos…’ (UNASUR, 2008. Tratado Cosntitutivo de UNASUR, 
Artículo 12). 
 
 
p. 225. ‘…Artigo 4. O Conselho de Defensa Sul-Americano tem os siguintes 
objetivos gerais: ‘a) Consolidar o América do Sul como uma zona de paz, base para 
la estabilidade democrática e o desenvolvimento integral de nossos povos, e como 
contribuição à paz mundial. b) Construir uma identidade sul-americana em matéria 
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de defensa, que leve em conta as características sub-regionais e nacionais e que 
contribua para o fortalecimento da unidade da América Latina e do Caribe. c) Gerar 
cosnsensos para fortalecer la cooperação regional em matéria de defensa’ 
(UNASUR, 2008a. Declaração do Conselho de Chefas e Chefes de Estado e de 
Governo. Costa do Sauipé, Bahía, 16 de Dezembro de 2008). 
 
p. 228. ‘Creo que para logremos esa tierra de paz, esa tierra de salud, democrática, 
soberana que lucha contra distintas patologías, precisamente tiene que luchar muy 
duro y muy fuerte para eleiminar las patologías que estamos padeciendo… … Para 
tener una tierra de paz, el Uruguay también piensa que la solución de las 
controversias que tenemos deben ser resueltas por la via pacífica, por la vía del 
análisis, discusión, del respeto… …Por eso desde el inicio Uruguay rechazó 
abiertamente y rechazamos hoy las instalaciones de bases militares extranjeras 
británicas en las Islas Malvinas argentinas…’ (Presidente Vázquez, 2009. Discurso 
del Presidente Vázquez en Bariloche, Argentina, Agosto 2009). 
 
p. 229. ‘Pero en cuanto a los golpes de Estado en la región, la ideologización que 
me parece grave es que solo los gobiernos de izquierda parecen ser afectados por 
esas rupturas institucionales…’ (Ministro Almagro, 2012a. Comparecencia ante el 
Senado de la República). 
 
b. Information summarised from the case analysis for a comparative purpose 
  
Themes 
 
National politics   Exterior influences Others 
Case 
study 
   
ECUADOR  
 Demands for social 
inclusion & unrests: 
 
 Political instability: 
 Volatility of political 
clout: 
 Respect for 
democratic 
institutions: 
 Foreign Policy and 
Long term planning: 
 Economic 
dependency: 
 Issues affecting the 
National Security: 
 
 
 International insecurity: 
 
 Economic dependency: 
 
 Geopolitical influences: 
 
URUGUAY  Demands for social 
inclusion&  unrests:  
 International insecurity: 
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 Political instability: 
 Volatility of political 
clout: 
 Respect for 
democratic 
institutions: 
 Foreign Policy and 
Long term planning: 
 Economic 
dependency: 
 Issues Affecting the 
National Security 
 Economic dependency: 
 
 Geopolitical influences: 
 
Themes 
 
Kind of cooperation Identity as reason Others 
Case 
study 
   
ECUADOR Satisfaction with CAN: 
 
Satisfaction with the FTAA 
project: 
Institutionalised norms: 
Shared identitatarian features: 
Shared values and beliefs: 
 
URUGUAY Satisfaction with MERCOSUR: 
 
Satisfaction with the FTAA 
project: 
Institutionalised norms: 
Shared identitatarian features: 
Shared values and beliefs: 
ALADI:  
 
Themes 
 
Ideology of Governments Roles and ability to cooperate Others 
Case 
study 
   
ECUADOR  National leader: 
 Governing party: 
 Regional tendency: 
President Pro Tempore: 
 
Depositary of Instruments of 
UNASUR: 
 
Founder & Member 
Host of the 
General 
Secretariat: 
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URUGUAY  National leader: 
 Governing party: 
 Regional tendency: 
President Pro Tempore: 
 
Depositary of Instruments of 
UNASUR: Uruguay no ha 
obtenido ninguna de estas 
funciones o roles típicos como 
la secreataría o como 
depositario de los instrumento 
legales 
 
Founder & Member: 
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